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Rational Patient Apathy
Barbara A. Noah* & René Reich-Graefe**
Patients with serious or life-threatening illness are frequently asked to
make complex, high-stakes medical decisions. The impact of anxiety, low
health literacy, asymmetric information and inadequate communication
between patients and health care providers, family pressures, rational
apathy by health care providers, cognitive biases of both patients and health
care providers, and other factors make it quite difficult for patients in these
circumstances to process and comprehend the strategic uncertainty and
resultant risks and benefits of, and alternatives to, whatever therapeutic or
life-prolonging treatment physicians are offering. All of these factors render
the classic goal of “informed consent” unachievable in all but the rarest of
circumstances: The effort to discuss and evaluate strategic uncertainty, its
rational reduction into risks and benefits, and alternatives of treatment for
purposes of optimizing decisional outcomes will have genuine intrinsic value
only for ultra-rational patients (and physicians).
In addition to these alterable barriers to rational decision-making—
i.e., barriers that can, in theory, be overcome by ultra-rational patients and
physicians with sufficient time and persistent inquiry—there is a second
decision-making realm in which the added complexities of bounded
rationality, clinical uncertainty and, in particular, of overall Knightian
uncertainty provide insurmountable, unalterable barriers to confident
rational decision-making. Within this more fundamental human realm of
irreducible uncertainty, even ultra-rational, good-Bayesian decision-makers
can never confidently calculate a highest-utility treatment option. In order
to better describe this secondary realm of unalterable barriers to rational
patient choice, including its usually subversive effect on end-of-life
decisional behavior, by both average, minimally-rational patients and ultrarational patients, we coin the terms “rational patient apathy” and, relatedly,
“rational patient ignorance.”
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Given that confronting the absolute uncertainty inherent in facing one’s
mortality is cognitively, psychologically and emotionally daunting, and thus
largely left unexplored and unpracticed by most patients for most of their
healthier decisional lives, rational patient apathy at the sudden onset of a
serious or life-threatening illness overwhelmingly defaults to negative
decision-making: an affirmative choice to not make any balanced decision
on the merits but rather to remain rationally ignorant of some or all aspects
of the choice situation. In the context of this persistent patient avoidance of
substantive decision-making, empirical evidence demonstrates frequent
reversion to a quantity-over-quality approach, allowing health care
providers to “do everything” until continued medical intervention reaches
the point of obvious medical or economic futility. As a result—and as a
largely discounted trade-off of choosing to avoid decisional burdens through
non-careful consideration or no consideration at all—the overwhelming
result of rational patient apathy in end-of-life decision-making is an
irrational calculation and decision unto itself. Not only does rational patient
apathy negate the classic (and utopian) goal of informed consent, it also
exerts tremendous costs—on patients, on loved ones, on health care
providers and on society at-large—in terms of adverse effects, avoidable
suffering, constantly recurring decisional commitment costs, and the wasting
of scarce economic resources.
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[I]gnorance more frequently begets confidence than does
knowledge.—Charles Darwin1
Ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat.—Tullius Cicero2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Patients with serious or life-threatening illness are frequently asked to
make complex, high stakes medical decisions. The impact of anxiety, low
health literacy, asymmetric information and inadequate communication
between patients and health care providers, family pressures, rational apathy
by health care providers, cognitive biases of both patients and health care
providers, and related factors weighs heavily on seriously ill patients. These
factors make it quite difficult for patients to process and comprehend the
strategic uncertainty and resultant risks and benefits of, and alternatives to,
whatever therapeutic or life-prolonging treatment physicians are offering.
All of these factors render the classic goal of “informed consent”
unachievable in all but the rarest of circumstances. In previous articles,3 one
of the authors described contextual barriers to fully-informed medical
decision-making and, in spite of these barriers, urged physicians and patients
to attempt to make the “best” end-of-life decisions possible. This article
explains why, for terminally ill patients, it can never be known, ex post,
whether or not the “best” was achieved. Similarly, for purposes of informed
decision-making, it also can never be known, ex ante, whether the “best” is
even rationally achievable.
People avoid acknowledging mortality in general or making and
documenting decisions in advance about health care preferences prior to
diagnosis with terminal illness.4 Rates of advance directive completion
remain low.5 Once faced with a life-threatening diagnosis, however, many
1

1 CHARLES C. DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN, AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 3

(1871).
2 He himself thinks he knows one thing, that he knows nothing. M. TULLIUS CICERO,
ACADEMICORUM RELIQUIAE CUM LUCULLO, Book I, §16 (O. Plasberg, ed., Leipzig, Teubner
1922).
3 See Barbara A. Noah & Neal R. Feigenson, Avoiding Overtreatment at the End of Life:
Physician-Patient Communication and Truly Informed Consent, 36 PACE L. REV. 736, 737–
800 (2016); Barbara A. Noah, The (Ir)rationality of (Un)informed Consent, 34 QUINNIPIAC L.
REV. 691 (2016).
4 See generally Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in Preparing for Death,
21 ELDER L.J. 1 (2013).
5 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT:
PROVIDERS OFFER INFORMATION ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 2
(1995) (concluding that “advance directives have been advocated more than they have been
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patients seek to exert substantial control over their treatment in order to make
the “best” medical decisions under the circumstances. Given that
confronting the absolute uncertainty inherent in facing one’s mortality is
cognitively, psychologically and emotionally daunting,6 and thus largely
avoided by most patients for most of their healthier decisional lives, rational
patient apathy7 at the sudden onset8 of a serious or life-threatening illness
overwhelmingly defaults to negative decision-making: an affirmative choice
to not make any balanced decision on the merits but rather to remain
rationally ignorant of some or all aspects of the choice situation.
In the context of this persistent patient avoidance of substantive
decision-making, empirical evidence demonstrates frequent reversion to a
quantity-over-quality approach, allowing health care providers to “do
everything”9 until the continued medical treatment reaches the point of
obvious medical or economic futility. As a result—and as a largely
discounted trade-off of choosing to avoid decisional burdens through noncareful consideration (or no consideration at all)—the overwhelming result
of rational patient apathy in end-of-life decision-making is an irrational
calculation and decision unto itself. Not only does rational patient apathy
negate the classic (and utopian) goal of informed consent, it also exerts
tremendous costs—on patients, on loved ones, on health care providers and
used” and that “in general, only 10 to 25 percent of Americans have documented their endof-life choices or appointed a health care agent”); Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider,
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 32, 36 (2004) (noting that
less than 20% of Americans have living wills and that studies also suggest that living wills
rarely influence the level of medical care—in fact at least a quarter of patients with living
wills receive care that is inconsistent with their instructions). The most recent data suggest a
slight uptick in the percentage of Americans who have completed advance directives. See
Jaya K. Rao et al., Completion of Advance Directives Among U.S. Consumers, 46 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 65, 65–67 (2014) (finding, based on survey data from 2009-2010, that
26.3% of respondents had completed an advance directive and that older age, higher income,
and higher educational attainment were correlated with a higher likelihood of having an
advance directive).
6 Cf. SHELDON SOLOMON ET AL., THE WORM AT THE CORE: ON THE ROLE OF DEATH IN
LIFE 23 (2015) (“By around age three, the grim handmaiden of self-consciousness—death
awareness—begins to make her appearance.”).
7 For a global definition of rational apathy, see infra notes 215-227 and accompanying
text. For a phenomenological explanation of rational patient apathy, see infra Part III.C.
8 The piercing awareness and urgency of mortality delivered by such sudden onset was
once laconically described by Christopher Hitchens as follows: “In whatever kind of a ‘race’
life may be, I have very abruptly become a finalist.” CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, MORTALITY 4
(2012).
9 Logically, it is impossible to “do everything” as a single human being locked in a
linear space-time continuum. In general, once one starts to do something (as one always does
as a living being), one is no longer doing everything (else)—indeed, one is excluding oneself
from doing everything (else) in every course of action. The notion of “doing everything”
would also have to include the choice of “doing nothing”—which is teleologically impossible
since, as a living being, one is still doing something when the professed purpose of one’s
chosen (in)action is to “do nothing.”
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on society at-large—in terms of adverse health effects, avoidable suffering,
constantly recurring decisional commitment costs, and the utilization of
scarce economic resources.
A. Uninformed Over-Provision of Medical Care
Although the challenges to rational decision-making that we discuss
within this article are not specific to the United States, the importance of
recognizing these challenges and how they limit good decision-making are
particularly important in this country. For purposes of this paper, there are
two contexts in which to consider the factors driving utilization of care: first,
in the case of medical decisions regarding treatment of life-threatening
illness and, second, in the case of medical decisions regarding end-of-life
care when a patient is no longer likely to recover. In this first context, it is
difficult to quantify or describe whether and when patients are receiving “too
much” therapeutic or life-prolonging care for life-threatening illnesses, but
various studies of cancer care in particular suggest that patients often
continue with second- and third-line therapies and unproven experimental
therapies that are unlikely to improve quality of life or significantly prolong
life.10 Second, it is well-documented that patients in the United States
receive high amounts of intensive and invasive care at the end of life,
compared with patients in some other countries.11
At the same time, there is evidence that suggests that this comparatively
high level of end-of-life care is frequently delivered without much
meaningful reflection, let alone truly informed consent, on the part of
patients. Physicians acknowledge that they are providing unnecessary
medical care for a variety of reasons, including fear of malpractice litigation,
10 See, e.g., A. Saito et al., The Effect on Survival of Continuing Chemotherapy to Near
Death, BMC PALLIATIVE CARE (Sept. 21, 2011), https://bmcpalliatcare.biomedcentral.com
/articles/10.1186/1472-684X-10-14 (concluding that, in the case of patients with small cell
lung cancer, chemotherapy was associated with two months additional survival time but that
there was no additional survival benefit from continuing chemotherapy within fourteen days
of death and that patients receiving chemotherapy at the end of life were significantly less
likely to utilize hospice care); Holly G. Prigerson et al., Chemotherapy Use, Performance
Status, and Quality of Life at the End of Life, 1 JAMA ONCOLOGY 778, 778–84 (2015)
(evaluating the effect of chemotherapy on patients with end-stage cancer and varying
functional statuses and concluding that chemotherapy did not improve quality of life near
death for patients with moderate and poor performance status and actually worsened quality
of life near death for patients with good performance status); cf. Martin R. Stockler et al.,
Chemotherapy for Advanced Breast Cancer – How Long Should It Continue?, 81 BREAST
CANCER RES. & TREATMENT S49, S49–S52 (Supp. 2003) (describing the life-extending
benefits of chemotherapy for advanced, terminal breast cancer and the debate over whether
to provide this therapy when it achieves modest life extension coupled with significant sideeffects).
11 See David Line, 2015 Quality of Death Index, ECONOMIST (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/healthcare/2015-quality-death-index.
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Medicare’s fee-for-service reimbursement mechanism, patient and family
requests for care, difficulty accessing medical records, a culture of denial of
mortality, and a physician culture of viewing death of a patient as a
professional failure.12 Recent data suggest that more than one-fifth of all
medical care provided is unnecessary.13 The challenge in this environment
is to identify those situations in which over-provision of care is likely
occurring and to respond with treatment that is both clinically appropriate
and consistent with the patient’s wishes. Given that every patient is unique
and that baseline end-of-life preferences vary significantly, any decisionmaking about treatment options in the face of serious illness or imminent
death must, by definition, constitute a complex, high opportunity-cost
process.
Patients say that they wish for a “good death,” but this abstract concept
means different things to different people. Even so, most people’s idea of a
“good death” have some elements in common, such as avoiding unnecessary
physical suffering.14 And most patients also state that they would prefer to
die in the comfort of their home,15 yet only about 30% of patients actually

12 See Heather Lyu et al., Overtreatment in the United States, PLOS ONE (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0181970.
13 In a recent study that attempts to measure physicians’ perceptions of when they are
delivering “futile” care to their patients, the data suggested that approximately 20% of patients
in five critical care units were receiving futile or “probably futile” treatment. See Thanh N.
Huynh et al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be Futile in Critical Care,
173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1887, fig. 1 (2013). The survey instrument defined five situations
in which treatment might be considered futile or medically inappropriate: burdens grossly
outweigh benefits; patient will never survive outside an ICU; patient is permanently
unconscious; treatment cannot achieve the patient’s goals; death is imminent. See id. at 1888;
see also Robert D. Truog & Douglas B. White, Futile Treatments in Intensive Care Units,
173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1894 (2013) (critiquing the study design, arguing that legal
complexities make it difficult for physicians to say “no” to futile treatment requests, and
pleading for better communication and a conflict resolution process to address these
situations).
14 For a review of the research on the multiple dimensions that influence perceived
quality of dying and death, see Sarah Hales et al., The Quality of Dying and Death, 168
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 912, 912–18 (2008) (identifying several commonly identified
qualities that a “good death” requires, such as freedom from pain and suffering, circumstances
of death (home versus hospital), and cultural variables in different studied countries such as
maintaining independence, control, self-determination, and entrusting decisions to others).
Id. at 913. For an excellent overview of the idea of a good death and of the emotional issues
surrounding death and dying, see SHERWIN B. NULAND, HOW WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE’S
FINAL CHAPTER (Vintage Books 1995).
15 See GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., SPIRITUAL BELIEFS AND THE DYING PROCESS: A REPORT
ON A NATIONAL SURVEY (1997) (reporting results of a survey of U.S. residents commissioned
by the Nathan Cummings Foundation and Fetzer Institute); I.J. Higginson & G.J. Sen-Gupta,
Place of Care in Advanced Cancer: A Qualitative Systematic Literature Review of Patient
Preferences, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 287, 287–300 (2000) (finding that despite the fact that the
majority of patients in England suffering from serious illnesses wish to die at home, most die
in either hospital or a long-term care facility).
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do so.16 Instead, large amounts of hospital-based health care resources are
routinely utilized at the end of life,17 often with little or no measurable benefit
to the physical well-being of dying patients. As a result, many patients
receive aggressive interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
ventilator support, or intensive care unit (ICU) care, and bear the inevitable
physical suffering that comes with such interventions, even when death is
imminent.18
Recent data suggest that the overutilization problem continues
unabated. In the context of terminal illness, many people believe that more
therapeutic care (including tests, procedures and drug therapies) leads to

16 See Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare Beneficiaries: Site
of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 JAMA
470 (2013) (concluding that, although only 24.6% of patients died in hospital in 2009
compared with 32.6% in 2000, percentages of deaths in long-term care facilities held steady
at around 27% and deaths at home rose from 30.7% in 2000 to 33.5% in 2009); see also Yafu
Zhao & William Encinosa, The Costs of End-of-Life Hospitalizations, 2007, HEALTHCARE
COSTS & UTILIZATION PROJECT (Nov. 2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53605
(describing data from 2007 indicating that one-third of Americans died in hospital); Jeanne
Lenzer, Unnecessary Care: Are Doctors in Denial and Is Profit Driven Healthcare to Blame?,
345 BRIT. MED. J. e6230 (2012) (referring to another estimate that 65% of deaths in the United
States occur in hospitals). Yet another study found that 45% of U.S. deaths occur in hospitals
and 22% in long term care facilities. See DIV. VITAL STATISTICS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS, DEATHS FROM 39 SELECTED CAUSES BY PLACE OF DEATH, STATUS OF DECEDENT
WHEN DEATH OCCURRED IN HOSPITAL OR MEDICAL CENTER, AND AGE: UNITED STATES, 19992005 (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality/gmwk307.htm.
17 Empirical research documents that approximately one-third of medical expenses for
the last year of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and technologies
in that final month account for nearly 80% of these costs. See Baohui Zhang et al., Health
Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: Associations with End-of-Life Conversations, 169
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 480, 482–84 (2009). Moreover, 30% of Medicare dollars spent go
to care for the 5% of Medicare beneficiaries who die each year. See Amber E. Barnato et al.,
Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39
HEALTH SERV. RES. 363, 363–64 (2004); see also Teno et al., supra note 16, at 473 tbl. 2
(noting that, in 2009, 29.2% of patients who died had received care in an ICU in the previous
30 days); Donald M. Berwick & Andrew Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care,
307 JAMA 1513 (2012) (describing six categories of health care spending waste, including
overtreatment such as use of surgery when watchful waiting is better and unwanted intensive
care at the end of life and estimating that wasteful spending in the overtreatment category
accounts form between $158 billion and $226 billion in 2011).
18 See Amresh Hanchate et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-Life Costs: Why
Do Minorities Cost More than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 493, 497–98 (2009)
(surveying use of expensive end-of-life interventions among a large sample of Medicare
beneficiaries and finding patterns of substantial expenditure on life-sustaining treatment in
the final six months of life). One palliative care specialist describes the ICU as a place “where
a Wild West culture makes it a challenge for palliative care to get a foothold,” adding that it
is difficult “to slow a wild horse, particularly one that believes it can outrace death.” See
Jessica Nutik Zitter, They Call Me ‘Dr. Kevorkian,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/they-call-me-dr-kevorkian/ (adding that she
“believe[s] in letting the dying determine how and when they die, as opposed to coaxing their
organs at all costs”).
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longer life and improved physical well-being.19 Data concerning utilization
reflect this belief. Recent data indicate that, in 2009, 28.4% of patients
received hospice care for only three days or fewer before dying, an increase
from 22.2% nine years earlier. Moreover, 29.2% of Medicare beneficiaries
received care in an ICU during the final month of life compared with 24.3%
in the earlier period.20 This pattern of systematic overutilization of nonpalliative terminal care means that dying patients continue to receive costly
therapeutic care and life-prolonging treatment even when it is very likely that
the benefits in terms of enhanced quality of life, increased survival time, or
other measurable physical outcomes are limited or non-existent.21 Still, a
large majority of dying patients consistently elects to pursue therapeutic care
and supposedly life-prolonging treatment even though their marginal costs
equal or, when measured wholistically by the notion of a “good death,”
vastly exceed their marginal benefit.
As a related consequence, dying patients also tend to underutilize
hospice and palliative care.22 In 2015, the Economist Intelligence Unit
research team published its latest Quality of Death Index (QDI) which ranks
access to palliative care across the world. While the United Kingdom, “due
to comprehensive national policies, the extensive integration of palliative
care into [its universal, nationalized health care delivery system], a strong
hospice movement, and deep community engagement on the issue,”23

19 See Sean Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a High-Tech Era, 364
NEW ENG. J. MED. e21 (2011), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1101392?ssour
ce’hcrc.pdf (commenting on the mistaken belief that “‘doing everything’ is the best practice
and the way to prevent harm”).
20 See Teno et al., supra note 16, at 471–73, tbl. 2 (also finding that 11.5% of patients
had been hospitalized three or more times in the three months before death, up from 10.3% in
the previous studied period).
21 See R. Sean Morrison et al., When Too Much Is Too Little, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1755, 1755–56 (1996) (describing a case of aggressive treatment of an elderly patient with
advanced, terminal disease despite his repeated requests that he receive no further treatment
and observing that such over-provision interferes with quality of life for these patients with
little offsetting benefit).
22 See Teno et al., supra note 16, at 474 (noting that, although the use of hospice services
has increased during the early 2000s, only 42.2% of Medicare beneficiaries with dementia
and 59.5% of Medicare beneficiaries with cancer received hospice services at the time of
death); Corita Grudzen & Deborah Grady, Improving Care at the End of Life, 171 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1202, 1202–04 (2011) (discussing over-use of therapeutic interventions at the
end of life and advocating that better quality care often requires emphasizing palliative
measures and avoiding unavailing therapies that risk unnecessary suffering and iatrogenic
harm); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Discussions with Physicians About Hospice Among
Patients with Metastatic Lung Cancer, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 954, 955–56 (2009)
(finding that only half of patients with stage IV lung cancer had had any discussion with their
physicians about hospice in the two months prior to death). These patterns are even more
marked among racial and ethnic minorities in the United States. See generally Barbara A.
Noah, The Role of Race in End-of-Life Care, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 349 (2012).
23 See Line, supra note 11.
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repeated its first-place ranking from the first QDI in 2010, the United States
remained stuck in ninth place.24 Part of the explanation here lies in the fact
that the current U.S. health care delivery system creates an artificial
dichotomy, and resultant structural separation, between curative and
palliative care.25 Physicians who practice in the curative role tend to focus
on clinical problem solving, will continue to advocate for therapy even when
the prognosis is grim, and may often view death as a failure. Physicians who
practice in the palliative-care role focus on the patient as a whole person
rather than as a disease diagnosis and will view unnecessary suffering at the
end of life as a failure. Thus, the underutilization of palliative and hospice
care in this country represents a missed opportunity on a massive scale. A
growing body of evidence demonstrates that an emphasis on palliative care,26
in conjunction with carefully considered therapeutic care, can not only
improve patients’ quality of life wholistically but also provide a significant
comparative advantage in prolonging life over standard therapeutic
treatment.27
When patients receive inadequate palliative care coupled with possibly
inappropriate therapeutic care, they are more likely to experience avoidable
suffering and reduced quality of life, during their last months and weeks of
life. When, however, care for a seriously ill patient integrates curative goals
(for as long as they are clinically appropriate) with palliative measures, the
patient, and also her loved ones and her health care providers, are all better
off. One major challenge to arriving at a mindset where the patient and her
physician can discuss how to achieve this sort of balance between care and
cure lies in the various obstacles to understanding the clinical picture with
24 The QDI rankings are based on scores derived from twenty quantitative and qualitative
indicators across five categories, which include palliative and healthcare environment, human
resources, affordability of care, quality of care, and community engagement. Id.
25 See Kathy Cerminara & Barbara A. Noah, Removing Obstacles to a Peaceful Death,
25 ELDER L.J. 101 (2018) (describing this artificial dichotomy, reasons for its perpetuation,
and suggesting approaches to integrating palliative care more routinely with therapeutic care
and smoothing the transition to hospice).
26 Palliative care refers to medical care intended to alleviate symptoms associated with
illness, whatever the patient’s prognosis and may address pain, shortness of breath, insomnia,
depression, nausea and lack of appetite, among other symptoms. See Lise M. Stevens,
Palliative Care, 296 JAMA 1428 (2006). Palliative care is often appropriate even while the
patient is receiving therapeutic care; the two are not mutually exclusive. Once therapeutic
care is discontinued, palliative care continues in order to manage symptoms.
27 See Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with Metastatic NonSmall-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 736–38 (2010) (finding that patients
recently diagnosed with lung cancer who began receiving palliative care immediately lived
an average of three months longer than patients who received standard therapeutic treatment
only); Matthijs Kox & Peter Pickkers, “Less Is More” in Critically Ill Patients Not Too
Intensive, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1369 (2013) (concluding, based on a meta-analysis of
multiple clinical trials, that many common treatments for critically ill patients pose a high risk
of iatrogenic harm compared with their potential benefit and ought to be used more
cautiously); see also Cerminara & Noah, supra note 25.
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all of its variables and unanswerable questions. The first step to achieving
some understanding is for the patient and her physician to acknowledge the
possibility of death from the disease, including a realistic assessment of
prognosis.
B. Clinical Scenario
In order to ground the abstract concepts and theories of medical
decision-making and informed consent that follow, we use the following
hypothetical clinical scenario to illustrate what roles clinical uncertainty,
bounded rationality, heuristic biases and, most importantly, Knightian
uncertainty play in the interactions between a physician and her seriously-ill
patient:
June Morton is a forty-six-year-old woman who recently
visited her gynecologist for a routine annual exam. The
gynecologist discovered that one of June’s ovaries was noticeably
enlarged and referred her to an oncologist. An MRI of June’s
chest and abdomen reveals masses on the ovary, and in the liver
and lungs. Biopsy has confirmed that the mass on the ovary is
malignant and, as a result of these tests, June has been diagnosed
with Stage IV invasive epithelial ovarian cancer. June is shocked
by the diagnosis, particularly because at the moment she is
experiencing no major symptoms.
The oncologist, Dr. Mary Savoy, knows that, even with
aggressive, multi-modal treatment, it is estimated that June has
statistically only a 17% chance of surviving for five years. Rather
than frighten her patient, the doctor tells June that the disease is
“very serious, potentially life-threatening,” and that it is
important to begin treatment immediately. Dr. Savoy and the
treatment team recommend that June immediately undergo
cytoreductive surgery in which surgeons attempt to remove as
much of the cancer as possible. This surgery reduces the
remaining cancer cells present that must be addressed with
chemotherapy. When June asks what the surgery entails, she is
also told the purpose of the surgery and that she can expect to
spend about seven days in the hospital and can expect recovery to
take approximately four to six weeks, depending on how much
tissue must be removed from her abdomen. Dr. Savoy also
explains to June that cytoreductive surgery may involve removal
of both ovaries, the uterus, and parts of the colon, bladder, gall
bladder, and other affected organs.
June is also told that, given her young age and otherwise
good health, she should consider intraperitoneal chemotherapy in
which chemotherapeutic drugs are introduced into the abdomen
directly during surgery in order to “bathe” cancer cells directly
in the drugs and kill more cells.
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The oncologist, Dr. Savoy, explains that, once the
cytoreductive therapy is completed (with or without
intraperitoneal chemotherapy), there are multiple post-surgery
treatment options available. In addition to describing standard
chemotherapy, she discusses with June the option of “dose dense”
chemotherapy, in which multiple chemotherapeutic agents are
delivered simultaneously to the patient at the highest doses that
the patient can tolerate, in order to kill as many cancer cells as
possible and to prevent the cancer cells from becoming resistant
to the drugs. She also tells June about some promising clinical
trials of new chemotherapeutic agents, and about standard and
experimental targeted therapy and immunotherapy. Finally, Dr.
Savoy points out to June that every patient is unique and that
survival rates and other prognostic factors are only averages
which vary according to the patient’s age and overall health.
June is divorced with two children, a sixteen-year-old
daughter who is a junior in high school and a twenty-one-yearold son who is in his third year of university. She hopes for a cure
and would at a minimum like to survive long enough to see them
both graduate from high school and college respectively. June
herself has an associate’s degree and works as a bookkeeper. She
purchases her insurance as an individual through the insurance
market in her state and receives a premium subsidy under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) because her
income is relatively low.
II.

RATIONAL HUMAN DECISION-MAKING AND CARE FOR LIFETHREATENING ILLNESS

The rationality of all human decision-making, including June’s choice
of any highest-utility treatment course of action for her cancer,28 is severely
limited under all circumstances. Even if June were an ultra-rational29
28

The juxtaposition may perhaps be subtle but is certainly intended. See Mark
Schlesinger, Choice Cuts: Parsing Policymakers’ Pursuit of Patient Empowerment From an
Individual Perspective, 5 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 365, 365 (2010) (“Some terms come
redolent with positive associations. This is no less true in the policy lexicon of democracy
(freedom, responsiveness, leadership and voting) than in everyday English (hope, friend,
kindness and chocolate). ‘Choice’ makes both lists.”) (internal citation omitted); cf. Mary
Frances Luce, Decision Making As Coping, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S23, S23 (Supp. 2005)
(“[F]ew words rival cancer for pure emotional impact, and decisions regarding cancer control
are likely among the most threatening decisions that many individuals will ever make.”).
29 As used throughout this Article, being “ultra-rational” means that decisional agents
(think Star Trek’s half-human, half-Vulcan Mr. Spock, first officer on the “USS Enterprise”
or, alternatively, the “rational investors” in modern financial portfolio theory) will form only
rational expectations; they are always in possession of all relevant information that, under the
circumstances, can be available to them; they are aware that information asymmetries may,
and that bounded rationality and opportunism inevitably do, apply to and constrain their
decision-making (thus, they do not have the perfect omniscience and foresight of
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decisional agent, she could never make a perfectly rational decision. In order
to explain and model why that is the case—why there are always several,
insurmountable rational limitations applicable to all human decision-making
regarding an ineluctably uncertain and scarce future—it is useful to carefully
distinguish among three different realms of rational utility calculation and
resultant models of rational decision-making:30 (i) the perfect calculation of
choice in a “Coasean world,”31 (ii) the transaction-cost efficient calculation
of choice under conditions of bounded rationality and opportunism in a
“Williamsonian world,”32 and (iii) the non-Bayesian updating of beliefs in
an uncertain “Knightian world”33 of constantly new information which
triggers the perpetual, imperfect revision of homogenized past experience in
order to achieve predictive utility. Only the third, Knightian realm is “real”
within the concrete world of human existence, learning, and decisionmaking.
The Coasean and Williamsonian realms are purposely
oversimplified, rational utility-maximization utopias of varying degree.

hyperrational decisional agents in traditional price theory, see infra note 38); they “coldly,”
“detachedly” and “formally” evaluate the entire, subjectively knowable choice situation by
competently calculating and comparing the expected future performance of each available
choice/transaction; and, in doing so, they are able to bypass any and all cognitive and
psychological “shortcomings” (heuristics, emotions, empathy, etc.) that would otherwise
render their decision-making and self-interested utility maximization processes and outcomes
suboptimal. See, e.g., James R. Hackney, Jr., The Enlightenment and the Financial Crisis of
2008: An Intellectual History of Corporate Finance Theory, 54 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1257,
1260 (2010). See generally Amitai Etzioni, Guidance Rules and Rational Decision Making,
66 SOC. SCI. Q. 753 (1985). See also Vanessa Houlder, Richard Thaler’s Advice: Be a Lazy
Investor—Buy and Forget, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2017 (“[Humans] are far from being the ultrarational machines assumed by traditional economic theory. Instead, they are error-prone,
blinded by prejudices and fond of mental short cuts that lead them astray.”); Paul Slovic et
al., Affect, Risk, and Decision Making, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S35, S39 (Supp. 2005) (“One
cannot assume that an intelligent person can understand the meaning of and properly act on
even the simplest of numbers, not to mention more esoteric measures or statistics pertaining
to risk, unless these numbers are infused with affect.”); Peter A. Ubel, Beyond Costs and
Benefits: Understanding How Patients Make Health Care Decisions, 15 ONCOLOGIST 5, 7
(Supp. 2010) (“[R]isk information is rarely received dispassionately, but is usually processed
by people in affective and intuitive ways, too. Risks create feelings.”).
30 See infra Figure 1.
31 See, e.g., Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 796 (2006).
32 See, e.g., René Reich-Graefe, Calculative Trust: Oxymoron or Tautology?, 4 J. TRUST
RES. 66, 68 (2014).
33 See, e.g., Tan Wang, Conditional Preferences and Updating, 108 J. ECON. THEORY
286, 291–92 (2003). See generally Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Risk, Uncertainty,
and Heuristics, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1671 (2014).
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rationality realm

Figure 1
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A. The Coasean World
In this first, flawlessly utopian realm of neoclassical utility theory, the
main prerequisite for the prediction and achievement of perfect competition
and, accordingly, perfectly rational decision-making is a colossal
simplification of the otherwise imperfect reality of human cooperation.
Here, perfectly rational, overtly self-interested, and omniscient actors,
unrestricted by bounded rationality,34 with access to complete and perfectly
available information, and with perfectly stable tastes and preferences, can
account for every stochastic variable and, hence, can rationally calculate
everything. These Coasean actors calculate choice using well-defined
mathematical, wealth-maximizing utility functions, without regard to
34 See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99
(1955); see also Renée A. Stiles & Stephanie A. So, Impact of Transaction Costs on
Healthcare Outcomes, 3 EXPERT REV. PHARMACOECON. & OUTCOMES RES. 283, 285 (2003).
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Knightian uncertainty, transaction costs, or resource scarcity, and within a
calculative environment that also provides for perfectly neutral governments
and perfectly specified and costlessly enforced property rights.35 In other
words, in this Coasean world of zero transaction costs and total prescience,
everything is always certain. Nothing is ever scarce. Indeed, genuine
decision-making—in terms of “exercising discretion, generating and
evaluating proposals and, finally, ratifying an informed choice from among
a multiplicity of viable best-interest options”36—does not occur in such a
perfect realm.37 Where hyperrational38 actors with perfect foresight can
35 See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197 (1921) (“Chief
among the simplifications of reality prerequisite to the achievement of perfect competition
is . . . the assumption of practical omniscience on the part of every member of the competitive
system.”); Douglass C. North, Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, 16
J. ECON. LIT. 963, 964 (1978) (summarizing the assumptions underlying neoclassical
economic theory as “(1) perfectly competitive markets, (2) perfectly specified and costlessly
enforced property rights, (3) neutral government, and (4) unchanging tastes”).
36 Reich-Graefe, supra note 32; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301, 303 (1983).
37 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 159, 161 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G.
Winter eds., 1993) (“The only management task that seems to remain, and which is the focus
of attention in the firm of traditional price theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing
quantities of outputs and inputs. But, since the required information for doing this is also
freely at hand, and the required calculations are costless to make, the model strips
management of any meaningful productivity in the performance of even these tasks. The cost
of maximizing is ignored or implicitly assumed to be zero. De facto, the resources that might
be required to make maximizing decisions are treated as if they are not scarce.”) (footnote
omitted).
38 Hyperrationality (also termed “super rationality” or “perfect rationality” in
neoclassical economics and game theory) describes decision-making by homo economicus,
i.e., by an economic agent who only engages with a homogenous group of other hyperrational
thinkers; who, like them, strictly pursues utility and profit maximization in all of her choices;
who, like them, is capable of solving highly complex mathematical coordination problems in
the blink of an eye; who, like them, can therefore predict the decisional behavior of all other
hyperrational agents (given that (i) everyone is following the same hyperrational decisional
rule (or strategy) when facing the same choice situation and (ii) everyone has internalized
their counterparties’ hyperrationality within their own hyperrational utility calculation); and
who, like them, can evaluate all possible choice options leading to all possible outcomes in
an instant and, accordingly, can confidently and correctly select the highest-utility/highestprofit personal course of action in every given choice situation. See Herbert A. Simon,
Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1978); see also Lee
Roy Beach & Raanan Lipshitz, Why Classical Decision Theory Is an Inappropriate Standard
for Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION:
MODELS AND METHODS 21, 21 (Gary A. Klein et al. eds., Ablex 1993) (pointing out that
“classical decision theory is an abstract system of propositions that is designed to describe the
choices of an ideal hypothetical decision maker—omniscient, computationally omnipotent
Economic Man”); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction
Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553 (1981). For critical accounts of hyperrationality, see,
for example, JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF
RATIONALITY 17 (1989) (defining hyperrationality as “the failure to recognize the failure of
rational-choice theory to yield unique prescriptions or predictions” and as the “irrational belief
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calculate everything, and time (at least, time for rational in-advance
calculation) is non-scarce, “there is no limitation on the computation of the
optimal transactional choice that will achieve the largest net-gain outcome
[so that] such computation always self-ratifies the final choice simply
through calculation, comparison and ranking.”39 Strictly speaking, any
decisional behavior beyond mere rational calculation—i.e., decision-making
that would evaluate, make utility judgments among, and prioritize, different
behavioral options in accordance with their expected future payoffs—would
be engaging in unreason and constitute perfect irrationality.
In this Coasean world, a perfectly omniscient and rationally clairvoyant
June would simply gather and process all relevant internal and external
information—past, present, and future— pertaining to her treatment options,
her personal preferences, and her overall life circumstances and calculatively
arrive at a highest-utility treatment or non-treatment decision. She would
then be able to costlessly implement this perfect choice—without any hitch
or requiring any post-decisional monitoring, interim assessment, or
subsequent revision of her choice. Since June would know everything about
the present and the future that would be necessary to know, she would know
(as fully-measured facts and completely accurate projections): (i) how long
she would have to live under each possible treatment or non-treatment
option, (ii) how much pain, disability, and physical and emotional distress
would accompany each of those options, (iii) how her overall life
circumstances would change in the future (for example, her sixteen-year-old
daughter might become pregnant in four months from June’s decision-point,
or June herself might die in a car accident before the end of the year), (iv)
what her exact future personal preferences and thresholds would be when
addressing treatment-related pain and suffering as well as under changing
life circumstances and, thus, (v) cumulatively, what her exact and perfect
balance point would be for purposes of choosing between the quality
(thriving) and the quantity (surviving) of her remaining lifetime.40
in the omnipotence of reason”); Steven Shulman, What’s So Rational About Rational
Expectations? Hyperrationality and the Logical Limits to Neoclassicism, 20 J. POST
KEYNESIAN ECON. 135 (1997).
39 Reich-Graefe, supra note 32.
40 To perhaps state the obvious, in a Coasean world “where infinity and eternity are
ignorant states of mind that can be overcome by rational, competent calculation,” ReichGraefe, supra note 32, June would never have arrived at this particular adaptive decisionmaking point (or, for that matter, any other decision-making point). Rather, at some behavioradapting point in the past, when she went through a perfectly rational calculation of her future,
she would have known that (i) she would develop Stage IV ovarian cancer under certain
circumstances (thus, no ovarian cancer would have ever been “discovered” during her recent
routine gynecological exam—indeed, any and all routine annual exams would have no
purpose whatsoever given that everything they could possibly “discover” would already be
known) and (ii) that something could be done about those circumstances in terms of
avoidance. In other words, June would have only arrived at her current medical diagnosis if
nothing could have been done about it in terms of avoidance behavior at any point in the past
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Even under those computational conditions, however, June would not
be able to ever make a “best,” i.e., highest-utility choice. Assuming that her
overall preference would be to return to her pre-diagnosis outlook of an
indeterminable-length survival for an average forty-six-year-old woman, i.e.,
to a statistically close-to-100% chance of surviving for five years (and
longer), June can never make a Coasean “best” choice that correlates with,
and achieves, her preference. She can never opt out of mortality and is
always forced—even in a modelled Coasean utopia—to pick the better bad
choice, namely, the most surviving coupled with the most thriving.
Accordingly, the insurmountability of death even under conditions of
Coasean utility calculation render the model per se useless for current
purposes because surviving and thriving are never endless, absolute states of
being. Logically, they are always time-limited. Otherwise, any and all
concepts of “quantity” and “quality” (and, similarly, of “life,” “survival” and
“death”) would be destroyed by infinity. Human life is only “real” life and
worth living because of the uncertainty of life and the certainty of death.41
There is no life without death and no death without living. As a mortal being,
June is spending her life, by neither choice nor consent but simple
(chrono)logical choice “architecture,”42 within a spatially and temporally
linear and scarce world.
Consequently, any “aspiring toward a consistent perfection”43 in a
Coasean world which would move beyond its utility in modeling rational
choice would be an “aspiring toward annihilation [and infinite]
nothingness.”44 “Perfection, we know, is finality; and finality is death.”45
Thus, any Coasean inquiry into real-life end-of-life decision-making must
return empty-handed to its very starting point. Coasean perfection, human
mortality and adaptive decision-making never go together. To “rigidly
confine[]” a predictive model of June’s rational decision-making behavior
within the “paradigm of neoclassical economic[]” choice theory will mean
and, therefore, would have resulted in a “better bad” outcome. If something was to be done,
June would have “chosen” and pursued this option a long while ago and her current diagnosis
and choice situation would have never evolved.
41 Cf. SAUL BELLOW, HUMBOLDT’S GIFT 265 (1975) (“Death is the dark backing that a
mirror needs if we are to see anything.”).
42 Lawrence Lessig introduced the term “architecture” to describe a particular grouping
of behavioral constraints (in addition to law, markets and social norms) as “the very basic
feasibility limitations imposed on resources (physical, technological, budgetary, etc.), in both
time and space, by the present circumstances and conditions under which decision-making
and resultant action may only take place.” René Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate
Governance: The Mechanics of Trusting, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 103, 132 (2013) (citing
Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 663–67 (1998)).
43 CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, LETTERS TO A YOUNG CONTRARIAN 19 (Basic Books 2001).
44 Id.
45 CYRIL NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW OR THE PURSUIT OF PROGRESS 85
(1958).
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that “large parts of [June’s] urgent reality are outside its comprehension.”46
As a result, the rational calculability of outcomes and modeling of choice
behavior in a Coasean world provides little or no assistance in navigating
June’s pressing decisional dilemmas.
B. The Williamsonian World
In order to better reflect the “urgent reality” of June’s life and decisionmaking in the face of omnipresent mortality—and, in general, to better adjust
rational choice models to the insurmountable non-perfection of human life
that requires cooperation and organization under inherent temporal and
spatial constraints—the second calculative realm, Williamsonian transaction
cost economics, attempts “to describe ‘man as he is, acting within the
constraints imposed by real institutions’”47 rather than in “caricature
terms.”48 In other words, the Williamsonian world endeavors to “find
substantive criteria [of rationality] broad enough to extend the concept of
rationality beyond the [Coasean world] boundaries of static organization
under certainty”49 and, in doing so, accepts two fundamental rational
limitations which can never be altered by ultra-rational actors: bounded
rationality and opportunism.50 Bounded rationality acknowledges the builtin cognitive limitations of the human mind to accumulate, filter and process
all decision-relevant information as a result of the imperfect search and
computational capacities of humans as well as the computational restrictions
provided by both scarce and asymmetric information.51 Opportunism
assumes that human agents are not “simpl[y] self-interest seeking [but] selfinterest seeking with guile,”52 so that, strategically, they may disguise or
otherwise keep undisclosed their personal preferences and commitments to
others in order to maximize their individual utility from cooperation.53
These two limitations for perfectly rational calculation, in turn, frame
the resulting twin dilemmas of adverse selection and moral hazard
applicable to all strategic decision-making and, thus, human cooperation.
Adverse selection refers to a choice situation where one party (namely, the
agent/fiduciary—for example, a physician), prior to a particular transaction
or commitment has more and better information available to assist with
46

George J. Stigler, The Conference Handbook, 85 J. POL. ECON. 441, 443 (1977).
Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 453, 458 (1993) (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 140 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 229, 231 (1984)).
48 Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 300
(1993).
49 Simon, supra note 38, at 10.
50 See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 47, at 458.
51 Simon, supra note 34.
52 Williamson, supra note 47.
53 See generally Stiles & So, supra note 34, at 285–87.
47
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calculating her self-interested future utility to be derived from the transaction
or commitment than has the other party (namely, the principal/beneficiary—
for example, a patient). As a result, the second party with the less welldeveloped set of information is at a competitive disadvantage compared to
the first party and is subject to exploitation at the time of their initial
“contracting.” Accordingly, the informational asymmetry between them
will result in a lack of efficiency in setting a mutually beneficial price-quality
equilibrium as regards the services provided by the agent-fiduciaryphysician.54 Moral hazard describes the general strategic phenomenon and
dilemma which occurs when one party’s (i.e., the agent-fiduciaryphysician’s) behavior is subject to change after a particular contemplated
transaction or commitment by another party (i.e., the principal-beneficiarypatient), because the first party will be placed in a control position where her
actions can no longer be (fully) observed and (completely) contracted for, or
otherwise controlled by, the second party. As a result, the first party can
unilaterally shift the downside risk and cost of her opportunistic
underperformance to another party, either directly to the second party (i.e.,
the principal-beneficiary-patient, in which case the coping costs of moral
hazard are agency costs)55 or to one or more third parties who do not
participate in the particular transaction or commitment (in which case the
manifestation of moral hazard constitutes negative externalities that present

54 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons:” Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490–91 (1970); Masako N. Darrough & Neal M.
Stoughton, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Question of Financial Structure, 41 J.
FIN. 501 (1986).
55 Put into the context of decision-making by seriously ill patients, moral hazard may,
for example, manifest in June’s “selection” of Dr. Savoy as her oncologist because, in her
first meeting, Dr. Savoy also promised her (either expressly or impliedly) to personally stay
on top of everything (as regards June’s treatment and interim assessments of her treatment
progress) at all times and to communicate all relevant information to June promptly and
completely, but suppose that, at some later point and for some unknown reason, Dr. Savoy is
often distracted, misses some scheduled appointments with June, and in other ways does not
follow through with her original promise. June can obviously observe some of the moralhazard manifestation in the missed appointments (in particular, if there is also no explanation
from Dr. Savoy and no other communication from Dr. Savoy, in lieu of appointments, to
apprise June of treatment progress, etc.). But, otherwise, any other forms of sub-par
performance by Dr. Savoy in light of her original promise will remain hidden from June and
can no longer be effectively controlled by June (other than by terminating the relationship).
Thus, in all instances in which Dr. Savoy could meet her original promise but decides for
whatever reason not to, moral hazard has manifested and June has to bear the agency costs (in
the form of less information, less assurance, less trust, etc.) of having a distracted, lesscommunicative-than-promised oncologist.
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as social costs).56 Moral hazard leaves the second party vulnerable57 and
subject to exploitation for the entire duration of her contracting with the first
party, so that the informational asymmetry between them will now result in
a lack of efficiency in even maintaining whatever mutually beneficial pricequality equilibrium the first party was able to negotiate and contract for with
the second party in the first place.58
Notwithstanding the limitations of bounded rationality and
opportunism and the resultant twin dilemmas of adverse selection and moral
hazard, human agents are deemed capable in the Williamsonian world to
make competent and confident in-advance calculations of their respective
utility in that they:
(1) are aware of the range of possible outcomes and their
associated probabilities,
(2) take cost-effective actions to mitigate hazards and enhance
benefits,
(3) proceed with the transaction only if expected net gains can be
projected, and
(4) [assign the transaction to that counterparty] for which the
largest net gain can be projected.59
Nevertheless, this confident calculation and decision-making is significantly
more complex and fraught with largely insurmountable obstacles in the
context of health care decision-making in general, and in end-of-life rational
choice behavior in particular. To begin with, an acutely ill, terminally ill or
56 Again, put into the context of decision-making by seriously ill patients and elaborating
on the above example, see supra note 55, moral hazard may manifest in this regard with June’s
twenty-one-year-old son who is in his third year of university. For example, if the son decided
to miss some of his university classes in order to drive June to some of her scheduled
appointments with Dr. Savoy (because June is too weak to drive herself) and, because of Dr.
Savoy’s underperformance on her promise to June, some of those scheduled appointments do
not happen, moral hazard has also manifested with regard to June’s son who now has to bear
the social costs (in the form of having to comfort his mom, worrying about her treatment
progress, wasting class time, labor, gasoline, etc. in getting his mom to and from Dr. Savoy’s
office, etc.) of his mother having a distracted, less-communicative-than-promised oncologist.
57 See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 64 (2002) (including
patients with incurable diseases among human-subject populations that are deemed
“vulnerable”).
58 See, e.g., Bengt Holmström, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74
(1979); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531
(1968); David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral Hazard”, 79 J.
RISK & INS. 1051 (2012); see also M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical
Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919, 930 (2002) (stating that “sick people are singularly illsituated to monitor the exercise of medical discretion”).
59 Williamson, supra note 47, at 467. The Williamsonian model is, accordingly, still
grounded in the classical Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theorem. See JOHN
VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
(1944).
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dying patient is, by large measures, a captive individual in any given
physician-patient relationship60 and, therefore, has “a limited capacity or
freedom to consent [to] or to decline”61 medical treatment at any point in
time of her physician-patient relationship. In addition to this relational
captivity, any critically ill or dying patient will also have a severely limited
capacity or freedom to engage in rational Williamsonian-world utility
calculations in the first place. Although June undoubtedly has decisional
capacity in the commonly understood meaning of capacity to make medical
decisions, her mental and psychological facility for self-interest protection
and resilience—in terms of rational contracting (for example, as regards
hazard mitigation and benefits enhancement), fending off opportunistic
behavior, and controlling for moral hazard in her physician’s relational
behavior—is severely reduced, both personally and situationally.
As systematically examined in Kenneth Arrow’s seminal 1963 article,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,62 the special
characteristics of the marketplace for health care services and delivery finds
the patient at “a departure from the normal state of affairs,”63 making her
“demand for medical services . . . not steady in origin as, for example, for
food or clothing, but irregular and unpredictable”64 and, overall, “associated,
with a considerable probability, with an assault on personal integrity.”65 At
the same time, the patient’s stakes in making “efficient” decisions in
purchasing health care services as well as “good” decisions in selecting and
consenting to treatment options are significantly increased. “[A]part from
the cost of medical care,” associated risks of “death, . . . impairment of full
functioning [and] loss or reduction of earning ability” apply which will turn
illness, in any form, into “a costly risk” in and of itself.66 Given that the
patient “cannot test the product before consuming it,”67 so that her credence
consumption of a particular form of medical care by definition will forego
the use of her personal resources (including time and energy) on alternative
60 See, e.g., Katrina George, Autonomy and Vulnerability at the Death Bed, 10 U. W.
SYDNEY L. REV. 139, 143 (2006). See generally Louis Lasagna, Special Subjects in Human
Experimentation, 98 DAEDALUS 449 (1969).
61 Ruth Macklin, Bioethics, Vulnerability, and Protection, 17 BIOETHICS 473, 474 (2003)
(discussing vulnerability in the context of human-subject research).
62 Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
63 Id. at 948.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 949; cf. Matthew A. Butkus, Free Will and Autonomous Medical DecisionMaking, 3 J. COGNITION & NEUROETHICS 75, 95 (2015) (“There is a common reaction in
medicine that patients are expected to react negatively to bad health news—in fact, many
consider it a sign of pathology if bad news does not engender some manner of depressive
reaction.”).
66 Arrow, supra note 62, at 949.
67 Id.
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options of care that she otherwise could have pursued, her overall
opportunity cost68 in making “good” health care decisions is compounded
further. Accordingly, the patient’s “inherent vulnerability created by illness
and by the process of treatment,”69 has an immediate and distortive effect on
the physician-patient relationship and expected physician behavior in terms
of marginality. The physician, as an agent-fiduciary, should (but not
necessarily will) orient her behavior towards “a concern for the customer’s
welfare,” thus, distinguishing “medicine . . . from business,” making “selfinterest on the part of participants [no longer] the accepted norm,”70 and
requiring a “[d]eparture from the profit motive [and] pure cash nexus.”71
Finally, product uncertainty in medical care, i.e., “the existence of
uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment,”72 is
strongly amplified given (i) the unavailability of “an adequate number of
trials,” (ii) the resultant inability of “learning from one’s own experience or
that of others,” (iii) the greater “utility variability [particularly] in severe
cases,” and (iv) the “informational inequality” based on the actual or
imagined better “information possessed by the physician as to the
consequences and possibilities of treatment.”73
In light of these factors, the rationally choosing patient now faces a vast
and complex optimality gap. It may therefore be posited that an ultrarational, repeat-player patient will be fully aware of and, therefore, unable to
confidently overcome, two cognitive constraints on her medical decisionmaking: ambivalence and ambiguity.
As regards ambivalence,
Williamsonian calculativeness carries over the Coasean-model assumption
that a calculating rational choice actor will never encounter a change in her
own tastes, preferences, and beliefs once her utility function has been fully
set and the largest net gain-transaction has been adopted. In real life, the
opposite must often be true: humans are frequently unable, a priori, to assign

68 See Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
776, 780–81 n.18 (1979) (“The cost attributable to doing one thing to the exclusion of another
stems from opportunities sacrificed to pursue the chosen course. This sacrifice is called
‘opportunity cost.’”).
69 Mark A. Hall, Arrow on Trust, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1136 (2001).
70 Arrow, supra note 62, at 949.
71 Id. at 950–51; see also R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 94–95 (Dover 2004)
(1920) (“The difference between industry as it exists to-day and a profession is, then, simple
and unmistakable. The essence of the former is that its only criterion is the financial return
which it offers to its shareholders. The essence of the latter, is that, though men enter it for
the sake of livelihood, the measure of their success is the service which they perform, not the
gains which they amass . . . . So, if they are doctors, they recognize that there are certain
kinds of conduct which cannot be practiced, however large the fee offered for them, because
they are unprofessional . . . . The meaning of a profession is that it makes the traitors the
exception, not as they are in industry, the rule.”).
72 Arrow, supra note 62, at 941.
73 Id. at 951.
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well-defined utilities to projected outcomes.74 Given their cognitive
limitations, they will only arrive at utility outcomes via a solvitur-ambulando
strategy.75 Thus, in particular, part (3) of Williamson’s definition of
calculativeness—making the transactional choice subject to the confident
projection of expected net gains—remains subject to what has been
described as a calculating actor’s own “opportunistic dissonance”76 (or, as
Williamson has called it, the “frailty of motive”77). Every human being
encounters subjective uncertainty as regards her future preferences.78
Ambiguity also affects the same Williamsonian calculativeness definition,
in particular, its part (4)—arriving at a largest net-gain transactional choice
through comparison and ranking of what potential counterparties have to
offer. Under conditions of ambiguity,79 humans are unable, a priori, to map
out all of the “possible outcomes and their associated probabilities”80 and,
thus, to fully apprehend the entire choice situation81—even in circumstances
of minimal-to-zero ambivalence (little to no opportunistic dissonance).
Accordingly, their projection and ranking of transactional net gains is subject
to what has been labeled “rational vacuity.”82 Every human being, because
of bounded rationality, experiences objective uncertainty about the effects of
external and internal influences on her subjective assessment of what is her
best choice.

74

See, e.g., Akos Rona-Tas, Uncertainty and Credit Card Markets 3 (unpublished
manuscript), http://cor.web.uci.edu/research/.
75 It is solved by walking. Cf. Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common Law and the Civil
Law—A Scot’s View, 63 HARV. L. REV. 468, 470–71 (1950) (“A civilian system differs from
a common law system much as rationalism differs from empiricism or deduction from
induction. The civilian naturally reasons from principles to instances, the common lawyer
from instances to principles. The civilian puts his faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in
precedents; the first silently asking himself as each new problem arises, ‘What should we do
this time?’ and the second asking aloud in the same situation, ‘What did we do last time?’ . . .
The instinct of the civilian is to systematize. The working rule of the common lawyer is
solvitur ambulando.”).
76 Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69.
77 Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and Its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. 97, 97 (1993).
78 See, e.g., Isabella Hatak & Dietmar Roessl, Trust Between Boundary-Spanning
Agents: The Role of Relational Competencies, 3 OPEN J. SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (2015); Donald A.
Redelmeier, Paul Rozin & Daniel Kahneman, Understanding Patients’ Decision: Cognitive
and Emotional Perspectives, 270 JAMA 72, 74 (1993) (“[P]sychologists have shown that
people are prone to err when making decisions about long-term consequences because they
fail to anticipate how their preferences will change over time.”).
79 Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics Are Tools for Uncertainty, 34
HOMO OECONOMICUS 361, 363 (2017) (defining ambiguity as “unknown probability
distributions over known outcomes”).
80 Williamson, supra note 47, at 467.
81 See, e.g., Rona-Tas, supra note 74.
82 Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69.
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Therefore, in a non-static Williamsonian world, June’s decisionmaking, driven by utility calculation and optimization under conditions of
bounded rationality and opportunism, will now run into an overwhelming
number of rational choice complications. For example, June may have
chosen (and learned to appreciate for competence and patient beneficence)
her gynecologist, but she was referred by her gynecologist to Dr. Savoy, her
oncologist. She will know that she knows next to nothing about her
oncologist, making already her “selection”83 of this medical provider
affected—to an in-advance unknown and largely unknowable degree—by
adverse selection and moral hazard. June will also know, in terms of rational
vacuity, that she knows next to nothing about “the range of possible
[treatment options and] outcomes and their associated probabilities”84
applicable to her diagnosis—other than what information Dr. Savoy has
directly divulged to her and what of this information June has been able to
comprehend. She will be further aware that Dr. Savoy’s diagnosis,
recommended treatment, and prognosis are all subject to having been formed
under conditions of Dr. Savoy’s own bounded rationality and opportunism.
Therefore, the possible adverse selection inherent in her physician-patient
relationship with Dr. Savoy—post-selection of Dr. Savoy but pre-selection
of medical treatment—may now include questions of her oncologist’s
professional competence and beneficent patient-orientation in general as
well as Dr. Savoy’s correct application of this competence and patientwelfare orientation in June’s particular case. For example, these questions
will involve correct diagnosis, correct recall of treatment and prognosis
information, correct collection, processing, and comprehension of all other
relevant information as it pertains to June’s treatment, and accurate, efficient
communication of the complete set of relevant information to June.
Moreover, in terms of moral hazard, June will know that she knows next to
nothing about the financial and personal choice infrastructure that Dr. Savoy
operates in—she is not privy to the fee reimbursement arrangements Dr.
Savoy has with June’s health insurer;85 she has not been apprised of any
83 If June can be said to have made a choice of oncologist, her selection of Dr. Savoy,
controlled by her gynecologist, was, at best, indirect and delegated. See generally Gwyn
Bevan et al., Changing Choices in Health Care: Implications for Equity, Efficiency and Cost,
5 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 251, 258–62 (2010) (discussing archetypal Beveridge and
Bismarck models of financing and organizing health care delivery and resultant scope of
patient choice of provider); Mark Schlesinger et al., Complexity, Public Reporting, and
Choice of Doctors: A Look Inside the Blackest Box of Consumer Behavior, 71(5) MED. CARE
RES. REV. 38S (Supp. 2014).
84 Williamson, supra note 47, at 467.
85 Cf. Ubel, supra note 29, at 9 (“[F]inancial conversations are not a routine part of most
clinical encounters. Outside settings like plastic surgery, most patients do not often talk about
the financial cost of interventions with their providers. Indeed, it is rare for doctors to talk
about the cost of care when patients face life-threatening illnesses.”). See generally Mark A.
Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical
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financial conflicts or incentives which Dr. Savoy may have in recommending
particular treatment options; she knows nothing about the personal
circumstances of Dr. Savoy’s life that could make Dr. Savoy’s actions more
or less opportunistic—either already now or later in June’s cancer treatment.
In addition to these examples of hard-to-impossible-to-measure
objective uncertainty and resultant ambiguity, June will know, in terms of
opportunistic dissonance, that she knows next to nothing about her own
tastes, preferences, and beliefs with regard to her treatment options for Stage
IV ovarian cancer.86
Accordingly, there must remain large-scale
ambivalence about possible outcomes, hazards to be avoided, and benefits to
be enhanced (affecting parts (1) and (2) of the Williamsonian rational utility
calculation above). For example, June’s ambivalence will be based on her
present subjective uncertainty about her future attitudes towards the pain and
suffering associated with different treatment options (in particular, when
encountered midstream in any given treatment scenario). Similarly, her
ambivalence will be nurtured by doubts about how over-optimistic her inadvance calculation of these subjective treatment parameters may be,
especially given her lack of any prior experience with cancer treatment.
Finally, June must be aware that she neither has the luxury to “proceed with
the transaction only if expected net gains can be projected”87 (i.e., June
cannot wait until the time that she could calculatively reduce ambiguity and
ambivalence to tolerable levels). She also lacks the luxury to cost-efficiently
question, negotiate, or monitor Dr. Savoy’s performance and to assign her
medical-treatment transaction to Dr. Savoy only when she is the medical
provider with whom “the largest net gain can be projected.”88 June cannot
efficiently comparison-shop to begin with and, if attempting to do so beyond
a standard second opinion, can expect to strategically increase the risk of
moral hazard in her eventual physician-patient relationship given her overt
Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 647–67 (2008) (analyzing in detail the “miserable
market for medical fees”).
86 Cf. Butkus, supra note 65, at 91–92 (“[T]he process of informed consent requires the
clinician to disclose the risks, benefits, and outcomes of particular interventions. Ostensibly
the patient then decides which option best suits his needs and values, but this concept does
not take into account the plasticity of human emotion—his needs and values may not be the
same once the intervention has been selected and performed.”). See generally George
Loewenstein, Hot–Cold Empathy Gaps and Medical Decision Making, 24(4) HEALTH
PSYCHOL. S49 (Supp. 2005) (analyzing how people mispredict their own behavior and
preferences across affective “cold” and “hot” states and examining the consequences of
resultant empathy “gaps” for medical, and specifically cancer-related, decision-making);
Peter A. Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Healthcare
Decision Making, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S57 (Supp. 2005) (describing how people often
mispredict the emotional impact of unfamiliar circumstances and suggesting that healthy
people generally mispredict the emotional impact that chronic illness and disability will have
on their lives).
87 Williamson, supra note 47, at 467 (emphasis added).
88 Id.
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display of “distrustfulness”—and the resulting lack of her reciprocal
trustworthiness at the outset of their relationship.89 Accordingly, any rational
calculability of outcomes and modeling of choice behavior in a
Williamsonian world provides mainly one type of certainty for June’s
decisional dilemmas: if she is brutally honest with herself (i.e., if she reflects
and acts ultra-rationally), a Williamsonian decisional calculus only supports
and emphasizes how little she knows and how little she may ever confidently
know and calculate in terms of preferred treatment utility.90 June is not homo
economicus, hyperrationally maximizing choice under constraints of
bounded rationality and opportunism. June is homo mortalis, unable to opt
out of the certainty of death and the absolute uncertainty of life.
C. The Knightian World
How can I behave urgently and with conviction when there are so
many doubtful variables to contend with?—Kenneth Arrow91
Accordingly, as the third and final fundamental realm of rational utility
calculation, Knightian uncertainty92 is essentially disregarded in the
Williamsonian definition of calculativeness. Here, the starting point is that
all of human decision-making always occurs under unalterable conditions
of true uncertainty. In this very real realm of genuine (as opposed to
strategic) uncertainty, no meaningful rational computability of costs and
benefits is attainable. In Frank Knight’s own words, “there is no possibility
of forming in any way groups of instances of sufficient homogeneity to make
possible a quantitative determination of true probability.”93 Knightian
uncertainty is insurmountable by advance calculation and so cannot be
reduced to probabilities and risks.94 It fundamentally disrupts the predictive
89

Cf. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (2000) (“Reciprocity means that in response to
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted
by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much
more nasty and even brutal.”).
90 Cf. Nora Szech, Becoming a Bad Doctor, 80 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 244, 245–46
(2011) (“Especially patients, i.e., consumers in medical markets, have been shown to apply
anecdotal reasoning. Even if statistical information on different forms of therapy is available,
patients often prefer to rely on personal stories.”); id. at 252 (“We have seen that if consumers
are unfamiliar with the market and rely on anecdotes, all firms, no matter how bad, yield
positive profits.”).
91 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 15 (Norton & Co. 1974).
92 For a concise discussion of Knight’s seminal differentiation between risk and
uncertainty, see, for example, Shabnam Mousavi & Gerd Gigerenzer, Heuristics Are Tools
for Uncertainty, 34 HOMO OECONOMICUS 361, 363–64 (2017); Reich-Graefe, supra note 32,
at 70–71.
93 KNIGHT, supra note 35, at 231.
94 Cf. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
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utility (a form of meta-utility) of all rational choice models. Accordingly,
this type of uncertainty as regards anything and everything the future may
bring is sui generis compared to what has been encountered by
Williamsonian calculativeness up to this point in the discussion: instead of
strategic uncertainty (the main problem for an actor’s utility function in a
transaction-cost economic world), “a world of Knightian uncertainty
recogni[z]es that ambivalence and ambiguity are ultimately calculatively
insurmountable.”95 In a Coasean world characterized by the neoclassical
expected utility hypothesis and the perfect rational measurability of one’s
future utility, everything is always perfect, everything is always certain,
nothing is ever scarce.96 In contrast, in a Knightian uncertain world of
universal and constant human vulnerability and certain mortality, everything
is—at all times—imperfect, uncertain and scarce. In their real world,
humans are never able to transcend this existential imperfection and rational
constraint. The uncertainty and scarcity of their own future internal and
external worlds will always remain unmeasurable and irreducible.97 Not
only is this uncertainty humanly unavoidable, but the degree of uncertainty
and its impact on patient outcomes is, ex ante, unknowable. In the context
of complex medical decision-making, with its attendant anxiety, asymmetric
information and communication problems, the realities of the Knightian
world coalesce into a perfect decisional storm.
Human knowledge and foresight are always severely limited.
Furthermore, humans’ first-hand, prior knowledge of the experience of dying
is logically non-existent—one simply cannot test death. On an individual
basis, humans positively know little about the world around them. They
know even less about their inner worlds.98 Outside the very limited realm of
their own purposeful actions as and when they take them, humans have, in
principle, no predictive idea as to what their respective tomorrows will bring.
In consequence—and in order to be able to still form expectations and, based
on them, orient their actions and choices in the present towards a future that
MONEY 162–63 (Macmillan 1936) (“We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions
affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot depend on strict
mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such calculations does not exist; and
that it is our innate urge to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational selves
choosing between the alternatives as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often
falling back for our motive on whim or sentiment or chance.”).
95 Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 70.
96 Id. at 68.
97 Cf. Richard Zeckhauser, New Frontiers Beyond Risk and Uncertainty: Ignorance,
Group Decision, and Unanticipated Themes, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY xvii, xxviii (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., Elsevier 2014) (“It is
worth reiterating that the economics of risk and uncertainty lost its vitality in a prison of
methodology that did not admit the real world.”).
98 See, e.g., Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Willpower and Personal Rules, 112 J. POL.
ECON. 848 (2004) (analyzing imperfect self-knowledge, will-power and recall).
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remains uncertain (but, prior to the onset of a terminal illness, generally
attainable)—human decision-makers regularly calculatively suppress99 their
awareness of Knightian uncertainty by discounting to zero its impact on their
“imperfectly rational”100 decision-making. In other words, as part of
imperfectly rational decision-making, human decision-makers always have
to engage in a pervasive form of rational delusion. In particular, with respect
to the certainty of mortality, they strategically reduce their imperfection-,
uncertainty- and scarcity-bearing through a collective, shared reality of
quasi-certainty, pseudo-homogeneity and “as-if”-utility.101 In doing so,
humans—ineluctably caught “in a world of constant decisional demand and
limited resources—calculatively mimic calculativeness”102 in order to
respond to their mortality-induced vulnerability and to confidently calculate,
99 Such suppression calculation is deliberate but blind (i.e., at best, semi-conscious), an
exercise in, and product of, necessary self-delusion. See, e.g., William von Hippel & Robert
Trivers, The Evolution and Psychology of Self-Deception, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2011).
100 As used throughout this Article, decision-making is “imperfectly rational” when it is
unalterably limited by bounded rationality and opportunism (of other and self). Additionally,
imperfectly rational decision-making is regularly constrained by rational errors and
calculative flaws in the form of biases and other heuristics as identified in behavioral
economics. Unlike bounded rationality and opportunism, however, those biases and
heuristics are alterable constraints for rational decision-making. Only when they are fully
remedied, thus, overcome within a given individual decision-making process can the resultant
choice be described as “imperfectly rational”—namely, in the sense that the decision-maker
is a good Bayesian and her decision-making “ultra-rational.” When biases and heuristics are
not fully remedied, thus, continue to implicate the rationality of decision-making
notwithstanding their avoidability, the resultant choice may be described as “imperfectly
irrational” and the decision-maker as being a “bad Bayesian.” See infra notes 168–176 and
accompanying text.
101 Coasean and Williamsonian models of rational decision-making are premised on the
assumption that human actors actually work through an optimization calculus for purposes of
maximizing utility. However, in a reality of constant informational scarcity and bounded
rationality, proper calculation remains a rare occurrence. Thus, as a logical result of
universally imperfect rational welfare calculability and as an effort to protect the remnants of
this calculability as a minimally rational mode of human behavior (given that there is nothing
else to replace these remnants with), humans rather “tend to behave ‘as though’ they assigned
numerical probabilities, or ‘degrees of belief,’ to the events impinging on their action . . . [and
to] behave[ ] ‘as if’ [t]he[y] assigned quantitative likelihoods to events.” Daniel Ellsberg,
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643, 643 (1961); see also MILTON
FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 21–22 (1953) (“[U]nder a wide range of
circumstances individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their
expected returns . . . and had full knowledge of the data needed to succeed in this attempt; as
if, that is, they knew the relevant cost and demand functions, calculated marginal cost and
marginal revenue from all actions open to them, and pushed each line of action to the point at
which the relevant marginal cost and marginal revenue were equal.”) (footnote omitted). For
a critical assessment of this “as-if” calculative choice behavior, see, for example, Itzhak
Gilboa et al., Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage’s Axioms Are Neither Necessary Nor
Sufficient for Rationality, 187 SYNTHESE 11, 28 (2012) (“It is sometimes more rational to admit
that one does not have sufficient information for probabilistic beliefs than to pretend that one
does.”).
102 Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 72.
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predict, and come to expect, in a minimally-rational manner, the contours of
what their respective futures should bring.103
Unfortunately, a diagnosis of potentially terminal illness will bring this
life-long discounting and masking of Knightian uncertainty to an abrupt and,
assuming a fully self-aware and honest ultra-rational patient, complete end.
Prior to this diagnosis, discounting of Knightian uncertainty meant that
surviving and thriving were both always attainable—an illusorily endless,
in-tandem accrual of both quantity and quality of future life. Once the
diagnosis hits, dis-illusion ensues.104 The realization of the sudden nonattainability of one’s future life will also bring with it the cognitive certainty
that, at some point in the not-too-distant future, the surviving-thriving nexus
will necessarily turn to an unavoidable in-tandem loss of both quantity and
quality of life—namely, during the active, possibly prolonged and possibly
painful dying process. Since, in many cases, this active dying process will
not have yet commenced at the time of diagnosis, the patient must enter a
never-before-experienced realm where the co-conditionality of surviving
and thriving completely ceases. Instead, quantity/surviving and quality/
thriving of remaining life become antagonistic, and possibly, mutually
exclusive conditions. The patient now has to choose one over the other or
discriminate in terms of more of one at the expense of less of the other.105
There is no longer any later point in one’s lifetime where, through a delayedgratification strategy in the present (i.e., sacrificing the accrual of quality
over quantity in the short-term), long-term utility will accrue in the future
(i.e., accrual of both quality and quantity will again break even). Similarly,
there is no longer a later point in time where the first course of action can
simply be corrected later for a better second course of action (while
necessarily assuming the costs of some lost time and of the first
“transaction”). Now, opportunity cost sky-rockets, and decisional delay will
quickly turn into decisional sacrifice.106 It’s now or never. Accordingly, the
103

Including in such utility, of course, a reduction in their cognitive awareness of
vulnerability-bearing, i.e., of their overall vulnerability costs in the first place.
104 Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 48 (“When people lose confidence in their core
beliefs, they become literally ‘dis-illusioned’ because they lack a functional blueprint of
reality.”).
105 A patient opting for the decisional default of “deciding nothing” or “waiting things
out” (i.e., of not making an active decision for or against treatment) is, of course, still making
a choice, possibly even an incorrectible one, vis-à-vis the distribution of her scarce future
quantity and quality of life. See also Ubel, supra note 29, at 9 (“Patients’ decisions become
more difficult when they are asked to compare apples to oranges, metaphorically speaking of
course. For instance, some decisions require patients to make trade-offs between length of
life and health-related quality of life.”).
106 In other words, delaying and deferring choice, seeking additional information,
searching for alternative options and choosing default options in the interim becomes overtly
futile choice behavior and is no longer “valuable” or “efficient.” See generally Amos Tversky
& Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Decision, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI.
358 (1992).
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insurmountable rational impact of Knightian uncertainty is heavily, if not
existentially, pronounced in all interim decision-making that remains before
one of the following events will occur: (i) a complete cure (returning to the
in-tandem accrual of surviving and thriving) or (ii) the commencement of an
active dying process (arrival at the in-tandem loss of surviving and thriving).
In a Coasean world, June could, at all times, calculatively establish for
all interim decision-making what her exact and perfect balance point would
be in order to choose between the quality/thriving and the quantity/surviving
of her remaining lifetime. Instead, in the real world, June has to acquaint
herself with two realms of Knightian uncertainty: the one directly pertaining
to her illness, its diagnosis, treatment and prognosis—clinical uncertainty—
and the larger realm of her uncertain life circumstances and overall future in
which her illness and clinical uncertainty is wholistically embedded107
(including the relational uncertainty caused by the asymmetry of
“presumably quite different medical knowledges”108 between herself and her
medical providers)—non-clinical uncertainty.
1. Clinical Uncertainty
Once a patient receives a diagnosis of a potentially life-threatening
condition, all of Knightian uncertainty, of course, continues—but at an
amplified level in the sense that the ambivalence and ambiguity affecting
rational decision-making pose graver potential consequences. Physicians
and patients want to make the “best” choices about medical care for serious
illness but, given their bounded rationality, lack the omniscience needed to
calculate all future possibilities without error. All medical decision-making
(as with all other types of human decision-making) occurs under conditions
of irreducible uncertainty and resultant ambivalence and ambiguity.
Philosophers Samuel Gorovitz and Alasdair MacIntyre offer a persuasive
theory of the nature of physician fallibility in this regard.109 As they explain,
fallibility in medical decision-making and treatment arises out of three
distinct causes. The first is ignorance based on a limited understanding of
the medical issue—the physician has full access to information and collects
it but cannot subjectively fully understand it.110 The second is ineptitude
based on the physician’s failure to access and follow available medical
information—all of the information is available to arrive at an evidence107

See, e.g., Tracey A. Revenson & Julie R. Pranikoff, A Contextual Approach to
Treatment Decision Making Among Breast Cancer Survivors, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S93
(Supp. 2005) (describing four contexts of the “social ecological framework” in which
treatment decision-making is embedded: “the situational context, the interpersonal context,
the sociocultural context, and the temporal context”).
108 Arrow, supra note 62, at 964.
109 See Samuel Gorovitz & Alasdair MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility,
1 J. MED. & PHIL. 51 (1976).
110 Id. at 65.
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based “correct” diagnosis and treatment plan but the physician, while
capable of understanding the relevant information, fails to fully collect,
process, and comprehend the information.111 In either case, the physician
either underperforms and fails to follow best practices or the physician
suffers from and applies biases that interfere with a (boundedly) rational
processing of the information. Both of these forms of fallibility can be
overcome with more skilled, more careful, more conscientious, and more
rational effort. In other words, they can be optimized in a Williamsonian
world.
By contrast, Gorovitz’s & MacIntyre’s third cause of fallibility is
necessary fallibility in which the information that must be understood
scientifically in order to make the “best” decision simply cannot be known
or predicted.112 In this scenario, no physician, no matter how skilled, careful,
conscientious, and rational, can provide a solution or “best” recommendation
because the solution is (at least, ex ante) unknowable due to the
unpredictability of the multiple objectively unknown and unknowable
variables involved in any patient’s prognosis or response to a particular
treatment—in spite of the statistical averages that generally apply to the
patient’s diagnosis.113 Necessary fallibility applies to every patient and every
prognosis because every patient’s prognosis and future response to treatment
remains subject to Knightian uncertainty.114 Not only is this uncertainty
humanly and rationally unavoidable, but the degree of uncertainty and its
impact on individual patient outcomes is, ex ante, unknowable. Therefore,
even the most skilled, careful, conscientious and rational physician’s
judgment can turn out to be 100% incorrect about a particular patient’s
prognosis or response to treatment. Assuming that June, as an ultra-rational
patient, were to again be brutally honest with herself, she would now have a
much more complex and much less confident calculation to make than
perhaps first assumed: acknowledging the (statistical) likelihood for some
ignorance and ineptitude among her medical providers as regards her
prognosis, recommended treatment, or both is already a tall order—
particularly given June’s expert dependency and, thus, her severely curtailed
ability to cost-effectively control and bargain for Williamsonian hazard

111

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 63. “[W]e have provided a theoretical account of why it is that knowledge about
the individual patient is not merely essential, but is always and necessarily potentially
inadequate to the extent that damaging error may result from conscientious, well-motivated
clinical intervention by even the best-informed physicians.” Id. at 65.
113 See, e.g., Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xvii–xviii (“[A] patient who presses a
physician will learn that aggregate statistics do not apply to the individual’s case, that the
physician and delivery institution can significantly affect risk levels, and that no data are so
finely parsed as to predict individual outcomes. Uncertainty rules.”).
114 Hence, necessary fallibility is irreducible to quantifiable risks, and so is unpredictable
in absolute terms. See generally KNIGHT, supra note 35, at ch. 7.
112
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mitigation and benefit enhancement. Still, June can somewhat reduce the
fallibility created by ignorance and ineptitude and “buy” herself more
confidence in the form of a second medical opinion. Of course, a second
opinion will suffer from the same statistical likelihood of ignorance and
ineptitude. But June can take some comfort in the fact that the stochastic
regularity of ignorance and ineptitude committed by two independent
clinical teams in the same patient’s prognosis and treatment
recommendations should, statistically, be substantially lower than when only
consulting one team of medical providers. If the second opinion supports
Dr. Savoy’s prognosis and treatment recommendations, June has reason to
worry somewhat less about fallibility in terms of ignorance and ineptitude.115
Unfortunately, the same is never true for necessary fallibility which, of
course, also always occurs with some statistical likelihood. Here, an ultrarational June would know that her physician’s judgment is unavoidably
affected by Knightian uncertainty. She also would know that it is impossible
to calculate in advance how much of Dr. Savoy’s judgment is affected by this
true, irreducible form of fallibility.116 As a result, June cannot “buy” any
more confidence through a second opinion. From an ultra-rational
perspective, any second opinion would only aggravate what is already an
infinite regression problem caused by Knightian uncertainty. For starters,
given the stochastic regularity of necessary fallibility, June can never be fully
confident that her best-treatment-option calculus based on Dr. Savoy’s
expert judgment is correct—even in the complete absence of ignorance and
ineptitude. Accordingly, the “remaining” Knightian uncertainty-induced
lack of confidence about the correctness of her first-order calculus (which
must always be larger than zero and may be as large as 100%) will
necessitate a second-order probability judgment designed to gauge how
confident June is about the correctness of her first-order probability
115 Still, a second opinion always “cuts both ways” in terms of confidence enhancement
vis-à-vis ignorance and ineptitude. Remember that Dr. Savoy estimates that, even with
aggressive, multi-modal treatment, June has statistically only a 17% chance of surviving for
five years. But, in an effort to not frighten June, she decides to not disclose this specific
information and rather tells June that the disease is “very serious, potentially life-threatening,”
and that it is important to begin treatment immediately. What could be expected to happen if
a second opinion both affirms Dr. Savoy’s five-year-survival estimate and discloses that
information to June, in particular, if Dr. Savoy were to mention to June that the second opinion
confirms her original estimate? Notwithstanding the reduction of fallibility as regards her
diagnosis in terms of ignorance and ineptitude, we would expect June to now have less
confidence in her oncologist in general and also less confidence in the correctness and
ultimate success of the treatment recommendations made by Dr. Savoy (i.e., she omitted
telling June about a crucial aspect of the diagnosis, so what else did she miss, for example, in
terms of treatment recommendations, both as regards the substance and the complete
disclosure thereof?).
116 Indeed, Dr. Savoy has cautioned her in this regard, namely that “every patient is unique
and that survival rates and other prognostic factors are only averages which vary according to
the patient’s age and overall health.”
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calculus—namely, that Dr. Savoy’s diagnosis and recommended treatment
is “correct” and the “best” way forward for June. Obviously, June’s secondorder probability judgment (possibly aided by a second opinion) will suffer
from the same Knightian uncertainty cum necessary fallibility that has
affected the first-order calculus,117 thereby, logically, necessitating a thirdorder probability judgment and so on into infinity.118 In other words, an
ultra-rational June would now have to acknowledge to herself that neither
patient nor doctor can ever predict how incorrect a given prognosis may turn
out to be in a particular patient’s case and how useless (or even harmful) an
incorrect medical treatment may be if undertaken by the particular patient.
Most likely, however, June is not deciding and proceeding in an ultrarational manner. Rather, she is understandably shocked by the diagnosis.
She also must be very scared given all of the uncertainty and change which
the diagnosis and recommended treatment will bring to all aspects of her life.
Most likely, among other minimally-rational decision-making strategies, she
will resort to loss-aversion,119 optimism-bias,120 and confirmation-bias121
behaviors, all of which would be common responses in critical-illness
situations like hers.

117 Namely, that no number of skilled, careful, conscientious and rational physicians can
correctly predict with certainty the correctness of a particular patient’s prognosis or the
patient’s response to treatment.
118 See generally Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69–70.
119 Here, June can be expected to prefer avoiding the chance of further loss of remaining
lifetime through opting for treatment intervention than acquiring the chance of gaining more
remaining lifetime (or more quality of remaining lifetime) through opting for less aggressive
medical treatment not recommended by her oncologist. In fact, Dr. Savoy urges her to
undergo the recommended treatment. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979)
(describing loss-aversion behavior).
120 Here, June can be expected to be over-optimistic in the sense that she will overemphasize the positive aspects about her treatment situation and will over-estimate the
probability of positive outcomes. In fact, June has been told that, given her young age and
otherwise good health, she should consider having more aggressive surgery and more
aggressive chemotherapy, that there are multiple post-surgery treatment options available, and
that some promising clinical trials of new chemotherapeutic agents (both standard and
experimental targeted therapy, as well as immunotherapy) are all available in order to “fight”
her cancer into submission. See generally John Chapin & Grace Coleman, Optimistic Bias:
What You Think, What You Know, or Whom You Know?, 11 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL. 121 (2009).
121 Here, June can be expected to gather and remember information selectively in order
to protect the confidence and optimistic outlook “bought” through her optimism-bias
behavior. In fact, even though she is told that her cytoreductive surgery may involve removal
of both ovaries, the uterus, and parts of the colon, bladder, gall bladder, and other affected
organs, she can be expected to discount and ignore (i.e., to selectively remember) such
information in an effort to preserve and entrench a belief that hers is, at worst, an average case
in which no such “complications” will materialize. See generally Raymond S. Nickerson,
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175
(1998).
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June has now had the debulking surgery with intraperitoneal
chemotherapy and has endured a long recovery and missed eight
weeks of work. She has residual pain from the surgery, digestive
problems due to the removal of her gall bladder and a length of
small bowel, and she has continuous nausea. She has also lost a
good deal of weight due to the nausea and difficulty eating. Dr.
Savoy informs June that now is the time to begin chemotherapy in
order to try to kill as many of the remaining cancer cells in her
body as possible. The chemotherapy proposed is proven to be
effective in about 60% of patients (about 40% of patients with
ovarian cancer do not respond to this particular chemotherapy
drug) in reducing cancer cells and prolonging life, but its side
effects are very toxic and will leave June exhausted and nauseated
after each weekly infusion. There is no way to predict the
likelihood or degree of response or the effects of toxicity with
respect to any individual patient. June is distressed at the fact
that, if she begins the chemotherapy, she will be unable to return
to work and that she will have little energy to care for her teenage
daughter. But June considers herself a “fighter” and believes that
her cancer will respond well to the chemotherapy and that,
because of her prior good health, the side effects will be
manageable. At Dr. Savoy’s urging, she agrees to the treatment.
When considering a decision with respect to a cancer treatment using
chemotherapy like June’s and assuming that the chemotherapy has a
hypothetical 60% chance of “success” and a 40% chance of “no success”
based on past application and experience—“success” in this context is
simply defined as killing a significant number of cancer cells and, thus,
theoretically contributing significantly to the prolongation of June’s life. It
is known that chemotherapy kills cancer cells—this is an example of a
knowable fact that is also actually known—a “known known.” It is also
known that chemotherapy will do damage to other parts of the body and will
cause severe side effects, but not known what or how bad the damage might
be in a particular person like June—this is an example of a “known
unknown” contingent outcome. Based on the known knowns and known
unknowns, a patient must make a decision about chemotherapy treatment.
The 60% chance of success only correlates with the known knowns and the
known unknowns—and only as a statistical average for a homogenized
group of past cancer patients that does not include June. These statistical
averages are certainly useful information.122 But they are only one piece of
122 As Lawrence Schneiderman has observed, “[m]ost of us probably would agree that if
a treatment has not worked in the last 100 cases, almost certainly it is not going to work if it
is tried again . . . . The experience of 100 cases is attainable in many areas of medicine. This
proposal is . . . one that seeks reasonable consensus where absolute certainty is impossible
and therapeutic benefit is the goal.” Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Defining Medical Futility
and Improving Quality of Care, 8 BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 123, 125 (2011) (adding that “in the
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salient information with regard to a significantly larger choice situation that
must include different chemotherapy and non-chemotherapy options and that
rarely, if ever, acknowledges the inevitable necessary fallibility and
Knightian uncertainty that is attached to these statistical averages (as well as
to any other pieces of information relevant to June’s decision-making).123
Therefore, acknowledging the limited rational intelligibility of
statistical averages is only a first step in accepting the full extent of true
uncertainty in making medical decisions. A particular patient’s decision
based on a statistical 60% chance of benefit as described above must, by
definition, entirely ignore the additional category of “unknown
unknowns”—those contingent future variables impacting patient outcomes
that are objectively unknowable at the time of decision-making.124 To make
as rational a decision as possible, physicians and patients must acknowledge
that unknown unknowns always exist and that they may substantially impact
the prognosis calculus (but in ex ante unknown and unknowable ways) so
that they do not, and rationally cannot, know the extent of any unknown
unknowns or how they might materialize in the particular patient’s future
course of treatment and treatment outcomes.125 For example, the 60-40
success ratio might have only a 10% chance of being applicable to the
particular patient (determinable only after the fact) due to unknown
unknowns unique to the patient. In other words, this particular patient,
because of unknown variables, is 90% likely not to fall into the average 6040 benefit-risk calculus that applies to the broader population of superficially
like patients. Notwithstanding this non-quantifiable-in-advance Knightian
uncertainty (of known unknowns and unknown unknowns), patients who
desire to survive will form expectations126 based on statistical averages,
end we all will have to accept some empirical notion of medical futility or else throw all
commonsense to the wind”).
123 Cf. Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xvii–xviii.
124 See, e.g., id. at xxii (“Unrecognized [ignorance] means that we are venturing forth, not
anticipating that something we have not even conjectured might occur.”). Cf. KARL R.
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 280 (1961), cited in Schneiderman, supra note
122, at 124 n.1 (“The old scientific ideal of episteme—of absolute certain, demonstrable
knowledge—has proved to be an idol. The demand for scientific objectivity makes it
inevitable that every scientific statement must remain tentative forever. It may indeed be
corroborated, but every corroboration is relative to other statements which, again, are
tentative. Only in our subjective experiences of conviction, in our subjective faith, can we be
‘absolutely certain.’”).
125 Cf. Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xxii (“Ignorance, although it cannot be conquered,
can be defended against. An attentive decision theorist cannot see into the future, but should
always contemplate the possibility of consequential surprise. A decision maker should always
be aware of the factor of Ignorance and should try to draw inferences about its nature from
the lessons taught by history, from experiences recounted by others, from accounts given in
the media, from possibilities developed in literature, etc. Decision makers who anticipate
Ignorance in this fashion are in a situation of Recognized Ignorance.”).
126 See Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in
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although these expectations may be irrational (or more imperfectly rational
than warranted). Physicians, when failing to acknowledge to themselves or
disclose to patients this form of necessary fallibility, become complicit in the
patients’ demanding and receiving potentially ineffective and harmful care.
In the specific context of medical decision-making, the concept of
“clinical uncertainty” is one form of necessary fallibility. The term clinical
uncertainty refers to the idea that, despite growing bodies of evidence with
respect to particular medical conditions,127 their prognoses, and the potential
efficacy of treatments, there is no way for a clinician to be entirely sure that
the relevant body of evidence applies to or will predict the outcomes for any
individual patient. Patients facing terminal illness frequently want their
treating physicians to advise them as to the “best” treatment for their illness
or condition. The problem is that, for multiple reasons, there is many times
no obvious, medically “best” approach for any particular patient at any
particular time. As two commentators explained:
The existence of an information mountain provides a myth of
certainty for the patient, the public and perhaps for health care
policy-makers. Certainty is an illusion. In most professional
spheres the expert is more critical of the available evidence, than
is the lay person. Hopefully, clinicians are taught to be more
critical than patients but they are faced with a dilemma. They
appear to be very well informed yet are acutely aware of the
fallibility of the information that is expected to guide their
practice. How do clinicians respond to this dilemma? Their day
consists of a succession of points at which decisions have to be
made on the basis of incomplete and inadequate information and
in a context in which risk, never mind error, is outlawed.128
First, patients must understand that what is “best” depends at least to some
extent on the patient’s own goals, values, and preferences. While one patient
may be seeking maximal life extension no matter what the costs in terms of
adverse effects, increased suffering, or medical dollars, another patient may
prefer to focus on maintaining physical and intellectual functionality even at
TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988)
(“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent events and you
have to neglect . . . the possibility of disappointment . . . because it is a very rare possibility,
but also because you do not know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of
permanent uncertainty . . . .”).
127 For further discussion of the interrelationship between clinical uncertainty and
evidence-based medicine, see generally Trisha Greenhalgh, Uncertainty & Clinical Method,
in CLINICAL UNCERTAINTY IN PRIMARY CARE: THE CHALLENGE OF COLLABORATIVE
ENGAGEMENT 23 (L.S. Sommers & J. Launer eds., Springer Science+Business Media 2013);
Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell, Evidence-Based Medicine, Clinical Uncertainty, and
Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 342–59 (2001).
128 A.F. West & R.R. West, Clinical Decision-Making: Coping with Uncertainty, 78
POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 319, 319 (2002).
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the cost of a potentially shorter lifespan. For this latter group of patients, the
prospect of loss of meaningful ability to interact with the world might drive
decisions to focus more on palliation of symptoms than on (hypothetical) life
prolongation. Second, clinical uncertainty means that the ability of
physicians and patients to make rational calculations about the comparative
desirability of various options within the context of the patient’s subjective
goals is always limited by the imperfections of predictive data on therapeutic
response, adverse effects, and prognosis.129
It is, therefore, impossible to determine with any rational certainty a
“best” or “optimal” treatment before the fact. Even after the fact, given the
logical lack of any availability of a same-patient comparator treatment course
of action and outcome, uncertainty will remain insurmountable—who is to
say that a different treatment might not have been better or that all other
available treatments would have been worse? Patients (and perhaps
physicians) mistakenly view the “best” or “optimal” treatment
recommendations and resultant decisions like forks in the road at which one
can take a “right turn” or a “wrong turn” when they are in fact more like a
river delta into which multiple rivers flow but all of which end up in the
sea.130 Choosing the best treatment is very different from a financial
129 See generally JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK (2007) (discussing clinical
uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment recommendations); see also George A. Diamond,
Future Imperfect: The Limitations of Clinical Predictive Models and the Limits of Clinical
Prediction, 14 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 12A (1989) (describing different ways in which
statistical regressive models to predict clinical outcomes can go awry). Prognosis for
meaningful recovery in many medical circumstances, such as for stroke patients, requires a
discussion between physician and patient of complex variables such as the likelihood of
regaining degrees of physical function and this, too, is difficult to predict as a scientific matter
because there are so many variables. A meta-analysis of data from multiple studies on the
recovery of stroke patients who were receiving mechanical ventilation found that prognosis
was generally poor, with 58% of these patients dying within thirty days, but that a minority
of patients survived without severe disability. See Robert G. Holloway et al., Prognosis and
Decision Making in Severe Stroke, 294 JAMA 725, 725–27, tbl.1 (2005). The authors of this
study caution that physicians can be unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic in various
circumstances and argue that physicians should think carefully about how they convey
prognostic evidence. See id. at 729, tbl.3 (offering the example of explaining to a patient a
surgical intervention as giving a person “a 50% better chance of an improved outcome” versus
that same intervention increasing the person’s chance “of an improved outcome from 5% to
7.5%” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Prognosis and optimal treatment is similarly
difficult to predict in the case of patients with cardiovascular disease. See Haider J. Warraich
et al., How Medicine Has Changed the End of Life for Patients with Cardiovascular Disease,
70 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1276, 1276–77 (2017) (explaining how improvements in treatment
of patients with heart failure have resulted in longer lives and fewer deaths from sudden
cardiac death but less predictable end-of-life progressions and more time with disability,
comorbidity and frailty for these patients).
130 For readers who are reminded of the tributaries-and-rivers metaphor in Judge
Andrews’ dissent in the Palsgraf case, this is no coincidence. Just as discerning how one
causal actor among several plays a role in an injury, it is similarly difficult to determine after
the fact whether one chosen treatment among several was “the best.” See Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting) (“Should analogy be
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investment in which one attempts to buy the “best” stock. With stock
investing, one can look at past data and make a bet. If the initial money
invested creates a return, one can assess retrospectively whether the chosen
stock gave the best return on investment by comparing how the same amount
of money would have performed if invested in a different stock. With
humans and medical treatment, by contrast, one can never look back and
assess with any certainty whether a different choice would have been
“better”—because humans can only make the investment once and with no
ability to compare alternative outcomes.131 Moreover, as soon as a treatment
decision has been made and implemented, biases will often continue to kick
in in order to shore up confidence in the decision. In this case, June’s belief
that she is a “fighter” will support her confidence in the decision to proceed
with chemotherapy despite its toxicity. At some point—if not at many points
in the treatment of life-threatening illness—patients have to make a decision
to begin (or forego) particular treatment, and they naturally crave
reassurance that they are doing the “best,” or at least, the “right” thing. These
decisions are perhaps “informed” to the extent that physicians provide
information about likelihood of success, but the concept of “informed,” even
in an optimally informed scenario, is greatly limited by the fallibility factors
described above.
Six months have passed. Unfortunately, June has not
responded well to the chemotherapy. Her various tumors
continue to grow, and she has experienced very severe side effects
including nausea, dizziness, and wasting. She is now extremely
weak and has lost thirty pounds. The tumors in her lungs have
continued to grow, making it more and more difficult to breath.
She also cannot take in enough nutrition orally to maintain even
her very diminished body weight. June has come to the emergency
thought helpful, however, I prefer that of a stream. The spring, starting on its journey, is
joined by tributary after tributary. The river, reaching the ocean, comes from a hundred
sources. No man may say whence any drop of water is derived. Yet for a time distinction
may be possible. Into the clear creek, brown swamp water flows from the left. Later, from
the right comes water stained by its clay bed. The three may remain for a space, sharply
divided. But at last, inevitably no trace of separation remains. They are so commingled that
all distinction is lost. As we have said, we cannot trace the effect of an act to the end, if end
there is.”).
131 In addition, while modern portfolio theory would hold that a rational investor would
invest in a diversified portfolio of stock in order to spread risk, see, e.g., HARRY M.
MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 6 (2d ed.
1991), a patient cannot invest into a “diversified portfolio of treatment” in order to minimize
the “risk” of any future “underperforming” treatment. Similarly, a holder of stock in a
publicly-held corporation enjoys limited liability—if, in the worst-case scenario, the entire
investment is lost in the corporation’s bankruptcy, no other personal assets of the stockholder
would be affected. The stockholder enjoys limited-to-no-recourse liability. In contrast, a
patient’s “investment” in a particular treatment option that fails completely may, in the worstcase scenario, amount to a death sentence. Therefore, a patient always bears “full-recourse
liability” for bad treatment choices.
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room at the hospital and has been admitted to the critical care
unit. Dr. Savoy recommends that June have a feeding tube
surgically implanted in order to supplement her nutrition and that
June be intubated so that a ventilator can assist with her
breathing. Dr. Savoy suggests that these measures will “buy
time” so that they can pursue the possibility of enrolling June in
a clinical trial to test an immunotherapy drug that has been
approved to treat other cancers but has not been thoroughly tested
for metastatic ovarian cancer. Dr. Savoy mentions that she is one
of the principal investigators in the clinical trial, which June
understands to mean that Dr. Savoy believes in the potential of the
studied therapy. June agrees to the feeding tube and ventilator,
hoping to live long enough to see both her children graduate from
high school and university respectively. She also has heard good
things about immunotherapy and hopes that it might make her
tumors disappear or at least shrink significantly so that she can
live some additional months or years feeling relatively healthy.
Unfortunately, further testing confirms that June has certain
clinical manifestations of her disease that make her ineligible for
the clinical trial. She is now in the CCU at the hospital, intubated
and receiving nutrition through a feeding tube. Her pain is wellmanaged but she is not likely to experience any improvement to
her condition. Although June is frightened and sad, she is stable
for now and enjoys daily visits from her children and friends. Dr.
Savoy explains that June can choose to cease the life-sustaining
interventions at any time. She assures June that, if she chooses to
stop these technologies, the palliative care staff will be able to
manage any symptoms such as pain and shortness of breath. She
also asks June whether she would like to sign a do-not-resuscitate
order (DNR) so that, if she goes into cardiac arrest, she will be
allowed to die.
The same effects of clinical uncertainty described with respect to the
decision about whether June should consent to chemotherapy also applied
when she consented to artificial nutrition and hydration. At the time that she
consented, she had no idea whether she would be admitted to the
immunotherapy clinical trial and no idea how long she would have to live
either with the immunotherapy or without it. These are two examples of the
known unknowns inherent in the choice situation. Even if Dr. Savoy had
more explicitly described her potential conflict of interest as a principal
investigator of the trial, it is likely that June would still have trusted that Dr.
Savoy was acting in June’s best medical interests in proposing the trial and
the life-prolonging interventions that would be necessary for her to survive
long enough to enroll in the trial. Now June must decide whether and, if so,
when she should request that these life-sustaining technologies be withdrawn
so that she can die peacefully. In these circumstances, many conscious

NOAH & REICH-GRAEFE (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

RATIONAL PATIENT APATHY

3/11/2019 10:45 AM

573

patients will find it difficult to contemplate foregoing additional days or
weeks of life but simultaneously fear “losing control” of the situation, i.e.,
lapsing into unconsciousness or losing decisional capacity and being “stuck”
with a prolonged death due to the effects of the life-sustaining technologies.
This series of events illustrates how clinical uncertainty can lead to the
default choice of continuing existing therapy and adding more interventions
(instead of perhaps scaling back some treatment)—even when this situation
is not what June would have ultra-rationally chosen if well-informed in
advance.132
2. Non-Clinical Uncertainty
In addition to clinical uncertainty, a separate layer of what we call “nonclinical uncertainty” adds complexity to the decision-making process, and it
is useful to distinguish the two concepts in the context of medical decisionmaking. Non-clinical uncertainty can refer to, among other things, the ex
ante uncertainty that every patient experiences with respect to what level of
pain, disability, and physical and emotional distress (resulting from both the
disease itself and the adverse effects of treatment) she can or is willing to
tolerate. This tolerance level will, naturally, change with the experience of
the disease and treatment over time and in the context of changes in the
patient’s life circumstances. Unforeseeable and unknowable-in-advance
changes in personal circumstances might also impact treatment decisions and
consequent patient tolerance for disability and suffering. With respect to
June, for example, she might discover that her sixteen -year-old daughter is
pregnant, and this discovery might substantially alter her surviving-thriving
calculus, in terms of her willingness to now tolerate more severe adverse
effects of treatment in a quest to prolong her survival, take care of her
daughter and future grandchild, and therefore perhaps enjoy an additional
period of thriving.
In addition to this non-clinical uncertainty inherent in June’s own life,
various aspects of health care delivery outside of the clinical realm also
influence a patient’s ability to make the “best” health care decisions.
Imperfectly rational calculation in a Williamsonian world gets more complex
because it is severely implicated by bounded rationality and accompanying
strategic external uncertainty—in particular, with regard to global aspects of
health care delivery and culture that make end-of-life decision-making occur
under suboptimal conditions.133
These decisions therefore become
132 Instead, June has ended up in a situation where her choice is between cutting her
remaining life short (i.e., even less surviving of what is left of surviving) and continuing
remaining life under the burden of life-sustaining technologies (i.e., even less thriving of what
is left of thriving).
133 See Barry R. Furrow, Smashing into Windows: Limits of Consumer Sovereignty in
Health Care, in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW
AND ETHICS (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, Barbara J. Evans & Carmel Shachar
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significantly more “expensive” in terms of opportunity cost. A multiplicity
of factors contribute to the earlier discussed overutilization of aggressive
therapeutic care for potentially fatal illness and at the end of life. They
aggravate the uncertainty (acknowledged or not) in which each and every
treatment decision is necessarily embedded and create serious obstacles to a
non-flawed, confident gathering and processing of decision-relevant
information by both patients and health care providers. In response, patients
and their physicians frequently—if not routinely and by default—shortcircuit the previously-described initiation and ratification segments of
rational decision-making and revert, almost reflexively, to a quantity over
quality approach.
Broadly speaking, the U.S. medical system operates within a culture of
denial of death. A combination of trends provides evidence of denial.
Longer average lifespans, together with the promise of new therapies,
encourages individuals to avoid confronting mortality. Some researchers
now promote the possibility of substantial life extension, even of a “cure for
death,”134 and speak of “[d]eath [a]s a series of preventable diseases”135
Although commentators have criticized this mindset,136 research into
lifespan extension continues with little regard for the consequences of the
distorted message it sends.137 This quest for a fountain of youth denies the
reality of mortality and also ignores the fact that more years of life do not
necessarily translate into a better quality of remaining life. These cultural
influences have played a significant role in transforming the natural process
of dying into a technologically-driven and, often, illogically overzealous

eds., Cambridge University Press 2018) (describing limits on patient capacity to make health
care decisions and behavioral interventions designed to compensate for bounded rationality
limits); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Discourse, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 720–29 (2011) (describing the negative impact of various cognitive
processes and deficiencies on medical (and other) decision-making); Wendy Netter Epstein,
Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1274–85 (2017) (describing the
negative impact of various biases and heuristics on informed medical decision-making).
134 Closing
in on the Cure for Death, FIGHT AGING! (Sept. 2, 2003),
https://www.fightaging.org/archives/2003/09/closing-in-on-the-cure-for-death.php.
135 Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 654,
654–55 (2000) (quoting William Haseltine, then CEO of Human Genome Sciences).
136 See id. at 655 (arguing that research “should not, even implicitly, have eradication of
death as its goal” because it supplants emphasis on the importance of relieving suffering at
the end of life and it “promotes the idea among the public and physicians that death represents
a failure of medicine.”); see also Penni Crabtree, Fountain of Youth with Just a Shot in the
Arm?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 25, 2004, at Al (explaining that mainstream science has
debunked anti-aging claims as “hucksterism” that offers little or no benefit but poses
potentially serious health risks).
137 Recent news stories document the efforts of tech billionaires to fund research into
lifespan extension. See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Tech Titans’ Latest Project: Defy Death,
WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/04/04/techtitans-latest-project-defy-death/.
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prolongation of the lives of terminally ill patients—at all costs.138
Physicians’ professional culture also contributes to the problem.
Physicians themselves sometimes exhibit a striking reluctance to cease
curative care for their patients, acknowledge that the patient is dying and turn
to symptom management, and instead will continue to treat the illness
aggressively or implement life-prolonging technologies such as artificial
nutrition or ventilation. While physicians’ attitudes towards these issues can
vary according to their specialty,139 some specialists, such as surgeons, tend
to have more difficulty relinquishing control over post-surgical patients who
are not faring well.140 One physician tells a story of an oncologist who was
upset about his patient’s decision to stop chemotherapy and enroll in hospice
care. The oncologist confronted the hospice physician and said, “We might
as well just be walking away, and we might as well just shoot [the patient]
now.”141 Interestingly, physicians themselves, when fatally ill, frequently
refuse invasive treatment and life-prolonging technology, including CPR,
preferring instead to accept the prognosis and spend their remaining time
feeling as well as possible.142 Although the data is limited, it suggests that
138 See Noah, supra note 4, at 22–24 (describing and discussing longevity research and
cultural denials of mortality).
139 See Soumitra R. Eachempati et al., The Surgical Intensivist as Mediator of End-of-Life
Issues in the Care of Critically Ill Patients, 197 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 847, 849–51 (2003).
140 See id. at 850 (adding that surgeons may also wish to avoid appearing to lack
confidence in themselves or may worry that losing a surgical patient will ruin their statistical
success numbers).
141 See Kevin B. O’Reilly, End-of-Life Care: Pain Control Carries Risk of Being Called
a Killer, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120416/
profession/304169955/2/ (relating an anecdote from a physician who directs a hospice
program).
142 See Vyjeyanthi S. Periyakoil et al., Do Unto Others: Doctors’ Personal End-of-Life
Resuscitation Preferences and Their Attitudes Toward Advance Directives, PLOS ONE (May
28,
2014),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0098246
(finding that attitudes towards advance directives varied substantially by physician subspecialty, race and ethnicity, and gender and that physicians themselves strongly prefer to
avoid high-intensity treatments for themselves at the end of life—over 88% of physicians in
one of the studied groups stated that they would forego resuscitation); Teresa A. Hillier et al.,
Physicians as Patients: Choices Regarding Their Own Resuscitation, 155 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 1289, 1289–92 (1995) (finding that, when physicians were asked whether
they would want cardiopulmonary resuscitation if diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, or
various other advanced chronic diseases at various ages, most physicians would not want
CPR, particularly with advancing age); Gregory P. Gramelspacher et al., Preferences of
Physicians and Their Patients for End-of-Life Care, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 346, 349–50
(1997) (finding that physicians preferred significantly less care at end of life than patients
usually receive); cf. Garrett M. Chinn et al., Physicians’ Preferences for Hospice if They Were
Terminally Ill and the Timing of Hospice Discussions With Their Patients, 174 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 466, E1, E1–E2 (2014) (finding that physicians who preferred hospice for
themselves were more likely to discuss hospice with terminally ill cancer patients); Ken
Murray, How Doctors Die: It’s Not Like the Rest of Us, But it Should Be, ZOCALO PUB.
SQUARE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/11/30/howdoctors-die/read/nexus.
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some physicians may internally acknowledge impending death to themselves
while avoiding discussing it with their patients.
Another cause of overutilization of medical tests and interventions is
the fear of making a medical error or being accused of hastening death, with
the accompanying prospect of malpractice litigation.143 Fear of liability, and
an understandable reluctance to deprive patients of hope, has created a
culture in which physicians may hesitate to initiate a discussion about
ceasing therapeutic care or withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
medical technologies unless the patient or family broaches the subject.
Research suggests that a significant number of physicians in the United
States has been accused of, investigated for, and occasionally prosecuted for
murder and euthanasia in circumstances in which physicians discontinued
life-supportive measures, provided drugs for pain control, or sedated patients
whose suffering they were unable to alleviate in other ways.144 Even when
a patient has a DNR order or other advance directive in place, physicians
may override the directive out of concern for potential liability.145
Nevertheless, court decisions penalizing physicians and hospitals for noncompliance with advance directives, along with administrative sanctions, are
becoming more common.146
Pinpointing the drivers behind unnecessary care, particularly at the end
of life, remains difficult, probably because the overall trend results from a

143 See Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care: Myths, Realities,
and Grains of Truth, 284 JAMA 2495, 2495 (2000) (explaining that physicians overestimate
the risk of malpractice lawsuits and that poor communication by physicians about end-of-life
issues increased the risk of litigation); Palfrey, supra note 19, at e(21)(1) (“Most doctors are
intensely risk-averse. We don’t tolerate uncertainty. Not wanting anything bad to happen,
we reflexively overtest and overtreat in order to protect our patients—and ourselves.”); Phillip
Wickenden Bale, Honoring Patients’ Wishes for Less Health Care, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1200 (2011) (describing the repeated hospitalization of a very elderly patient in a long
term care facility in contravention of surrogate decision-makers’ request to provide only
comfort care in apparent reaction to a government fine of the facility due to the accidental
death of another patient).
144 See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of Murder and
Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 334 (2012) (finding, based on survey
data, that over half of respondents had been accused of euthanasia or murder by a patient or
patient’s family member within the previous five years and 4% of those surveyed had been
formally investigated for hastening a patient’s death); Lewis Cohen et al., Accusations of
Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1096, 1096–97, 1101
(2005) (describing examples of such accusations along with occasional prosecutions and
providing data for rates of prosecution in end-of-life care cases).
145 INST. OF MED., DYING IN AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL
PREFERENCES NEAR THE END OF LIFE 133 (2015), http://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/
Reports/2014/Dying-In-America-Improving-Quality-and-Honoring-Individual-PreferencesNear-the-End-of-Life.aspx (finding that physicians worried that complying with advance
directives could lead to malpractice liability).
146 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: New Penalties for Ignoring Advance
Directives and Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 28 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 74, 75–76 (2017).
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combination of patient and family requests for such care and physicians’
unwillingness to be candid about the likely ineffectiveness of the care in
prolonging life or improving quality of life. There is, however, clearly a
causal connection between overtreatment at the end of life and poor
communication between physicians and patients. Research suggests that
physicians avoid or delay disclosing details about patients’ prognoses or
spontaneously initiating discussions about ending therapeutic care and
making the transition to hospice.147 With respect to patients with likely
incurable cancers, research demonstrates that, while two-thirds of physicians
tell their patients at the initial visit that they have an incurable form of cancer,
only one-third ever state the prognosis at any point in the treatment
process.148 Physicians also tend to overestimate the remaining life spans of
seriously ill patients and to convey prognoses in overly optimistic terms.149
Moreover, a remarkable number of physicians acknowledge deliberately
deceiving patients when discussing prognoses. In a recent survey of
physicians, one in ten physicians admitted to lying to a patient within the
previous year, and over half acknowledged that they had been unreasonably
optimistic about a patient’s prognosis.150 Physicians also report that even
147 See, e.g., Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated with Discussions
About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER 998 (2010) (concluding that most physicians surveyed
indicated that they would not discuss end-of-life decisions and choices with terminally ill
patients until they exhibited symptoms or there were no remaining treatments available);
Bethel Ann Powers et al., Meaning and Practice of Palliative Care for Hospitalized Older
Adults with Life Limiting Illnesses, 2011 J. AGING RES. (2011) (discussing the distinctions
between and intersection of palliative care and end-of-life care and recommending better
training of health care providers to understand that “end-of-life” is not a “well-demarcated
period of time before death”).
148 See Belinda E. Kiely et al., Thinking and Talking About Life Expectancy in Incurable
Cancer, 38 SEMINARS ONCOLOGY 380, 380–81 (2011).
149 See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and Determinants of Error
in Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients: Prospective Cohort Study, 320 BRIT. MED.
J. 469, 470–71 (2000) (finding that, in predicting patients’ remaining life expectancies,
physicians were correct only 20% of the time and were over-optimistic 63% of the time and
concluding that a closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over-optimistic
predictions); Elizabeth B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to
Patients with Cancer Near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1096 (2001) (finding
that, in communicating expected survival times to patients with terminal cancer, physicians
were frank with patients only 37% of the time, provided deliberately inaccurate survival
estimates 40.3% of the time and preferred to offer no estimate for 22.7% of the patients
studied). The authors concluded that “for all of these patients, physicians were able and
willing to formulate objective prognoses, whether accurate or not, but had difficulty
communicating them, even to insistent patients”; cf. Elisa J. Gordon & Christopher K.
Daugherty, ‘Hitting You Over the Head: Oncologists’ Disclosure of Prognosis to Advanced
Cancer Patients, 17 BIOETHICS 142, 142–68 (2003) (describing the results of a small focus
group discussion with physicians in which many expressed reluctance to convey statistical
details about prognosis because they felt that the information would seem too abrupt and
would interfere with patients’ hope).
150 See Lisa I. Iezzoni et al., Survey Shows That at Least Some Physicians Are Not Always
Open or Honest with Patients, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 383, 383–88 (2012); Sandeep Jauhar, The
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when cancer patients specifically request prognostic estimates, they would
either withhold their opinion or intentionally provide an inaccurate figure in
almost two-thirds of cases.151 The logical result is flawed decision-making
by patients, creating an uncontrolled-for risk that patients will pursue
aggressive and debilitating treatments in the misguided hope of prolonging
life and without fully understanding (i) their respective choice situations and
(ii) the potentially negative welfare implications of their choices.
All of these already suboptimal decisional contexts are exacerbated by
the fact that the system of reimbursement for health care in the federal
Medicare program often distorts the type and quantity of care offered, by
incentivizing physicians to provide more treatments and tests than necessary.
Although Medicare now reimburses physicians for having advance care
planning discussions with patients,152 this provision may do little to
encourage the iterative conversations over the course of treatment for a
serious illness that allow physicians to convey to patients changes in the
calculus regarding continuing treatment. Moreover, the Medicare program
still reimburses physicians and hospitals in some situations on a fee-forservice basis. Simply put, this means that the more treatments, tests, and
procedures the patient receives, the more reimbursement the physician and/
or hospital will receive.153 Many commentators have recognized the general
Lies That Doctors and Patients Tell, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:21 AM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/the-lies-that-doctors-and-patients-tell/?_r=0
(explaining, with reference to his over-treatment of a very elderly and dying patient, that “[a]t
their core, my actions were a kind of deception—convincing myself, despite all the evidence,
that I could save her, stay the inexorable course of her disease. Perhaps I was afraid of failure,
or embarrassed by my impotence. Those last few days of her life she almost ceased to be a
person for me. She became an experiment, a puzzle—one that I desperately wanted to solve”);
cf. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993) (involving a claim by a deceased patient’s
family that the physicians’ failure to disclose specific information about survival rates and
times with pancreatic cancer impaired the patient’s ability to get his financial and business
affairs in order). Of course, if the patient’s preference is to avoid receiving explicit
information about prognosis, this is a different matter.
151 See Lamont & Christakis, supra note 149, at 1096–98 (concluding that physicians
would provide an honest estimate only 37% of the time and would provide no estimate, or a
deliberate overestimate or underestimate 63% of the time).
152 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ADVANCE CARE PLANNING 2 (2018),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-Learning-NetworkMLN/MLNProducts/Downloads/AdvanceCarePlanning.pdf (explaining that “[e]ffective
January 1, 2016, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) pays for voluntary
Advance Care Planning (ACP) under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (PFS) and the
Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS).”). It remains to be seen whether
this small change will have any measurable impact on the pattern of heavy utilization of
therapeutic and life-prolonging care in patients with serious illness.
153 See, e.g., Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations Among Patients in the Medicare
Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1418, 1419 (2009) (discussing the Medicare
fee-for-service reimbursement system in the context of rates of rehospitalization for Medicare
beneficiaries); Robert Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for
Payment Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED 1036, 1036 (2009) (discussing the
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problem of overutilization of health care resources and have recommended
the implementation of various programs designed to target this problem.154
Physicians also must recognize that patients frequently fail to
understand the likely efficacy of certain invasive treatments, either because
this information is not included in the discussion or because it is impossible
to predict with any accuracy the curative or palliative effects of the treatment
on any particular patient. Patients accept treatment with the hope of a cure,
but sometimes fail to understand that a proffered treatment may, at best,
prolong life. With respect to chemotherapy for metastatic cancer, one study
found that 69% of patients with lung cancer and 81% of patients with
colorectal cancer mistakenly believed that the chemotherapy they were
receiving was likely to cure their disease.155 The problem with this
unrealistic or inaccurate expectation of cure is that patients will be more
likely to consent to treatment that, while it may possibly palliate symptoms
or even extend life, is also likely to cause significant toxic effects that will
impair quality of life. Patients who are fully apprised and, thus, at least in
theory have the informational tools to understand that chemotherapy under
these circumstances cannot cure their illness and will at best have a palliative
effect on it may weigh the value of this treatment differently and may be
more likely to decline it. Another study suggests that some physicians (and
thus, their patients) misperceive certain types of care as palliative when the
evidence suggests that they are not providing any benefit and may cause
iatrogenic harm to dying patients. In this regard, this study indicates that
many cancer patients are offered chemotherapy for palliative purposes when
they are in the end stages of their disease, even though the evidence suggests
that chemotherapy worsens quality of life near death for many patients.156
incentives for overutilization of medical services created by a fee-for-service payment
system). There is some promising news on this front. The U.S. recently passed a bill that
will attempt to remedy the worst effects of fee-for-service medicine in the Medicare Program.
The revamped reimbursement system will pay physicians based on the quality of the care they
deliver rather than the quantity of care. See Carol W. Cassella, Keep Patients Healthy, and
Doctors Sane, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/
keep-patients-healthy-and-doctors-sane.html?_r=0; see also Siobhan Hughes, House Passes
Medicare ‘Doc Fix’ Bill, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015, 7:03 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-medicare-doc-fix-bill-1427386278.
154 See, e.g., Christine K. Cassel & James A. Guest, Choosing Wisely: Helping Physicians
and Patients Make Smart Decisions About Their Care, 307 JAMA 1801, 1801–02 (2012)
(describing various programs such as Choosing Wisely, Less is More, and the Good
Stewardship Working Group that aim to educate physicians about commonly overutilized
tests and procedures).
155 See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients’ Expectations About Effects of Chemotherapy for
Advanced Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1620 (2012) (noting that, “[p]aradoxically,
patients who reported higher scores for physician communication were also at higher risk for
inaccurate expectations” regarding the curative potential of chemotherapy).
156 See Prigerson et al., supra note 10, at 778–84 (evaluating the effect of chemotherapy on
patients with end-stage cancer and varying functional statuses and concluding that chemotherapy
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All of these non-clinical, contextual problems surrounding the delivery
of health care increase the uncertainty inherent in June’s decision-making,
even if she is unaware of them. Table 1 provides a systematic summary of
the known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns, which an
ultra-rational June would have to competently calculate for purposes of
making a treatment decision with the highest attainable utility and the
smallest remaining amount of clinical and non-clinical uncertainty:
Table 1
June’s World of Uncertainty
Clinical
Uncertainty

Known
Knowns





Chemotherapy kills cancer cells
Chemotherapy causes toxic adverse effects
Surgery and anesthesia have inherent risks for all patients

Known
Unknowns





June’s diagnosis and treatment prognosis may be incorrect
June may not respond to the proposed chemotherapy
June may have more or fewer complications and adverse
effects than average

Unknown
Unknowns



June may be so atypical in her physiologic makeup that the
statistics about potential response to chemotherapy simply
do not apply to her
June may, for example, have an allergic reaction to the
chemotherapy drug that has never been encountered before
June may be “lucky” in that a “miracle” cure for Stage IV
ovarian cancer is discovered in time



Non-Clinical
Uncertainty

Known
Knowns





June is a 46-year-old woman with two children
June is mortal and will die eventually (although perhaps not
from ovarian cancer)
June’s insurance coverage contains limitations that will
cause her to accrue uncovered medical costs which she will
find difficult to afford

did not improve quality of life near death for patients with moderate and poor performance status
and actually worsened quality of life near death for patients with good performance status).
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June’s physician may be unduly optimistic about treatment
efficacy
June herself may be unduly optimistic about her tolerance
of treatment complications and adverse effects
June’s physician may have a financial conflict of interest in
recommending the immunotherapy clinical trial
June may die of something entirely unforeseeable and
unrelated during treatment (e.g., being hit by a bus)
June may (temporarily) lose decisional capacity in a manner
not related to her treatment
June may become unable to comply with her treatment
regime because she is grieving the sudden loss of a loved
one, loses her ability to drive herself to her treatment
appointments, or is simply “giving up on herself”

3. Bayesian and Non-Bayesian Updating
The field of behavioral economics has critiqued the idealistic, utopian
oversimplification of the Williamsonian-world rational choice model and
has demonstrated how rational errors and cognitive flaws further affect and
constrain—even within the bounds of bounded rationality and
opportunism—rationally optimal human decision-making with principled
and predictable regularity. Unlike bounded rationality and opportunism,
these errors and flaws (heuristics and biases)157 are alterable constraints to
ultra-rational decision-making and therefore, in principle, can be remedied
through more skilled, careful, and conscientious decision-making processes.
In real life, however, decisional agents are, for good reason, pathdependent158 and derive, from the vast, homogenized totality of all decisions
157

See, e.g., Thomas Gilovich & Dale Griffin, Introduction—Heuristics and Biases: Then
and Now, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 1 (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2002); Kahneman & Tversky, supra note
119. As used throughout this Article, the terminology of “heuristics and biases” is meant to
include not only insights developed in behavioral economics as to alterable cognitive
shortcuts and constraints to ultra-rational decision-making, but to also comprise other
decisional constraints beyond bounded rationality and opportunism as pervasively discussed
in non-traditional decision research, for example, the role of affect, emotion, motivation, and
risk perception on decisional behavior and the function of naturalistic expert decision-making
in dynamic, evolving choice environments. See generally Vimla L. Patel et al., Emerging
Paradigms of Cognition in Medical Decision-Making, 35 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 52
(2002).
158 “Path-dependency” is understood here in a non-pejorative, purely descriptive manner.
The same is true for “rational errors” and “cognitive flaws.” Cf. Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra
note 79, at 367 (“Heuristics per se are neither good nor bad.”); Odette Wegwarth, Smart
Strategies for Doctors and Doctors-in-Training: Heuristics in Medicine, 43 MED. EDUC. 721,
727 (2009) (“Today’s medical students should learn and understand that heuristics are neither
good nor bad per se, but that their reliability and usefulness interplays with environmental
circumstances, such as the inherent uncertainty of a specific situation.”). There is an entire
spectrum of automatized and semi-automatized human behavior that has genetically evolved

NOAH & REICH-GRAEFE (DO NOT DELETE)

3/11/2019 10:45 AM

582

[Vol. 49:535

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

made during their respective prior lifespans, some relatively accurate
predictive utility—and, with it the meta-utility of an efficient orientation
towards the future—by sticking to their learned “fast-and-frugal”159
aversions, biases and similar heuristic decisional devices. In short, as homo
mortalis, June is “homo heuristicus.”160
Accordingly, in addition to necessary fallibility, patients and physicians
also turn out to be bad Bayesians.161 Their ability to investigate, evaluate
courses of action, and properly calculate for purposes of informed, ultrarational decision-making about complex medical care is limited by heuristic
flaws in collecting and processing information.162 In other words, these
regularly employed biases and heuristic shortcuts further interfere with
over time as well as been honed through adaptive behavior in each human lifetime which, on
aggregate, will serve human decision-making under conditions of scarcity and Knightian
uncertainty in the vast majority of cases much better than prolonged information gathering,
rational deliberation, evaluation and ranking of behavioral proposals and, finally, selection
and ratification of a highest-utility behavioral mode. In this regard, reflexes (as, for example,
the flight reflex) constitute automatized, involuntary human behavior that overrides rational
decision-making and increases the survival rate of the human in question (in case of a real
threat to survival) almost every time. Similarly, instincts qualify as semi-automatic behavior
(as, for example, the instinct of being in danger triggered by a sudden release of adrenalin into
the bloodstream which may lead to controlled, somewhat voluntary, thus, non-reflexive flight
behavior) but a carefully self-aware rational decision-maker can, as part of informationgathering and -processing, realize that the instinct has been triggered “accidentally” (i.e.,
objectively, there is no lurking danger to the decision-maker), to the effect that the rational
decisional behavior will override the instinctive behavioral mode. Still, instincts short-cut
aspects of cognitive decision-making because they alert a rational decision-maker of an
existing (and often pressing) choice situation before the rational decision-maker will have had
enough time and will have mustered enough attention to fully and rationally apprehend the
choice situation through rationally diligent and competent information-gathering
and -processing. Accordingly, there may be many situations where reflexes and instincts (or,
for that matter, aversions, biases, and similar heuristic “decisional shortcuts” described in
behavioral economics) make human decision-makers choose less efficient options among
those available in a given choice situation. When, however, fully aggregated over the
statistical length of a human lifespan, they are highly efficient means of adaptive behavior in
order to secure the baselines of human existence (i.e., continued survival, physical and
emotional wellbeing, flourishing). Cf. Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 368
(“Heuristics are adaptive tools that ignore information to make fast and frugal decisions that
are accurate and robust under conditions of uncertainty. A heuristic is considered ecologically
rational when it functionally matches the structure of environment.”). See also Butkus, supra
note 65, at 80 (“Automaticity is a significant element of cognition—a variety of processes
simply occur without volitional cueing.”).
159 Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 364.
160 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds
Make Better Inferences, 1 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 107 (2009).
161 See infra notes 168–176 and accompanying text; cf. Zechhauser, supra note 97, at xviii
(“Unfortunately, the way most [economists and decision theorists] would counsel people to
make choices is not the way most individuals do make choices.”). Throughout this Article,
we also use the term “bad Bayesian” only in a descriptive rather than a normative manner.
162 Cf. Ubel, supra note 29, at 8 (“When people receive information about cancer risks,
they do not simply encode the numbers into a mathematical algorithm.”).
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boundedly-rational
informed
decision-making—rendering
choices
imperfectly irrational.163 As mentioned earlier,164 optimism bias constitutes
one example of this class of alterable rational constraints within the context
of decisions about treatment and life-prolonging technologies for those with
life-threatening illness. Patients tend to think they will be among the
fortunate 1% who greatly outlive the statistical prognosis for their disease or
who respond unusually well to an otherwise non-curative therapy.165
Understanding statistical predictions of survival time is challenging, even for
physicians.166 Similarly, physicians have difficulty discussing uncertainty
with patients.167 In June’s situation, it is almost inevitable that her optimistic
outlook before commencing chemotherapy—considering herself a “fighter,”
believing that her cancer will respond well to chemotherapy, and that
because of her prior good health, the side effects will be manageable—will
make her not only count herself, ex ante, among the 60% chance-of-success
cohort but will also cause her to unconsciously discount to zero the
likelihood of any “mixed” relative outcomes (i.e., partial success/partial
failure, or less success/more failure), which are statistically left entirely
unaccounted for within this absolute, dyadic 60-40 success-failure
classification.
Bayesian updating, as a concept, originated in probability theory, which
itself is “the fundamental mathematical tool to quantify uncertainty.”168
Thus, as a statistical device, Bayes’ Theorem169 lies at the heart of a rational
human belief updating process where beliefs (about what is “certain” in the
world around us and within us) are continually confirmed or revised based
163 See supra Figure 1. Cf. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability:
A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 450 (1972) (“In his evaluation
of evidence, man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all.”).
164 See supra note 120.
165 See Lynn A. Jansen et al., Unrealistic Optimism in Early-Phase Oncology Trials, 33
IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RES. 1 (2011) (finding that, although participants in an early phase
trial understood that the treatment would not cure their cancer, a majority of those surveyed
nevertheless exhibited an optimism bias in believing that the experimental drug would control
their disease and that they would experience only benefits from the drug and no side effects).
166 See Philip Sedgwick & Katherine Joekes, Survival (Time to Event) Data: Median
Survival Times, 343 BRIT. MED. J. d4890 (2011) (providing data on median survival times for
patients with advanced colon cancer and posing a multiple-choice question about accurate
characterization of the median survival time data, and concluding that “[i]t may be hard to
find the balance between explaining statistical information accurately and using words or
concepts that are unambiguous to the patient”). For a rare example of a patient with an
excellent understanding of his own statistical prognosis, see Stephen Jay Gould, The Median
Isn’t the Message, CANCERGUIDE https://www.cancerguide.org/median_not_msg.html (last
visited July 28, 2018).
167 See James A. Tulsky et al., Opening the Black Box: How Do Physicians Communicate
about Advance Directives?, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 441, 446 (1998).
168 LAURENT CONDAMIN ET AL., RISK QUANTIFICATION—MANAGEMENT, DIAGNOSIS AND
HEDGING 43 (Wiley 2006).
169 Or Bayes’ Law as it is sometimes also called.
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on new pieces of information received. Often, a proper calculation of
Bayesian probability will lead to counterintuitive statistical outcomes—i.e.,
ones that do not match or, at least, substantially confirm prior beliefs. Hence,
ultra-rational, good-Bayesian decision-makers would revise their prior
beliefs into more (statistically) accurate posterior beliefs.170 Unfortunately,
however, humans often fail to apply Bayes’ Theorem correctly so that proper
Bayesian updating to account for new evidence rarely happens in a consistent
manner.171 But notwithstanding the fact that humans are regularly bad at
Bayesian updating, i.e., they are bad Bayesians, a minimally-rational version
of updating of beliefs in the face of new information constantly and
ineluctably happens. Here, humans engage in non-Bayesian (or biased)
updating because it still provides probabilistic utility: as bad Bayesians, they
“do not rely on precise calculations . . . [but] on the direction in which beliefs
are updated [so that as] long as bad news shifts beliefs about ability
downward and good news shifts them up, . . . the spirit of [their nonBayesian calculative] models is preserved.”172 In other words, non-Bayesian
updating persists in human decision-making because, on a meta-probability
level, it autopoietically confirms and thus validates its own utility as a
prediction (and psychological sense-making) tool. When fully aggregated
and correlated with recognized outcomes over the course of their respective
entire cognitive lives, all new decision-making by humans updates their prior
beliefs about the validity and utility of their non-Bayesian updating—i.e.,
how they think about probability and make probability judgments even
though such “thinking” may not be a conscious process.173 This updating,
however, occurs in only one direction, namely, to formulate their posterior
beliefs in only a non-revisionist manner so that the world around them

170 See, e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Assessing Managerial
Ability: Implications for Corporate Governance, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 93, 153 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017)
(“A maintained assumption of most learning models is that individual incorporate new
information rationally; that is, they update their beliefs according to Bayes Law.”).
171 Id. (stating that humans “often hold beliefs or take actions that are inconsistent with
their having properly employed Bayes Law to account for new evidence”); see also Simon,
supra note 38, at 9 (commenting on behavioral-economics research by Ward Edwards, Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky on anchoring and adjustment heuristics and availability biases
as follows: “They describe experimental situations in which estimates formed [by human
decision-makers] on the basis of initial information are not revised nearly as much by
subsequent information as would be required by Bayes’ Theorem”).
172 Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 170, at 154 (emphasis added); cf. Kevin D. McCaul
et al., Linking Decision-Making Research and Cancer Prevention and Control: Important
Themes, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S106, S107 (Supp. 2005) (stating that the “direction of
[predictive] mistakes is also biased; in particular, people underestimate their likely happiness
when confronted with negative life conditions”).
173 Cf. Butkus, supra note 65, at 83 (“The cognitive processes of which we are aware are
surface phenomena, and merely a subset of all the phenomena occurring when we consider
choices and options.”).
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remains moderately coherent, explainable, and predictable. Given this
unidirectional, autopoietic tendency of non-Bayesian updating, humans also
often tend to over-react to current, new information.174 Any new
information, by definition, has the potential to challenge (rather than
confirm) the validity and value of prior beliefs—including the meta-belief
that non-Bayesian updating provides predictive benefit. It may, therefore,
trigger an unavoidable revision and updating of prior beliefs to such an extent
that humans could (temporarily) no longer be able to form coherent posterior
beliefs.175 In this scenario, a severely reduced predictability of future events
would ensue and immediately lead to an existential level of disorientation.176
Accordingly, humans operate with a constant, heightened vigilance with
regard to new information that disturbs prior-belief equilibria—irrespective
of whether the news is good or bad.
To give a factually simplified and hypothetical example of Bayesian
and non-Bayesian updating in this regard, Bayes’ Theorem allows one to
answer a question like this: What is the probability that June is among the
60% chance-of-success cohort (rather than the 40% chance-of-no-success
cohort) given that she has had one of her ovarian tumors biopsied, and that
the biopsy result is positive for the types of ovarian cancer that occur
predominantly in the 60% responder cohort, so that she also will likely
respond to the proposed chemotherapy (assuming that such a predictiveresponse test were to exist)? As a mathematical formula, Bayes’ Theorem
can be expressed as follows:
𝑃 𝑅∣𝑆

𝑃 𝑆∣𝑅 𝑃 𝑅
𝑃 𝑆∣𝑅 𝑃 𝑅
𝑃 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 𝑃 ~𝑅

In June’s example, P stands for probability, R for the result of being
among the 60% cohort, S for testing positive, and ~R for the mutually
exclusive, other result of being among the 40% cohort (i.e., not being among
the 60% cohort), while the vertical line symbol (∣) is simply read as “given
174 Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 170, at 154 (stating that “people are likely reacting
to current signals more than rational Bayesian updating would imply”).
175 In other words, new information could shock and disrupt the entire learning and system
of prediction.
176 Cf. 2 G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONS TO
PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION AND EDUCATION 562
(1904) (“She works by intuition and feeling; fear, anger, pity, love, and most of the emotions
have a wider range and greater intensity. If she abandons her natural naïveté and takes up the
burden of guiding and accounting for her life by consciousness, she is likely to lose more than
she gains, according to the old saw that she who deliberates is lost.”); see also Luhmann,
supra note 126, at 97 (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to
contingent events and you have to neglect . . . the possibility of disappointment . . . because it
is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what else to do. The alternative
is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty.”).
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that.” Hence, in answering the above question, the formula now reads out as
“the probability of being among the 60% cohort given that June tested
positive equals the probability of testing positive given that the patient is
among the 60% cohort times the probability of being among the 60% cohort,
divided by that very same quantity plus the probability of testing positive
given that the patient is not among the 60% cohort (i.e., that she rather is
among the 40% cohort) times the probability that she is not among the 60%
cohort (i.e., that she is rather among the 40% cohort).” Bayesian updating
is, thus, premised on two “mutually exclusive and exhaustive”177 sets of
patients to whom the new information (i.e., the positive test result) applies:
those who, indeed, turn out to be among the 60% cohort (after going through
treatment) and those who turn out to be false positives, thus, who are not
among the 60% cohort of treatment success (but, given the positive test, ex
ante look as if they would be).178
In June’s example, we know that out of every 100 women with her type
of Stage IV ovarian cancer, sixty react “successfully”179 to chemotherapy.
Let’s further assume that, based on biopsy samples of patients’ tumors, a
predictive response test were available that would be 80% accurate among
the 60% cohort. In other words, eight out of every ten (or forty-eight out of
sixty) patients would accurately test positive as likely chemo responders
prior to chemotherapy treatment. The test, however, is problematic in that it
(for some yet unknown reason) is less accurate among the 40% cohort of
patients who do not react successfully to chemotherapy treatment. Let’s
assume here that, out of those forty patients, 55% (or twenty-two patients)
also test positive (i.e., falsely as being among the 60% cohort). Finally, let’s
assume that June’s biopsy sample has tested positive. Accordingly, what is
the probability that June will respond successfully to her future
chemotherapy treatment? If you ask June, her intuitive non-Bayesian
probability judgment will likely tell her that 80% of correct results as being
among the 60% cohort “sounds really promising” and, assuming she literally
calculates in this regard, that her original 1.5-to-1 odds (sixty over forty) of
treatment success (her prior belief) have now significantly improved to 4 to
1 (eighty over twenty) in favor of chemotherapy success (her posterior
belief). It is, indeed, correct that June has a bit of reason for statistically177

Gerd Gigerenzer & Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian Reasoning Without
Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 684, 685 (1995).
178 See generally David M. Eddy, Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine:
Problems and Opportunities, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES
249, 253–54 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University
Press 1982); Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, supra note 177, at 685–86; Patel et al., supra note 157,
at 56.
179 Again, “success” in this context is simply defined as killing a significant number of
cancer cells and, thus, theoretically contributing significantly to the prolongation of the
patient’s life. It does not take into account the potential magnitude of adverse effects and
their consequent impact on the patient’s quality of life.
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driven optimism. Nevertheless, only about half the amount of improved
odds which June may have intuitively calculated in her non-Bayesian way
have actually occurred as a result of her positive test. By ignoring false
positives among the 40% cohort, June is almost 100% more optimistic in her
probability judgment and in updating her belief of treatment odds than,
mathematically, she has reason for. Here is Bayes’ Theorem applied to the
above facts:
𝑃 𝑅∣𝑆

𝑃 𝑆∣𝑅 𝑃 𝑅
𝑃 𝑆∣𝑅 𝑃 𝑅
𝑃 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 𝑃 ~𝑅
.8 .6
.8 .6
. 55 . 4

. 48
.7

48
60

48
60
60
100

60
100
22
40

40
100

68.6%

The probability of being among the 60% cohort given that June tested
positive rounds out to 68.6%.180 Hence, the positive test result has, indeed,
improved June’s originally known (statistical) odds that she will turn out to
be among the 60% cohort after her chemotherapy treatment. Nonetheless,
what she believed to be her prior odds (1.5 to 1) only improved statistically
to approximately 2.18 to 1 (.48/.7 over .22/.7), not even close to the overoptimistic, false-positives-ignoring odds of 4 to 1. Rather, when confronted
with the new evidence and current signal of an 80% accurate positive test,
June may prefer, in a typical bad-Bayesian manner, to rely on the more
optimistic direction in which her treatment-success beliefs are updating
(80% accurate of 60% success, i.e., being among the forty-eight out of sixty
women with true-positive tests) instead of also properly accounting for the
less optimistic direction (55% inaccurate of 40% non-success, i.e., being
among the twenty-two out of forty women with false-positive tests). Indeed,
for purposes of psychological comfort (i.e., sustained bad-Bayesian metautility), she may additionally engage in confirmation-bias behavior181 and

180 In order to proof this number, Bayes’ Theorem can also be run in the opposite direction
by answering the question: What is the probability that June will, unfortunately, not respond
successfully to her future chemotherapy treatment (i.e., be among the 40% cohort),
notwithstanding the fact that she has tested positive for the 60% cohort? Accordingly:
22 40
𝑃 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 𝑃 ~𝑅
40 100
𝑃 ~𝑅 ∣ 𝑆
22 40
48 60
𝑃 𝑆 ∣ ~𝑅 𝑃 ~𝑅
𝑃 𝑆∣𝑅 𝑃 𝑅
40 100
60 100
. 55 . 4
. 22
31.4%
. 55 . 4
.8 .6
.7
Thus, June’s probability of being among the 40% cohort notwithstanding that June tested
positive for the 60% cohort rounds out to 31.4%. In other words, if June were among 100
similarly situated women who all tested positive, statistically, close to a third of those 100
women would still not react “successfully” to chemotherapy.
181 See supra note 121.
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“round up” her positive test that comes with an 80% accuracy182 to near
certainty (i.e., 100% predictive test accuracy)183 of future successful
chemotherapy treatment, thus, crowding out all other possible (and, ultrarationally and wholistically, perhaps more beneficial) treatment options. As
a result and by means of this calculative example only, June (and, to an
empirically proven extent, also her attending oncologist)184 can be expected
to short-circuit her informed-consent decision in a bad-Bayesian manner
because, in full alignment with her preferences, non-Bayesian updating
allows her to (more) confidently believe that the immediate commencement
of chemotherapy treatment, as urged by Dr. Savoy, is now a no-brainer and
almost surefire solution given her positive predictive test result.185
III. INFORMED CONSENT AND RATIONAL PATIENT APATHY
Up to this point in the Article, we have mapped out how uncertainty
implicates complex medical and end-of-life decision-making. We now turn
in this part to how the aspirational world of law, specifically the law of
informed consent, and the real world of actual patient and physician
182

But only among the 60% responder cohort.
For example, June may also “add” the twelve patients with false-negative test results to
her optimistic “calculus” by telling herself that there are even more women who will respond
“successfully” to chemotherapy treatment in the 60% cohort than the test accurately predicts,
namely, the women with false-negative test results. Statistically, however, there is not a single
additional woman in June’s predictive-test cohort, namely, a woman with a correct truepositive test result, that could also be among the twelve patients with an incorrect falsenegative test result within the 60% cohort. In other words, June may intuitively add the twelve
false-negatives to the original total of sixty women who react “successfully” to chemotherapy,
now arriving at seventy-two women overall, rather than correctly adding the twelve false
negatives only to the forty-eight true positives within the 60% cohort. In other words, June
will not understand that the forty-eight correct true-positive test results and the twelve
incorrect false-negative ones are mutually exclusive.
184 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer & Adrian Edwards, Simple Tools for Understanding Risks:
From Innumeracy to Insight, 327 BRIT. MED. J. 741, 741 (2003) (“If patients knew about th[e]
degree of variability and statistical innumeracy [of their attending doctors] they would be
justly alarmed.”); Patel et al., supra note 157, at 56 (“Clinicians often overestimate the impact
of a positive test, failing to appreciate the importance of the base rate (prevalence) of the
disease they are considering.”); see also Eddy, supra note 178, at 253–59; Mirjam Annina
Jenny, Niklas Keller & Gerd Gigerenzer, Assessing Minimal Medical Statistical Literacy
Using the Quick Risk Test: A Prospective Observational Study in Germany, 8 BRIT. MED. J.
OPEN (2018), https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/8/8/e020847.full.pdf.
185 As a reminder, all of June’s (and, likely, Dr. Savoy’s) non-Bayesian updating also takes
place in the larger context of Knightian uncertainty that is fully, irrationally discounted. An
ultra-rational, good-Bayesian decision-maker would be aware and would take into account
that, when non-discounting, Knightian uncertainty could mean that there is some unknown
unknown characteristic, unique to June, which renders her predictive response test results
entirely false. Since the probability of this unknown unknown characteristic (or of any other
Knightian uncertain clinical condition) remains immeasurable under all circumstances and
therefore cannot be specified and inserted into a Bayesian formula, an even larger calculative
dilemma would ensue. See infra text accompanying notes 207–210.
183
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decision-making, specifically the phenomenon of rational apathy, react to
uncertainty. It is well- covered ground that informed consent law on the
books compared to informed consent as it is actually practiced are very
different—that the real life implementation of informed consent law is
largely inefficient, disjunctive with reality, and even potentially harmful. As
we will explain, the largest, common-denominator driver behind these
suboptimal outcomes in real-world complex medical decision-making is
rational patient (and, relatedly, rational physician) apathy. Decisional apathy
as the default,186 “satisficing”187 herd-behavior of patients and health care
professionals alike, relegates informed consent law to an ineffectual doctrine
that deceptively signals an illusion of autonomy where there is little to none.
A. Informed Consent as Utopian Ideal
In the United States, according to both legal and ethical principles,
medical care should accord with the individual patient’s values and
preferences. Patient autonomy, as implemented in law via the doctrines of
informed consent and substituted judgment, is the primary principle that
governs medical decisions, including those made on behalf of patients who
have lost decisional capacity.188 In ideal circumstances, patients can express
their preferences directly to their physicians at the appropriate time. When
a patient retains decisional capacity, the patient’s choice may be irrational,
unreasonable, or unwise, but the principle of autonomy, with limited
exceptions, protects these choices.
Ideally, the law of informed consent would always ensure that patients’
decisions reflect their known individual preferences at the time of decisionmaking. Informed consent is ethically and legally required for virtually all
medical procedures and treatment relationships. As to the information
disclosed, in general, informed consent requires a discussion of the risks,189
186

See, e.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Making Better Decisions: From Measuring to Constructing
Preferences, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S17, S18 (Supp. 2005) (defining default as “the option
selected if no active decision is made”).
187 Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL.
REV. 129, 136 (1956) (introducing and explaining the concept of “satisficing”).
188 See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE
HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND
CAMPAIGNS 51, 51–52 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (“Autonomy is paramount for patients who
possess decision making capacity, but it is also a major consideration for patients who lack
this capacity. Their wishes must be respected by the relatives or other health care proxies
who make decisions on their behalf.”) The American Medical Association (AMA) has
acknowledged that patients have a right of self-determination that includes the right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment, and that this right is not lost when a patient loses decisional
capacity. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Decisions Near the End of Life,
267 JAMA 2229, 2229–33 (1992).
189 As commentators on medical consent have explained, “[t]he magnitude of the risks and
their frequency should receive special emphasis. Also considered are alternative treatments
and their benefits, risks, and measured utility, the likely results of no treatment; and the
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benefits, and alternatives to the proposed medical intervention, including the
option of doing nothing, or withholding or withdrawing care.190 The
protection of patient autonomy that informed consent law provides is, as we
have seen, only as good as the quality and accuracy of the information on
which the consent is based and the individual decision-maker’s ability to
comprehend and process that information.
Numerous commentators have observed that this view of informed
consent is, in fact, utopian or illusory.191 As George Annas has observed,
informed consent is “more accurately termed informed choice,”192 and
because of the doctrine’s “implications for power and accountability”193
critical evaluation of its limitations is essential. Annas argues that courts
have not gone far enough in requiring physicians to discuss relevant
information with patients.194 And Peter Schuck, in discussing the “informed
consent gap” between what idealists such as judges and medical ethicists
probability of a good outcome with the proposed strategy.” See Timothy J. Paterick et al.,
Medical Informed Consent: General Considerations for Physicians, 83 MAYO CLINIC PROC.
313, 316 (2008).
190 See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-11 (3d ed. 2015) (explaining
that factors to be disclosed include diagnosis, nature and purpose of treatment, risks of
treatment and, in some circumstances comparative data on the treating physician’s skills,
alternatives to the proposed treatment, prognosis with and without the treatment, and conflicts
of interest). The scope of required disclosure varies by jurisdiction, but typically follows one
of two models, with states about evenly divided between the two. See BARRY R. FURROW ET
AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, PATIENT SAFETY, AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 195 (7th ed.
2013). In states that have adopted the professional standard of disclosure, physicians must
disclose all information that a reasonable physician would disclose under the circumstances.
See, e.g., Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002) ( “A physician has a duty in the
exercise of ordinary care to inform a patient of the dangers of, possible negative consequences
of, and alternatives to a proposed medical treatment or procedure. To recover against a
physician for failure to provide such information, the patient generally is required to establish
by expert testimony whether and to what extent any information should have been
disclosed.”); see also FURROW ET AL., supra, at § 3-10(a) (describing the physician-based
standard of disclosure). In jurisdictions that follow the patient-oriented standard, the
physician must disclose what a reasonable patient would want to know under the
circumstances. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs
v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); see also FURROW ET AL., supra, at § 3-10(b) (describing the
reasonable patient standard of disclosure).
191 See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS,
AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998) (critiquing the operation of informed consent in practice but
not advocating that it be abandoned); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 411 (2006); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899
(1994); Angela Fagerlin et al., An Informed Decision? Breast Cancer Patients and Their
Knowledge About Treatment, 64 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 303–12 (2006).
192 GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO THE
RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 113 (2004).
193 Id. at 113.
194 Id. at 119 (noting that most courts, for example, do not require that a physician disclose
the patient’s prognosis unless the patient asks and conclude that prognosis need only be
disclosed if it was material in the patient’s particular case).
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envision and what realists such as physicians know to be true, argues that the
gap is essentially structural and “reflects the constraints imposed by human
psychology, the physician-patient relationship, the tort law system, and an
increasingly cost conscious health care delivery system.”195 He concludes
that informed consent as envisioned by the idealists is mostly unachievable
and that attempting to close the consent gap by imposing more onerous
obligations via tort law would fail and might further widen the gap.196 Most
of the critiques of informed consent doctrine agree that there is no practical,
cost-effective way to narrow the gap between the ideal of disclosure,
comprehension, and fully-informed, authentic choice and the actual practice
of consent between physicians and patients.
When a patient is asked to make an informed decision to consent to,
for example, a surgical procedure to remove his gall bladder, the physician
will describe the purpose of the surgery, its risks and benefits, and
alternatives to the procedure, if any, and the patient then will sign a consent
form indicating a willingness to undergo the surgery. Assuming that the
surgery is successful, the patient anticipates that he will return to his
previous, healthy life. In the context of decisions about whether to consent
to a potentially debilitating chemotherapeutic regime with limited likelihood
of effectiveness for patients in general and for any one patient in particular
however, the consent process becomes more complicated because of various
aspects of bounded rationality, including clinical uncertainty as to prognosis
and response to treatment. In the face of this clinical uncertainty (and the
unknown impact of various forms of non-clinical uncertainty), June may
rationally abandon the attempt to balance risks, benefits, and alternatives and
simply consent to the proposed treatment. To decline treatment in these
circumstances is to leave a potential path to cure or at least life-prolongation
untaken; despite inherent uncertainty, June may—almost unavoidably
must—consent.
This sort of “informed consent” which often results in provision of
what turns out ex post to be unsuccessful treatment (and also in utilization of
life-prolonging technologies at the end of life in ways that may be
inconsistent with patient preferences), may seem to follow from the
autonomy principle, but in fact it results from an overly mechanistic view of
the physician’s role in guiding end-of-life decision-making. Physicians are
rarely called upon to make the actual decision about whether to withdraw
life-sustaining medical treatment and, even when the patient or surrogate
requests that the physician decide,197 the physician has an ethical obligation
195

See Schuck, supra note 191, at 905.
Id. at 938–39.
197 See generally Arthur S. Elstein, Gretchen B. Chatman & Sara J. Knight, Patients’ Values
and Clinical Substituted Judgments: The Case of Localized Prostate Cancer, 24(4) HEALTH
PSYCHOL. S85 (Supp. 2005).
196
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to do so based on an understanding of the particular patient’s values and
goals of care.198 Physicians instead usually are asked to implement decisions
made by patients (or their agents), after offering one or more treatment
options. Because the autonomy principle focuses on the patient’s
preferences, the physician can, if she chooses, avoid the more complex
discussion of whether initiating or continuing treatment serves the patient’s
best interests as a medical matter, even if the patient consents to that
treatment.
Consider, in this context, the advance-directive question regarding
preferences for cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the case of cardiac arrest in
terminally-ill patients such as June. There are at least three scenarios in
which a decision may occur, including a decision to postpone the decision.
First, a patient may be asked, “Would you like to fill out a DNR form?”
Second, the patient may be presented with the form and asked whether she
would like the health care team to attempt resuscitation or not, and the patient
may make a choice. Finally, the patient may say that she prefers to answer
this question later (because, in her mind, the question is not “ripe”) and may
therefore, by default, leave the question to her physician or family because
she may experience cardiac arrest without having confronted and answered
the question. Studies indicate that many patients prefer to leave the
resuscitation question open and let their physicians or family members
decide, should the occasion arise.199
More generally, the implications of the informed consent doctrine’s
limitations for June are now obvious and, in some dimensions, unavoidable.
June’s “informed” consent to the various steps in her treatment and life
prolongation (debulking surgery with intraperitoneal chemotherapy, postsurgery chemotherapy, ventilation and feeding tube) was never, except in the
most limited sense, informed. At the outset, her oncologist withheld detailed
198 For an interesting case study of a situation in which the patient delegated the decision about
whether to have coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery to his physician, see Alan W.
Cross & Larry R. Churchill, Ethical and Cultural Dimensions of Informed Consent: A Case
Study and Analysis, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 110, 110–12 (1982) (explaining that in this
“paternalism with permission” situation, consent is not invalidated but rather requires the
physician to “gain as complete an understanding as possible of the patient’s values, culture,
and life-style . . . [to] appreciate the larger significance of the treatment choice for the
patient”). On general choice delegation behavior, i.e., deciding “whether to make a choice on
[one’s] own or to delegate choice-making authority to someone else,” see, for example,
Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez et al., The Intrinsic Value of Choice: The Propensity to UnderDelegate in the Face of Potential Gains and Losses, 54 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 187, 188 (2017).
199 Evidence also suggests that patients regularly delegate the particular decision about
whether to attempt resuscitation in the case of cardiac arrest to their physicians or family
members. See C. Puchalski et al., Patients Who Want Their Family and Physician to Make
Resuscitation Decisions for Them: Observations from SUPPORT and HELP, 48 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y S84–S90 (Supp. 2000) (concluding that most patients prefer to leave
resuscitation decisions to their family and physicians rather than asserting their own
preferences—70.8% in HELP and 78% in SUPPORT).
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information about her prognosis, which meant that even the very first step of
consent to surgery was made by June without any real understanding of her
statistical life expectancy with and without surgery, the details of risks versus
benefits to surgery, and the overall impact of surgery on her short-term health
and well-being. If she had received and ultra-rationally understood more
detailed statistical information about prognosis with and without surgery, it
is possible that she might have elected to forego surgery, or follow-up
chemotherapy and focus on palliation of her symptoms. She might have
chosen thriving over surviving. Of course, it is impossible to know whether,
in one of these latter scenarios, she would have lived longer overall, or for
less time, and with what extent of avoidable treatment side effects compared
with the effects of the disease process itself on her quality of life.
Finally, there is an additional layer of decisional complexity that, for
purposes of keeping this discussion relatively simple, we exclude. One
estimate suggests that, in the final weeks of life, approximately 42% of dying
patients aged sixty or older require assistance with decision-making and, of
that 42%, about 70% of these patients eventually lose decisional capacity
entirely.200 Another couple of studies place these numbers even higher in the
context of decisions about life-sustaining treatment, concluding that 75% of
patients with life-threatening illnesses and 96% of patients in intensive care
units have lost decisional capacity at the point of decision.201 For these
individuals, a surrogate decision-maker, typically a family member or a
legally-appointed proxy who often also is a family member, must make
difficult choices on behalf of the patient about how much therapeutic and
life-prolonging medical care to request or accept. For patients who have lost
decisional capacity, an autonomy-based model of medical decision-making
does not work well unless the patients were previously willing to discuss
their preferences with family and physicians in advance. Often, however,
when a patient loses decisional capacity, insufficient evidence of the
patient’s wishes will leave physicians and family members in a dilemma as
to whether to implement, or to continue, providing therapeutic treatment or
life-sustaining care. Uncertainty about prognosis in the case of terminal
illness adds to the complexity of decisions about withholding or withdrawing
treatment or life-supportive measures.202

200

See Maria J. Silveira et al., Advance Directives and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision
Making Before Death, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211–18 (2010).
201 See N.G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of Life Support from the Critically
Ill, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 309–15 (1990); Annette Rid & David Wendler, Can We Improve
Treatment Decision-Making for Incapacitated Patients?, 40(5) HASTINGS CTR. REP. 36–45
(2010).
202 For a more detailed discussion of how surrogate decision-making adds complexity to endof-life choices, see Noah & Feigenson, supra note 3, at 758–66.
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B. Rational Apathy in General
In addition to the fact that most physicians are not trained in discussing
end-of-life decision-making,203 and therefore may avoid the discussion or
even misrepresent facts in order to dampen the emotional impact of what
they believe to be the clinical reality, informed consent as a process also fails
because of the limiting effects of bounded rationality, opportunism,
Knightian uncertainty and non-Bayesian updating. Although the ideal of
informed consent suggests that June, even though in real life she is not an
ultra-rationalist, will receive and be able to “correctly” process at the best of
her abilities the latest evidence-based information and counseling about the
relative merits of choosing among different therapeutic options, the reality is
that this course of joint action is highly unlikely. Based on the data and
trends described above, it is more likely that June will sign badly drafted
consent forms after lack of adequate explanation from her physicians who,
like her, have multiple incentives to avoid thorough and careful discussion
and to allow the default mechanism of maximal care utilization to drive her
future treatment. Accordingly, the current law and resultant practice of
informed consent are likely to fail June on multiple levels and at multiple
decision points during her illness because the ideal of informed consent—an
ultra-rational, “hyper-autonomous”204 decision based solely on scientific
evidence and evaluation of risks, benefits, alternatives, best practices, and
personal preferences—remains both illusive and elusive in end-of-life
medical practice.
Moreover, the underlying causes that drive systemically suboptimal
complex medical decision-making go much deeper: The logical result of
ambivalence205 and ambiguity206 affecting the rationality of all human
decision-making is an infinite regression dilemma, i.e., an infinite calculative
quest for a confident utility equilibrium.207 What starts out in the
Williamsonian formula208 as confident calculation, upon introduction of
203

See Shannon Griffin et al., JAMA Infographic Visualizing Health Policy: Medicare and
End-of-Life Care, 316 JAMA 1754 (2016) (illustrating that, in 2016, 68% of physicians
reported not being trained to discuss end-of-life care).
204 See infra Part IV.B.1.
205 As accompanied by the opportunistic dissonance of the patient- and/or physiciandecisionmaker; see Cooper, supra note 75 and accompanying text.
206 Similarly accompanied by rational vacuity. See Reich-Graefe, supra note 32, at 69, and
text accompanying note 82.
207 See supra notes 116–118 and accompanying text.
Cf. LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 3 (2d rev. ed. 1972) (“Personalistic views [of probability] hold
that probability measures the confidence that a particular individual has in the truth of a
particular proposition, for example, the proposition that it will rain tomorrow. These views
postulate that the individual concerned is in some ways ‘reasonable,’ but they do not deny the
possibility that two reasonable individuals faced with the same evidence may have different
degrees of confidence in the truth of the same proposition.”).
208 See Williamson, supra note 47, at 467, and text accompanying note 59.
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Knightian uncertainty and decisional ultra-rationality, becomes complete,
unsuppressed awareness that there always remains an unknown and
rationally unknowable probability209 that estimated utility projections may
turn out to be 100% incorrect. In other words, human decision-makers may
be completely misled by their own ultra-rational calculations. Any
consciously known lack of knowledge in relative terms (i.e., known and
knowable unknowns) affirms the impact of strategic uncertainty on rational
decision-making. Any consciously known lack of knowledge in absolute
terms (i.e., unknown and unknowable unknowns) affirms the impact of
Knightian uncertainty on rational decision-making. In addition, the degree
of both impacts on any decision to be made is—at least, ex ante—also
unknowable in absolute, calculatively immutable terms.
Furthermore, when both strategic and Knightian uncertainty are fully
aggregated over all past and future decisions during an entire human lifespan,
there is now 100% certainty—and a concomitant 100% cognitive
awareness—of zero ultra-rational confidence for any prospective decisions
aimed at positioning oneself towards a Knightian uncertain (and therefore
possibly unattainable) future. As a logical endpoint, ultra-rational human
decision-makers would now have to remain in a state of rational stasis—not
mere rational apathy with regard to some aspects of their utility calculations
and decision-making, but broad, all-encompassing paralysis given their
inability to confidently calculate and predict any and all future events and
their accompanying hypothetical utility effects. Accordingly, it may be
posited that an ultra-rational person, consciously and completely aware of
this constantly recurring and inescapable choice situation, would make only
one rational decision over and over again—namely, to rationally resign
herself from making any decision, i.e., to not just wait things out, but to never
decide anything ever again (other than to reiteratively “decide” to never
change her only safe-haven and zero-cognitive-load default of not deciding
anything on its merits).210 In other words, a fully ultra-rational person would
decide, once and for all, to never opt out of perfect irrationality.211
209

Based on the limited aspects of human existence positively known and knowable to human
actors, for example, in June’s scenario, the limited prospective knowability of both clinically
and non-clinically uncertain variables unique to her personal situation.
210 The quotation marks on “decide” indicate that this “decision”—similar to decision-making
in the Coasean world, but this time on the opposite end of the decisional spectrum—is not a
genuine decision. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
211 See supra Figure 1. Taken to its logical extreme, an alternative in this realm of perfectly
irrational decision-making, without the constraints of time, space and therefore, mortality,
would be to only make completely random decisions for eternity, that is, to rationally resign
from predicting future outcomes, calculating utilities and monitoring performance (as rational
decision-making preparation and validation modes) but to still ratify and implement choices,
albeit entirely random ones. In eternity, all choices are equal in that they are of identical
utility in terms of substantive rationality given the logical absence of any scarcity-induced
need for value judgments. Arguably then, choosing randomly always carries the lowest
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In “a real world that is both bounded and perceptually laden”212 and
that introduces the certainty of human mortality into all human decisionmaking processes aimed at orienting time-limited human lives towards a
scarce future, neither decisional paralysis nor complete decisional
randomness is genuinely available to humans endowed with some
rationality. As sentient beings, humans always have some self-awareness
and capability to reflect on their mortality, and so recognize their captivity
in a relentlessly progressing linear time and space continuum that constantly
reduces their individual future lives. In this real world of constant
opportunity cost, it may be posited that most people ultimately will rationally
resign from attempting to make as informed a decision as possible—given
its impossibility due to the impacts of strategic and Knightian uncertainty,
fully aggregated. In other words, people will opt for the minimally-rational
choice to remain rationally apathetic—to not acknowledge and therefore to
not know what is otherwise positively knowable within the realm of their
bounded rationality. Rational apathy, as another rationally delusional form
of blinding oneself against what otherwise one could know, often, but not
always, turns out to be the decision-making mode with the highest remaining
utility, including the lowest cognitive load. People will “not be induced to
take action . . . because [they] do[ ] not know ex ante whether investigating
any particular proposed . . . action will pay off.”213
A starting point for purposes of describing rational apathy globally—
in terms that apply to all subject-matter contexts of human rational decisionmaking—is to organize decision-making into separate, consecutive parts.
“In broad terms,”214 four sequential segments of decision-making can be
distinguished:
1. initiation—generation of proposals for resource utilization
and structuring of contracts;
2. ratification—choice of the decision initiatives to be
implemented;
3. implementation—execution of ratified decisions; and
4. monitoring—measurement of the performance of decision
agents and implementation of rewards.215
Rational apathy particularly applies to the contemplative stages of
decision-making (initiation, ratification, and monitoring).
First, it
deliberately reduces the rational “payload” that good Bayesians would have
to carry in order to arrive at a highest-utility choice during the ratification
decisional cost—but only in terms of procedural rationality (the need for which does also not
exist in eternity).
212 MATTHEW B. MILES, MICHAEL A. HUBERMAN & JOHNNY SALDAÑA, QUALITATIVE DATA
ANALYSIS: A METHODS SOURCEBOOK 7 (3d ed. 2014).
213 Clark, supra note 68, at 782.
214 Fama & Jensen, supra note 36, at 303.
215 Id.
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stage. Second, it also reduces rational payload otherwise necessary to
achieve a highest-utility outcome at the ultimate conclusion of the decisional
process by refusing to acknowledge that this outcome may require further
decisional revision and course correction during the implementation and
monitoring stages. Without rational apathy, the procedural rationality of
decision-making alone will regularly constitute a daunting task for any good
Bayesian.216 If one adds both start and end points to the above four-stage
procedural sequence of initiation, ratification, implementation and
monitoring,217 there is now a plethora of procedural challenges and
constraints, which June as a good-Bayesian, ultra-rational decision-maker218
would have to acknowledge and diligently overcome in order to arrive at
both an optimal decision and an optimal decisional outcome. A goodBayesian, ultra-rational decision-making process can be summarized as
follows:219

216

See infra Figure 2.
I.e., the initial choice situation necessitating the decision-making process as well as the
eventual choice outcome once a decision made has been fully implemented (and is therefore,
chronologically speaking, no longer subject to revision or correction).
218 Cf. BRUNO DE FINETTI, THEORY OF PROBABILITY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTORY TREATMENT
470–71 (Wiley 2017) (1974) (“A decision must . . . be based on probabilities; that is the
posterior probabilities as evaluated on the basis of all information so far available. This is the
main point to note. In order to make decisions, we first require a statistical theory which
provides conclusions in the form of posterior probabilities. The Bayesian approach does this:
other approaches explicitly refuse to do this.”).
219 See generally THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO
CONSENT TO TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
(1998); Baruch Fischhoff, Decision Research Strategies, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S9 (Supp.
2005). See also Butkus, supra note 65, at 93 (“First, it is necessary that the moral agent be
able to express a choice—this is not tied to any particular medium of communication (for
example, the patient does not need to be able to speak to do so), but rather, the patient must
possess the ability to make his or her choices known. Second, the patient must be able to
understand the information germane to the health care decision. If the patient cannot
understand the information at hand, there is no way to act upon it or to voice a preference for
one intervention over another. Third, the patient must appreciate the significance of the
information and the expected outcomes. If there is no way for the patient to gauge risk or to
weigh outcomes, there is no way for the patient to take ownership of the decision—there is a
fundamental disconnect between the decision and the outcome. Fourth, the patient must be
able to reason with the germane information in a manner that allows him or her to logically
weigh treatment options.”).
217
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Figure 2
Decisional Stages and Procedural Rationality
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Accordingly, rational apathy behavior directly correlates with and
reduces or even eliminates the information, evaluation and monitoring work
to be done during the process of decision-making as outlined in Figure 2
above. As a behavioral default of decisional “laziness,” rational apathy
either refuses to perform this choice work at all or performs the task in only
a perfunctory fashion. Rational apathy may therefore be defined globally as
the iterative rational decision (i) to not become (fully) informed within the
objectively available and subjectively reachable bounds of uncertainty and
scarcity; (ii) to not (fully) evaluate the current choice situation in the
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present;220 (iii) to not (fully) formulate utility judgments on the merits (other
than the reiterative utility judgment that engagement in judging matters on
their respective merits is suboptimal behavior compared to not making utility
judgments);221 and (iv) to not (fully) monitor and, where necessary, initiate,
ratify and implement revisional decisions with regard to the utility of actual
outcomes resulting from the refusal decisions made in steps (i) through
(iii).222 As a result, a rationally-apathetic decision-maker will arrive at a
current-low-cost223 default decision that is a negative decision224 as well as a
non-active decision.225 Prior to being confronted with complex and timesensitive medical decision-making, rational apathy will discourage decisionmakers from even attempting actively-involved, contemplative decisions.
Rather, with minimal decisional effort, the decision-maker opts into the
default: to “stay the course,” to not make a change in position as regards the
status quo and its trajectory, to wait and not see,226 and to only revisit the
issue in the future when unavoidably dire or noticeably fortunate
circumstances will pierce through the rationally-apathetic “default armor.”227

220

Thus, aspects (i) and (ii) of rational apathy relate to the initiation stage of rational decisionmaking.
221 Accordingly, this aspect (iii) of rational apathy relates to the decisional ratification stage.
222 Correspondingly, this aspect (iv) of rational apathy relates to the implementation and
monitoring stages of rational decision-making.
223 As distinguished from the long-term, “existentially-heavy” costs accruing from rationallyapathetic choice behavior. See infra notes 282–289 and accompanying text.
224 Namely, a decision not to decide on the merits.
225 Since the default decision is to remain passive and to not cognitively engage with the
merits. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 186, at S19.
226 Wait-and-see decisional behavior requires a contemplative, engaged-with-the-merits
decisional stance because it involves a low-payload judgment that the time is not yet ripe for
making a final decision on the merits. As a result, this decisional behavior will continue to
monitor the evolving choice situation. Rationally-apathetic wait-and-not-see behavior is
decisional avoidance behavior aimed at not having to confront the same, modified or worse
choice situation ever again. Its goal is to permanently (if only, reiteratively) disengage with
having to make any (final) decision on any merits.
227 Such point in time will arrive when the decisional laziness and lethargy induced by rational
apathy loses the meta-utility of non-Bayesian updating. At that time, the strategy of “staying
the course” and following the same procedure of yesterdays and yesteryears (which helped
insulate and sustain one’s belief system as a bad Bayesian) will come to an abrupt end. For
example, a diagnosis of terminal illness will bring to an end the non-Bayesian utility of a
lifelong denial of mortality—as in the general belief (or attitude) that there will always be
more time later to do something that one actually wants or needs to do now (but does not feel
“ready” to make an affirmative decision on now).
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C. Rational Patient Apathy
If you do not know where you are going, it does not matter how
you get there.—Anonymous228
Separate from the description of rational apathy as a general decisional
phenomenon, rational apathy theory, “of critical importance in corporate law
analysis . . . and corporate governance,”229 also can be utilized in the current
context to discuss more specifically (i) the behavior of rationally-apathetic
patients in their individual, bad-Bayesian decision-making and (ii) the
collective impact of this behavior—when fully aggregated among the totality
of rationally-apathetic patient decision-making—on the delivery of health
care, particularly at the end of life. In the broader sense, rational patient
apathy applies (and is generated and reinforced) within four discrete
dimensions:
1. the default, minimally-rational informed-consent decisionmaking of individual patients (rational patient apathy in the
narrower sense);
2. the minimally-rational decisional support of, and influence
over,230 patient decision-making by individual doctors
(rational physician apathy);

228

See ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 9 (4th ed. 2014).
Ige Omotayo Bolodeoku, Corporate Governance in the New Information and
Communication Age: An Interrogation of Rational Apathy Theory, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 109,
109 (2007). See also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 81 (1933) (being the first to describe rational
shareholder apathy as “the normal apathy of the small stockholder . . . such that he will either
fail to return his proxy vote, or will sign on the dotted line, returning his proxy to the
[managers] of the corporation”); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390–400 (1986);
Clark, supra note 68, at 779–80; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983).
230 Even though the legally-relevant decision-making, i.e., the act of consenting, is performed
by the patient, the patient’s treatment choice, in most situations, is ultimately as much causally
connected with the physician’s decision-making as it is with the patient’s. See, e.g., Richard
G. Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics 19 (NBER, Working Paper No.
10881, 2004) (“Physicians commonly must choose from among many competing approaches
to treating a particular condition and trusting patients rely centrally on the recommendations
of the physician. This makes the physician largely responsible for the consequences of the
complex choice.”). Accordingly, from a social-ontology perspective, informed consent is not
the individual act of a patient at all; it is an instance of “joint agency,” i.e., “a single action
performed by many individuals,” namely, patient, physician and, possibly, additional healthservices providers. Philip Pettit, Corporate Agency: The Lesson of the Discursive Dilemma,
in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY 249, 249 (Marija Jankovic &
Kirk Ludwig eds., 2018); see also Wendy Nelson et al., Basic and Applied Decision Making
in Cancer Control, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S3, S8 (Supp. 2005) (“In theory, the physician
and patient construct the decision tree together, thereby making it a shared decision process.”).
229
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3. in terms of agency costs,231 the merger and mutual
enforcement of rational patient apathy and rational
physician apathy within the patient-physician relationship
(vertical rational patient-physician apathy); and
4. in terms of social costs,232 the un(der)informed
overutilization of medical care across the entire health care
delivery system as a result of the totality of vertical rational
patient-physician apathy occurring system-wide in a large
majority of all patient-physician relationships (horizontal
rational patient-physician apathy).
In the individual-efficiency dimension of single-patient decisionmaking, rational apathy theory models and predicts that patients will not
attempt to fully inform themselves of all material, reasonably available
information regarding their prospective medical treatment requiring
consent—because the opportunity cost of good-Bayesian information
gathering and processing will substantially outweigh the default-choice
expected utility of rational patient apathy.233 In other words, personal
investments (of time, physical and emotional energy, and money) in
diligently and systematically comprehending, selecting and monitoring
options and courses of medical treatment are deemed irrational. As a
default, the minimally-rational patient will want to stay away as much as
feasible from the costly, never-ending calculative morass of applied
procedural rationality234 and non-biased, ultra-rational Bayesian updating.
Rational patient apathy, on an individual patient basis, is therefore
efficient—most of the time—for both decisional utility (by making cheap
decisions in terms of transaction costs) and overall welfare utility (by
arriving at a large majority of beneficial outcomes over the fully aggregated
number of rationally-apathetic medical decisions).235 Rational apathy,
231

I.e., as transaction costs that (i) are opportunistically caused by the physician and
materialize in the patient’s suboptimal decision-making, and (ii) are opportunistically caused
by the patient and materialize in the physician’s suboptimal support of the patient’s decisionmaking.
232 I.e., as negative externalities borne by the overall health care delivery system and by the
totality of patients and physicians in it, caused by both patients and physicians as a result of
their suboptimal, opportunistic decision-making and decisional support, respectively.
233 Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 186, at S18 (stating that “people may wish to avoid the effort
and cost of changing from a default, preferring to accept a default to making an active,
effortful choice”).
234 As outlined in Figure 2, supra.
235 As discussed below (see infra Part IV.A), this efficiency clearly ends at the end of life and
the decisional costs of a lifetime of rationally-apathetic decision-making will then become
payable. Additionally, not every rationally-apathetic decision during one’s lifetime is
efficient in terms of its own overall utility. Thus, more activist patients can be expected to be
better in “selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior (see infra note 293 and accompanying
text)—namely, to be able to discriminate more competently between choice situations that
warrant rationally-apathetic responses and those that require more ultra-rational choice
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however, inevitably inhibits individual decisional systematicity as well as
any future preference for systematic decision-making.
Rational patient apathy is also supported by rational patient ignorance.
In general, the notion of “rational ignorance,” introduced in the social
sciences by Anthony Downs,236 posits that “when the expected benefits of
information are small . . . people buy little information.”237 As an active and
deliberate form of ignorance, rational patient ignorance will, accordingly,
deny that a choice situation requiring rational engagement on the merits and
triggering a need for information gathering even exists. Rational ignorance
prescribes the decisional and tactical default that the “same procedure as last
time” (i.e., not affirmatively deciding or even investigating anything) is
sufficient absent clear new evidence to the contrary. Rational ignorance,
therefore, shuts down any inquiry into the evidence presented by the choice
situation so that, in principle, “clear new evidence to the contrary” never
reaches the decision-maker’s unobstructed awareness.238 Accordingly, the
rationally-ignorant patient embraces whatever is offered as the default (in
June’s example, even “urgently” offered by Dr. Savoy) and will actively
refrain from ever (i) becoming genuinely (partially) informed with regard to
the original choice situation, (ii) genuinely monitoring (at least, not
routinely) the performance of her default choice vis-à-vis expected utility,
and, thus, (iii) becoming genuinely informed with regard to any subsequent
choice situation(s) that would allow her to revise and perhaps improve the
performance of her original default choice. Yesterday’s default decision to
choose rational apathy over any and all other decisional courses of action
will, ideally, never have to be monitored or revised. Rational patient
ignorance is, therefore, the deliberate non-generation of plausible badoutcome probabilities and expectations.239 In effect, it is the convenient
denial of statistically possible, but personally non-preferred rival futures.240

behavior for purposes of maximizing outcome utility. In other words, rational patient apathy
is never efficient all of the time on a per-decision basis and is always inefficient on an
aggregated-decision basis.
236 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 244–46, 266–71(1957). See,
e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Rational Ignorance in Politics, Economics and Law, 1 J. DES
ÉCONOMISTES ET DES ÉTUDES HUMAINES 25, 25 (1990).
237 Bryan Caplan, Rational Ignorance Versus Rational Irrationality, 54 KYKLOS 3, 3 (2001).
Cf. Zeckhauser, supra note 97, at xxi–xxii (“Ignorance arises in a situation where some
potential states of the world cannot be identified.”).
238 As a result, the choice situation and its merits, at best, remain “hovering on the fringes
of . . . consciousness.” SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 34.
239 The rationally-ignorant decision-maker selectively decides to look the other way. Even as
learned behavior, conducted on auto-pilot and reflexively, it requires the decision-maker to
take active evasive measures in order to avoid fuller confrontation with the merits of the
choice situation.
240 Cf. C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, PARKINSON’S LAW OR THE PURSUIT OF PROGRESS 96 (1958)
(“To travel hopefully is better than to arrive.”); Carol Blue, Afterword, in CHRISTOPHER
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In the collective-efficiency dimension—constituting the largest
possible,241 “latent group”242 of patient-decisionmakers—rational apathy
theory models and predicts that the benefits of rationally non-apathetic
patients (or activist patients)243 will create social benefits (i.e., collective/
public goods) for all patients, including all passivist patients,244 in terms of
incrementally yet globally optimizing the provision of medical care. In other
words, when assuming that (i) activist patients challenge and improve the
decision-support performance of medical providers generally, (ii) those
providers are long-term repeat players, and (iii) they train next-generation
providers based on their experience and improved decisional competence,
activist patients will, through their rationally non-apathetic individual
decision-making, generate positive spillover effects (or positive
externalities) for complex medical and end-of-life care globally—namely,
by improving care on a per-patient level and across all present and future
patients.245 Only activist patients, however, will bear the private costs246 of
this generation of social benefits.247 Therefore, since these “benefits are nonexcludable group goods, most [patients]248 will see free-riding as the best
HITCHENS, MORTALITY 95, 103–04 (2012) (“When he was admitted to the hospital for the last
time, we thought it would be for a brief stay . . . The end was unexpected.”).
241 Namely, all humans at the respective ends of their lives to the extent that (i) they receive
medical care prior to death and (ii) they can consent to such care.
242 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS 50–51 (2d ed. 1971). “Large groups are . . . called ‘latent’ groups because they have
a latent power or capacity for action, but that potential power can be realized or ‘mobilized’
only with the aid of ‘selective incentives.’” Id. at 51.
243 Those patients making (or attempting to make) boundedly-rational, yet more ultra-rational,
good-Bayesian personal investments in comprehending, selecting, monitoring and, therefore,
optimizing their respective medical decisions, treatments and outcomes.
244 Those patients remaining rationally apathetic to protect their prior beliefs and the metautility of their non-Bayesian updating.
245 In other words, rational apathy theory here predicts that the totality of suboptimal,
intrasystem decision-making by individual patients will translate negatively into the overall
performance and efficiency of the system (and vice versa).
246 In particular, ultimately, the cost of facing mortality and of recognizing the futility of all
end-of-life care in fending off death, and to rationally account for the certainty of their
impending death in their informed-consent decision-making.
247 Cf. Clark, supra note 68, at 779 (“Whenever shareholders of a publicly held company vote
upon matters affecting the corporation, they engage in a collective action that suffers from
many systemic difficulties. Such difficulties include ‘rational apathy’ of shareholders, the
temptation of individual shareholders to take a ‘free ride,’ and unfairness to certain
shareholders even where collective action is successful . . . . Often the aggregate cost to
shareholders of informing themselves of potential corporate actions, independently assessing
the wisdom of such actions, and casting their votes will greatly exceed the expected or actual
benefits garnered from informed voting.”).
248 Who are already heavily disinclined to reverse their rational-apathy defaults in order to
avoid private bads, namely, costly activist, yet, ultimately inefficient decision-making,
particularly, at the end of life (i.e., with no or not much difference to the outcome, namely
death).

NOAH & REICH-GRAEFE (DO NOT DELETE)

3/11/2019 10:45 AM

604

[Vol. 49:535

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

strategic behaviour.”249 “By doing so, [passivist patients] can reap all of the
benefits of [more activist] decision [behavior] without sharing in any of the
costs.”250 In the collective realm, rational apathy theory therefore also
models and predicts that “no collective action [will] be taken, and everyone
[will] lose the chance of reaping [any] benefits”251 from the spillover effects
of more ultra-rational, good-Bayesian end-of-life decisional behavior.252
Accordingly, passivist patients, preferring to maximize short-term utility,
can be expected to default even further towards suboptimal but
“satisficing”253 rational apathy given that passivists regard the returns that
accrue from costly activist decisional investment in the collective realm as
the generation of team-production assets254 and public goods.255 In their
view, those returns can never be specifically identified and paired only with
their individual (more activist) investment, (cheaply) separated from the
benefits that will accrue to all other patients (and the system as a whole)256
and, therefore, made to exclusively benefit only their own decisional
investment and private wealth-generation.257 Accordingly, rational apathy
inevitably inhibits collective decisional systematicity as well as any future
preferences for systematic decision-making.
As a result, rational patient apathy, even when efficient (some of the
time) on an individual-patient basis, is never costless (or efficient) for society
as a whole. In the collective realm, rational patient apathy practiced by
249

Bolodeoku, supra note 229, at 110.
Jonathan J. Katz, Barbarians at the Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to Acquire Low Cost
Corporate Influence and Its Effect on Shareholder Apathy, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1483, 1491
(2006).
251 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 392 (1986).
252 In other words, passivists would only become more activist if they were to “be
compensated for the risk of engaging in such behavior”; see Clark, supra note 68, at 779, 882.
253 Simon, supra note 187, at 136.
254 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–81, 794–95 (1972) (describing team
production and intrafirm competition as characteristics of specific investment).
255 See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387 (1954) (describing public, i.e., “collective consumption goods” as those “which all
enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no
subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good”).
256 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 250, at 1490–91 (“The division of benefits problem stands for
the proposition that voters in the corporate context will reap only a small percentage of the
benefit of their vote to influence the corporation.”). Arguably, in many situations there is no
percentage of benefit since their individual vote does not influence the outcome at all (i.e.,
without counting their vote, the majority-vote outcome is still identical in result). See, e.g.,
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 395 (stating that “[s]hareholders are apathetic in
the best of times because it is so unlikely that their votes would make a difference”); id. at
397 (“No shareholder has the right incentives to participate in governance, because none could
influence the outcome of the election.”).
257 In other words, the collective goods generated by the activists cannot be manipulated into
private goods that only accrue to the activists’ welfare.
250
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passivist patients and physicians wrongly assumes “that if our actions are
individually blameless, then the sum of our actions will be good for
society.”258 Accordingly, when aggregating the modelling and prediction of
rational apathy theory in both its individual and collective patient
dimensions, rationally-apathetic patients and physicians incentivize a health
care system to feature the following trends (as negative spillover effects of
their suboptimal complex medical and end-of-life decisional behavior):
1. to further orient the provision of medical care towards
unmitigated overutilization of care that may be either
medically inappropriate, or contrary to patient wishes if
better informed, or both;
2. to further increase the complexity and transaction costs of
future activist-patient investments in rationally optimal
health care decision-making;
3. to further amplify the transaction-cost-avoiding value of
rational apathy and the decisional efficiency of rational
ignorance in an autopoietic manner;
4. to reinforce the isolation and atomistic competition259
prevalent in the market for rational-patient decisionmaking (often under the guise of patient autonomy) for
purposes of inhibiting the formation of patient coalitions
258

Matthew Stewart, The Birth of a New American Aristocracy, ATLANTIC, June 2018, at 48,
53. Cf. Katz, supra note 250, at 1491 (“The free rider problem causes a shareholder to ‘sit
back’ and let his fellow shareholders invest the time and energy in casting ballots.”).
259 Atomistic competition prevails in “a market characterized by numerous individual actors
on both sides, all without market power.” DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (Craig Calhoun
ed., 2002). In the current context, atomistic competition means that the prevailing number of
passivist patients, through an enormous daily multitude of individual patient-physician
“transactions,” co-generate rational patient apathy (in the broad sense) and, with it, suboptimal
medical decision-making considerably below total (agency and social) costs—all without
much or any power held by individual (and more activist) patients to change these “market”
conditions. Thus, due to atomistic competition, the activist patient competes independently
(for less apathetic decision-making) and without much, if any, ability to distinguish herself
from the passivists or to offer physicians a better “product” (i.e., joint informed-consent
outcome). As a highly sporadic and irregular informed consenter, she cannot reach economies
of scale in terms of setting good-Bayesian updating as a more prevalent condition in the
marketplace for informed consent. Thus, her share of this market is so small that in practice
she cannot, by changing her decisional output to more good-Bayesian, less rationallyapathetic choice behavior, influence the market share or “income” derived from sub-optimal
medical decision-making by passivist patients. To counteract these system-wide distortions
of the atomistic competitive process on patients themselves and to incentivize “better badBayesian” medical decision-making overall, cooperation (if not, cooperatives) among activist
patients, as well as between activist patients and activist doctors, would be necessary. This
would allow activist patients to formulate and bundle their patient interests in matters of
informed consent and, thus, as collective “buyers” of informed consent, to bring rational
patient apathy into conformity with actual supply- and demand-side preferences for informed
consent.
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and the collective-activist participation of patients in a
more global, patient-oriented optimization of health care
(decisional) systems;260 and
5. to further aggravate, rather than mitigate, the average
vertical agency costs261 and horizontal social costs262
generated within the physician-patient relationship,
especially in complex medical and end-of-life care.
In other words, the aggregate result of this cascade of effects of rational
patient apathy perpetuates a race to the bottom with respect to making “best”
choices for therapeutic and end-of-life care of seriously ill patients. The
vicious cycle of rational apathy and rational ignorance—coupled with the
various internal and external incentives that physicians have to minimize and
avoid robust, time-consuming decisional support as to treatment options,
individual patient preferences and the potential benefits of less care—will be
difficult to disrupt and to partially reverse for those individual patients and
physicians with activist decisional preferences.
IV. PRACTICAL AND LEGAL EFFECTS
The practical and legal effects of rational patient and physician apathy,
fully-aggregated, on the experience of health care and informed consent for
seriously ill and terminally ill patients are both insidious in process and
deleterious in result. Together, they operate as a massive obstacle to activist
patient and physician participation in and improvement to the delivery of
complex medical care and its system-wide decisional governance.263
A. Practical Effects: The Death of Rational Patient Apathy
In each of its four dimensions,264 rational patient apathy reinforces four
fundamental fallacies and majoritarian beliefs shared among large parts of
U.S. end-of-life care stakeholders (patients, doctors, hospitals, insurers,
long-term care facilities, etc.)—namely:
1. the fallacy that, on an individual-patient basis, optimal
medical treatment is, or (with sufficient effort and evidence
base) should be, identifiable and therefore that optimal
medical decision-making is possible in absolute terms

260

The collective-action problem for patients, in particular, end-of-life patients makes it hard,
if not impossible, for patients to comprehend, select and monitor the quality of their care
specifically, and the quality of their overall health care access globally.
261 I.e., as between patient-beneficiary-principal and physician-fiduciary-agent.
262 I.e., as among all patients.
263 Cf. Katz, supra note 250, at 1492.
264 See supra notes 230–232 and accompanying text.
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through prospective knowledge since outcomes are
sufficiently predictable;265
2. the fallacy that, on an individual-patient basis, optimal
medical treatment is, or (with sufficient effort and evidence
base) should be, verifiable and therefore that optimal
medical decision-making can be validated in absolute terms
through retrospective knowledge since outcomes are
sufficiently ascertainable;266
3. the fallacy that medical decision-making (informed or
otherwise), on an individual-patient basis, is wholistically
optimal only when choosing prospectively-identified
optimal medical treatment;267 and
4. the fallacy that suboptimal medical decision-making
(informed or otherwise) can, on a system-wide basis, be
“nudged”268 prospectively into optimal medical treatment

265 Cf. Stiles & So, supra note 34, at 284 (discussing, as a first general assumption in the
context for health care delivery, “that for any care-giving scenario, there exists the equivalent
of a medical bull’s eye, a scientifically ideal treatment known to yield the best clinical
outcome”).
266 Id. (discussing, as a second general assumption in the context for health care delivery, “that
the treatment administered, whatever form it takes (e.g., medication, procedure or device)
causes specific outcomes [obviating] the need to consider variations in outcomes introduced
by events occurring beyond the confines of the healthcare system and leav[ing] the decisionmaker with a far more computable problem”).
267 Id. (discussing how the “analytic power gained from this [second] assumption is the ability
to model the care-giving process such that the scientifically ideal treatment yields the
optimum clinical outcome and anything other than the scientific ideal produces a suboptimal
result”). See also Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 369 (discussing how “most choice-enhancing
policies are predicated on a simple, but intuitive, model of decision-making [which] presumes
that (a) consumers have well defined expectations (i.e. they know what they want from their
medical care or health insurance), (b) they can coherently evaluate their current health care
experiences in light of these expectations and (c) if dissatisfied, will learn about alternatives
to their current circumstances”).
268 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009); NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2016); Epstein, supra note 133; Megan
S. Wright, End of Life and Autonomy: The Case for Relational Nudges in End-of-Life
Decision-Making Law and Policy, 77 MD. L. REV. 1062 (2018). At heart, nudging
inescapably counts on rational inertia (see infra note 289). Accordingly, nudging takes
advantage of and encourages rationally-apathetic decisional behavior rather than to promote
less apathetic decision-making on both an individual and a collective basis. Nudging is about
changing defaults and herding people into more “correct” decisional outcomes (with the
“correctness” of outcomes being determined by some objective, inevitably normative and,
usually, benign paternalistic standard) rather than allowing people to make decisions more
“correctly” based on their subjective preferences. “Correctness” here only means that patients
choose with more procedural rationality (i.e., as “better bad-Bayesians;” see infra note 291
and accompanying text) at their respective, personal level of decisional ability, guided by their
own values and preferences.
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decisions and outcomes—both system-wide and on an
individual-patient basis.
As a result, all medical decision-making subject to rational patient
apathy is rationally suboptimal given apathy’s deleterious effects.
Unfortunately, the end-of-life decision-making context further aggravates
this suboptimality. In general, rational patient apathy suppresses rational
awareness of mortality (and with it, Knightian uncertainty of the conditions
of one’s future) in order to make an uncertain future imaginable, expectable,
and predictable.269 It is the cognitively convenient, apathetic decision to not
decide—not at this time, maybe later, if ever—and to create an existentially
necessary illusion of a foreseeably unlimited remainder of life. At the end
of life,270 however, this meta-utility abruptly ceases.271 And because of its
insidious nature, the meta-utility of rational apathy ceases without
forewarning. Now, there is suddenly and unexpectedly little quantity and
livable quality of future left. Now, mortality becomes virtually impossible
to suppress rationally via decisional apathy. “Later, if ever” morphs
“forever” into “now, or never.” In other words, the meta-utility of rational
patient apathy as an “affect meta-heuristic”272 is what expires and “dies” first
269 Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 66 (“[Modern humans’] capacity to strategize, to
make decisions, to design and to plan based on an imagined future represented by words and
symbols, is something no other creature on earth was then, or is now, able to do.”). The
imagination of one’s personal future, therefore, requires awareness of a different future than
may be preferred, including, a non-future for the one doing the imagining.
270 “End of life” can mean different things in different contexts. Here, we use it to refer to
that point where the patient understands that she will eventually die from her disease no matter
what additional medical interventions she accepts in the meantime.
271 Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 420 (“Because of the easy availability
of the exit option through the stock market, the rational strategy for dissatisfied shareholders
in most cases, given the collective action problem, is to disinvest rather than incur costs in
attempting to bring about change through the voting process.”), with Arthur R. Pinto,
Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in American Corporations, 46
AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 326 (1998) (pointing out that “shareholders in publicly traded
corporations are viewed as passive with a preference to exit by selling rather than using their
voice to challenge management”). Passivist patients cannot exit and rectify their prior
investment in bad-Bayesian decision-making. Similarly, they have not practiced earlier the
use of their voice to challenge their own bad-Bayesian life management for purposes of “better
bad-Bayesian” decision-making and control. Now that their investment is sunk, i.e.,
irretrievable, in absolute terms, their rationally-apathetic/ignorant investment horizon arrives
at its inevitable and final end point. While Easterbrook and Fischel find it “difficult to imagine
a more effective exit option than the market in shares,” passivist patients find it difficult to
imagine a less effective exit option than the death that is staring them into the face.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 420 n.70.
272 Whereas an “affect heuristic” (McCaul et al., supra note 172, at S107) constitutes a
“decision-making strategy that bases decisions on the rapidly experienced good and bad
feelings attached to decision alternatives” (Slovic et al., supra note 29), i.e., in terms of
substantive, on-the-merits rationality, rational patient apathy is what we call an “affect metaheuristic” in that it is a decision-making strategy that bases and reiterates substantive nondecision on the rapidly experienced bad feeling of engaging in the procedurally-rational
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at the end of life (assuming a patient like June with, at least, some sentient
awareness of her situation). Like overall human mortality, this eventual
termination of rational patient apathy is logically predictable because it is
always certain.273
Since apathy no longer “buys” the patient anything274 in terms of a
long-term future outlook at the end of life (and therefore, is no longer
minimally rational),275 all of the patient’s earlier, life-long utility “purchases”
via the “currency” of rational apathy also, retrospectively, become suspect
as to their true overall value.276 The added burden of this suspicion may, in
general, make dying even more difficult from an emotional and cognitiveload perspective. As brutal as it may sound, we would expect and posit that
those more activist patients who can look back over their lives and can
recognize and abandon their prior apathetic decision-making (not only with
regard to health care but also other major life decisions) and become more
ultra-rational with their choice behavior going forward, even for the bit of
time left at the end of their respective lives, will be “better off” as they
decision alternative of more ultra-rational, good-Bayesian updating (and of the resultant loss
of apathetic meta-utility).
273 End-of-life patients can, of course, pretend to remain outwardly apathetic and ignorant.
We posit, however, that in an at least minimally-rational sphere of decisional awareness, timor
mortis will always “pierce through” any such pretense. Thus, no further utility derives from
the prior belief that rational apathy pays better. Accordingly, any continued bad-Bayesian
updating of this prior belief is now perfectly-irrational calculative behavior.
274 If rational apathy is part of the human condition and can be regarded as either (i) a terror
management strategy or (ii) an “adaptive toolbox” coping-with-uncertainty strategy, it is a
terribly inefficient strategy in either case: in any life-long “battle” of apathy versus timor
mortis, we posit that the latter will always win. See SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 210–15
(discussing terror management theory); see also Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 37 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten
eds., 2001).
275 Rational apathy is a long-term strategic tool aimed at attaining life-long decisional utility
through the cumulative effect of small everyday decisional increments and accretions of
apathy. At the doorstep of nonexistence, any long-term strategic decision-making for one’s
own future ends.
276 In other words, we hypothesize that the certitude of a given patient’s convictions vis-à-vis
the general utility of rational apathy may be severely waning at the end of life. Indeed, the
patient might recognize her life-long, ultimately futile investment in what Bryan Caplan has
modelled as “rational irrationality”: “If the most pleasant belief for an individual differs from
the belief dictated by [more ultra-]rational expectations, agents implicitly weigh the hedonic
benefits of deviating from [more ultra-]rational expectations against the expected material
costs of self-delusion [assuming that these] kinds of errors are privately costless.” Caplan,
supra note 237, at 4. Accordingly, the end-of-life patient may now not only realize the social
inefficiency of rational patient apathy across the entire health care delivery system caused by
prior “private irrationality,” id., of both herself and similar passivist patients, but she may also
begin to question the assumed costlessness to herself of her private-irrationality decisionmaking and thus begin to painfully ascertain the compounded personal opportunity costs of
having forgone the benefits of second-best, “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior for most
of her adult life.
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prepare to die. Accordingly, we hypothesize that rational patient apathy has
to “die” first, be abandoned, or otherwise not be present at the very end of
life in order for the individual rationally-apathetic patient to “die well.”
Unfortunately, when already in extremis or close to it, good-Bayesian
decision-making constitutes an impossibly tall order—psychologically,
emotionally, and cognitively.277 Even worse, there is one’s life-long
decisional momentum against good-Bayesian decision-making. First, any
awareness of the private costs of Bayesian error—i.e., the cumulative
decisional-utility costs of rational apathy and rational ignorance practiced
over the course of an entire lifetime—is virtually non-existent in a mindset
that conveniently discounts these costs by “counting” on a continued life of
indeterminable duration (and, with it, costless course correction, if
absolutely necessary). Second, discounting does not mean that rational
apathy is indeed costless. Any exercise of decisional apathy creates more
personal preference and moral hazard for additional minimally-rational
decision-making in a future deemed open-ended and foreseeably neverending.278 When the actual future becomes tangibly scarce at the end of life,
the “intangible loss-producing propensities of the [rationally-apathetic]
individual”279 over the course of her lifetime will suddenly materialize and
reveal themselves. In this regard, we also hypothesize that—not only
system-wide but also on an individual-patient basis—the decisional-utility
cost of rational apathy and ignorance compounds over time, namely, in tiny
sediments and accretions of per-decision “apathy fees,”280 and that the
deferred payments of those apathy fees, fully compounded, will become due
on demand in a sudden “balloon payment” at the end of life. Thus, not only
does prospective meta-utility “unexpectedly” end towards the end of life, but
the total trading costs of one’s prior apathy-financed meta-utility become
“unexpectedly” due.281
277 Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 367 (“[C]hoice itself is never simple from the patient’s
perspective. The stakes are too high, making the choices fraught with anxiety. The
consequences are impossible to fully anticipate, rendering judgments at best semi-informed
guesses. And the circumstances are never really amenable: either the patients are healthy—
and therefore cannot be bothered to dwell much on medical matters—or they are sick, which
often limits their capacity to process a lot of complicated information.”).
278 Cf. Pauly, supra note 58, at 535.
279 Id. at 535 (quoting OLIVER D. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 463 (rev. ed. 1963)).
280 Each fee equals the utility cost savings generated in a single decision produced through
heuristic, rationally-apathetic behavior as compared to a single decision produced through
algorithmic, Bayesian behavior. Research suggests that even moderate attempts at the latter
decisional mode may lead to reductions in post-choice satisfaction—a type of decisional cost
saved, on a single-decision basis, through rationally-apathetic behavior. See, e.g., Timothy
D. Wilson et al., Introspecting About Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice Satisfaction, 19
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331 (1993).
281 In other words, life-long engagements in rational patient apathy are “buy-now-pay-later”
transactions gone wrong. Passivist patients “finance” the cost of ultra-rationality through
apathy (thus, every time they “finance,” they avoid the personal expense of producing by
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And we are talking existentially heavy apathy costs materializing and
revealing themselves here: assuming, at the end of life, that (i) patients have
self-awareness of prior suboptimal choices—which with the benefit of
hindsight can be recognized as suboptimal282 and therefore will lead to the
awareness of regret,283 and (ii) patients have self-awareness of suboptimal
prior decisional task completion284—which with the benefit of hindsight can
be recognized as suboptimally done and will lead to the awareness of
unfulfilled decisional potential,285 patients are now openly burdened with the
following costs:
1. the compounded opportunity cost of all rationally-apathetic
and regret-inducing choices made over their entire
cognitive lives (in terms of current awareness of once
available but now permanently lost choice opportunities—
apathy costs of earlier choice-initiation avoidance),
2. the psychological cost of facing an absolute bar to complete
all earlier decisional tasks that were accomplished
suboptimally (in terms of current decisional impotence
notwithstanding current awareness of what the better
choices would have been—apathy costs of earlier choiceratification avoidance),
3. the psychological cost of regret awareness itself as a result
of the inability to revise prior suboptimal decisions (in
terms of current disappointment with one’s own past
decisional performance—apathy costs of earlier choicemonitoring avoidance), and

themselves more ultra-rational decisional behavior and outcomes) and now, at the end of life,
they lack both “revenues” and “savings” to repay earlier financings and, at the same time,
produce “better bad-Bayesian” end-of-life choice behavior (see infra note 291 and
accompanying text)—in particular, given that they never learned to produce their own ultrarational decisional “income” and “resilience.”
282 “Suboptimal” here means not achieving “subjective ultra-rationality”—that is, the
maximum of “better bad-Bayesian” choice (see infra note 291 and accompanying text) at the
maximum of a given human’s current rational capabilities at the respective time(s) of her
choice.
283 See generally David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30
OPERATIONS RES. 961 (1982); Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb, Regret in Cancer-Related
Decisions, 24(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. S29 (Supp. 2005); Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., Eliciting
Regret Improves Decision Making at the End of Life, 68 EUR. J. CANCER 27 (2016);
Athanasios Tsalatsanis et al., Extensions to Regret-Based Decision Curve Analysis: An
Application to Hospice Referral for Terminal Patients, 11 BMC MED. INFORMATICS &
DECISION MAKING 77 (2011).
284 The task here being the ratification, implementation and completion of “better badBayesian” choice (see infra note 291 and accompanying text) at the maximum of their current
rational abilities at the respective time(s) of choice.
285 I.e., awareness of lost-opportunity cost.
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4. the psychological cost of completing one outstanding and
specific decisional task which is both unwanted and
unreceptive to rationally-apathetic behavior (in terms of
attempting, through a few remaining, time-sensitive
choices, to “die well”—apathy costs of earlier better-badchoice-rehearsal avoidance).286
In other words, all of the dying patient’s earlier-life apathy utility in terms of
“hedonic tax”287 avoidance and “regret avoidance”288 comes to an abrupt and
complete end in end-of-life decision-making. Fully aggregated, we therefore
also posit that there is no such thing as “rational inertia.”289 Eventually,
every human life runs out of time. Accordingly, decisional inertia—as the
meta-utility and sum total of all rationally-apathetic and rationally-ignorant
choice behavior accruing over one’s entire decisional lifetime—is never
costless, nor optimally cost-reducing, nor even minimally-rational in the
long-term view of human life. At the end, the “meta-utility balance” of costs
and benefits of decisional inertia is always a negative sum. Decisional
intuition will always evaporate into thin air as any remaining time for
decisional systematicity rapidly disappears.
As with every human endeavor and skill, there seems to be at least one
clear solution for making better choices: practice makes perfect.290 Good
decisions in dying are practiced and modelled by good decisions in living.
Patients, before becoming patients, while still in good health, should work to
robustly develop, through life-long practice, two fundamental qualities of
their complex medical and non-medical decision-making:
1. the quality of “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior—
i.e., patients should develop good habits of more ultra286

See also infra notes 348–349 and accompanying text. The costs under 1. through 4. can
also be aggregated into the apathy cost of decisional-systematicity avoidance.
287 Bobadilla-Suarez et al., supra note 198, at 188.
288 Id. at 189.
289 See, e.g., Hugh H. Kim et al., Time is Money: Life Cycle Rational Inertia and Delegation
of Investment Management 1 (Pension Res. Council, Working Paper No. WP2013-33, 2013)
(describing “[i]ndividuals’ tendency to maintain their [financial] portfolio allocations for long
periods of time [as] investor inertia” and demonstrating that by “incorporat[ing] time costs
associated with investment management . . . such inertia can be consistent with optimal
behavior”). Alas, if one incorporates time cost in one direction (i.e., in terms of savings of
current time not spent for purposes of short-term optimal, rationally-apathetic behavior), one
also needs to incorporate time cost in the other direction (i.e., in terms of losses of later time
spent as a result of prior rationally-apathetic behavior). We posit that the long-term cost of
time losses eventually always catches up with the short-term benefit of time savings. In short,
time always catches up as lost—it can never be saved.
290 “Good decisions come from experience. Experience comes from making bad decisions.”
Schlesinger et al., supra note 83, at 38S (quoting Mark Twain); see also REID HASTIE &
ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING 2 (2d ed. 2010) (“Choosing wisely is a learned skill,
which, like any other skill, can be improved with experience.”) (emphasis in original).
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rational and less biased choice behavior in order to
maximize their utility of decisional outcomes;291 and
2. the quality of “selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior—
i.e., patients should develop an activist decisional ability to
discriminate between choice situations warranting only
default rational apathy292 and choice situations requiring
“better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior.293
B. Legal Effects: The Infra-Marginality of Informed Consent
Informed consent law is idealistic and flawed because it assumes the
prevalence of Williamsonian ultra-rationality where (i) patients and
physicians make decisions with only bounded rationality and opportunism
291 What we call “better bad-Bayesianism” is not a normative decisional theory. It is neither
aimed at making correct decisions nor at making decisions correctly. Cf. Beach & Lipshitz,
supra note 38, at 28 (“[C]lassical decision theory does not address the question of making
correct decisions, it merely addresses the question of making decisions correctly.”). And it is
only a prescriptive decisional theory to the extent that it assumes humans to be capable of
decisional systematicity as a result of which they strive to optimize the value of their choices.
Accordingly, “better bad-Bayesianism” accepts a given patient’s ability to strive for a lessminimally-rational decisional process and outcome, therefore, to attempt attaining a personal
decisional optimum. This optimum will rarely, if ever, be perfect, will often be less “better
bad-Bayesian” than would be possible for similarly-situated others or even possible for the
patient herself at a different time of deciding, but the “best bad-Bayesian” choice that this
particular patient in her particular choice situation and under the particular conditions of the
overall choice architecture at the time of deciding is personally capable of.
292 Or other cognitive heuristics and biases.
293 Accordingly, what we call “selective bad-Bayesianism” applies to the threshold decision
of whether or not to engage in “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior. Thus, overall,
“selective bad-Bayesianism” is a procedural-rationality subset of “better bad-Bayesianism.”
Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 53 (“Navigating through the ups and downs of life
requires a delicate balance between self-deception and honest objectivity.”). We all, at least
intuitively, understand the prevalence and efficiency of “selective forgetfulness” in order to
avoid cognitive overload. In terms of learning, the ease of short-term memory loss (as the
default) and the difficulty of long-term memory gain (as a learned behavior, either by choice
or circumstance) are, depending on task environment and utility preferences, either a benefit
or a detriment. Thus, if rational apathy (as the default) is an autopoietic decisional behavior
aimed at the ex-post suppression of cognitive awareness and current memory of earlier choice
situations (in terms of “deciding not to decide and then forgetting” or “waiting to decide and
then not seeing”), we also must, at least intuitively, understand that, as learned behavior, we
need to exert more effort to overcome the default (short-term memory loss/rational apathy)
and opt into the exception (long-term memory gain/“better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior).
In terms of rational apathy, this opt-in behavior is, by necessity, both decisional and active—
i.e., there is no secondary passivist default overwriting and correcting the primary passivist
default of apathy in case the primary default choice would lead to the prediction of suboptimal
choice outcomes. Hence, “selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior is a probabilistic utility
judgment and, as with all decisional judgment, can be learned, regularly practiced (to avoid
loss of “selective bad-Bayesian” memory and technique) and, accordingly, optimized. Good
habits of decision-making are, in and of themselves, of immense (meta-)value and
(meta-)utility.
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as constraints, (ii) Knightian uncertainty is either absent or can be overcome
by confident calculation, (iii) cognitive heuristics and biases are
inapplicable, and (iv) “ultra-autonomy”294 prevails across a vast spectrum of
end-of-life patient populations.295 In short, informed consent law “has
substituted an ideal moral agent for a practical one.”296 Dying patients,
however, are rarely superheroes.297 Recent developments such as decisionsupport aids, shared decision-making and nudging298 may help improve the
quality of end-of-life decision-making so that it comports somewhat more
with the utopian ideal of informed consent.299 Physicians and ethicists are
now more actively advocating strategies for responding to requests for
potentially inappropriate medical care.300 These functional and legal
rationality augmentations301 and palliatives,302 can, however, only make a
small dent in rational patient apathy because of (i) the inherent limiting
effects of various types of clinical uncertainty, including Knightian
uncertainty, on an individual-patient basis, and (ii) the limitation of those
mechanisms to point-of-care improvements only (i.e., when serious illness
already has arisen and complex medical decisions have to be made).303
Although commentators have recognized that classical theories of decisionmaking do not adequately describe the realities of the process, they

294

See infra Part IV.B.1.
I.e., excluding only patients without current decisional capacity irrespective of the cause(s)
thereof.
296 Butkus, supra note 65, at 76.
297 As in all human affairs, there are notable exceptions. See, e.g., SOLOMON ET AL., supra
note 6, at vii–viii (“On a rainy, gray day in December 1973, philosopher Sam Keen, writing
for Psychology Today, trundled down the halls of a hospital in Burnaby, British Columbia, to
interview a terminally ill cancer patient who doctors said had just days to live. When Keen
entered the room, the dying man told him, with a touch of mortal irony: ‘You are catching me
in extremis. This is a test of everything I’ve written about death. And I’ve got a chance to
show how one dies . . . how one accepts his death.’ The man in the hospital bed was cultural
anthropologist Ernest Becker . . . . Ernest Becker died on March 6, 1974, at the age of fortynine.”). Becker’s magnum opus is ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (1973).
298 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 133; Wright, supra note 268.
299 See generally Noah & Feigenson, supra note 3.
300 See, e.g., Gabriel T. Bosslet et al., Responding to Requests for Potentially Inappropriate
Treatments in Intensive Care Units, 191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318,
1319–28 (2015) (recommending use of the term “potentially inappropriate” rather than
“futile” in these situations and suggesting that physicians should seek dispute resolution and,
if necessary, decline to provide the requested care).
301 Cf. Patel et al., supra note 157, at 66–68.
302 Cf. Clark, supra note 68, at 779; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 396–97.
303 Either in actuality (i.e., the patient has been diagnosed with a serious illness) or
hypothetically (i.e., the patient engages in advance planning for possible future situations of
serious illness).
295
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nevertheless assume that a “best” decision is achievable under the right
circumstances.304
Ideally, an ultra-rational patient would not only have a deep awareness
and appreciation of the impact of uncertainty on all aspects of her life
(including, but not limited to, her health and mortality), but would also have
practiced rational choice, with full awareness and appreciation of these
limiting conditions, through a multitude of different choice contexts and
iterations of similar choice situations during most of her adult life.305 In other
words, the ultra-rational patient would be good at making rationally
competent, “better bad-Bayesian” decisions.306 She would also be good at
spotting her individual inclinations towards rational apathy and, in each
instance, at making good, “selective bad-Bayesian” meta-utility judgments
between either avoiding or engaging with apathy. Furthermore, as a highlyskilled repeat player, she would fully appreciate the cognitive “bandwidth
tax” which every engagement with serious illness and the resultant
involuntary exposure to a complex health care system will bring.307 As a
result, any treatment decision would normally come with such a high burden
of calculative complexity and uncertainty that the good-Bayesian patient
would simply not be able, and so would rationally refuse, to resolve and
reduce the complexity and uncertainty at the point of care.308
Notwithstanding its idealistic conception, in the context of rational
patient apathy, informed consent law principally operates within the
individual realm (between individual doctors and patients) as a means of
avoiding litigation risk.309 In the collective realm, the superficial compliance
with the legal requirements of informed-consent process among doctors and
patients as a group has the effect of cementing suboptimal consent outcomes.
304

See, e.g., McCaul et al., supra note 172, at S106 (noting the effects of bounded rationality
and heuristics on patient decision-making but suggesting that, when decision-makers consider
the probability of various outcomes for each possible choice, it is still possible to select the
“best” option).
305 Cf. Schlesinger, supra note 28, at 380 (“[M]uch health care involves repeat business.”).
306 Cf. John Harris, Consent and End of Life Decisions, 29 J. MED. ETHICS 10, 12 (2003) (“It
is not people who are competent but decisions.”).
307 See, e.g., Ada C. Stefanescu Schmidt et al., Boundedly Rational Patients? Part 2: Health
and Patient Mistakes in a Behavioral Framework, 1 J. BEHAV. ECON. POL’Y. 17, 19–20
(2017).
308 I.e., while still at the hospital or in the doctor’s office or in any other circumstance of
temporarily reduced cognitive bandwidth. Accordingly, and unless it were a situation of dire
emergency, she would impose on herself a “cooling-off period” after which she would be able
to reflect and decide (more) ultra-rationally. Cf. id. at 21.
309 See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT (1986). In this regard, rational patient apathy has a meta-utility similar
to malpractice insurance. Insurance allows both patient and physician to minimize (if not,
avoid) complementary financial risk—thus, to “un-bear” and (mostly) forget the residual risk
of suboptimal choice. Unlike the patient, however, the physician will continue to bear
reputational risk of malpractice (litigation).
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Large numbers of passivist patients working on an iterative basis with large
numbers of passivist physicians reinforce mediocrity in complex medical
and end-of-life decision-making. Because suboptimal but superficiallyacceptable informed-consent practices usually “work” to protect (i) the
patient against rational-apathy meta-utility losses and (ii) the physician
against potential legal liability, there is no urgent incentive for the collective
of patients and health care providers to do better. Superficial compliance
with informed consent law allows the passivists to free-ride on the en banc
legal compliance of the “herd” with little to no incentive to attempt a
discussion that aims higher—namely, to a level of ultra-rational
understanding and decisional autonomy that would be achievable within the
limits of bounded rationality, residual opportunism and Knightian
uncertainty.
To be clear, we are by no means advocating the abandonment of
informed consent law or a return to the “bad old days” of physician
paternalism. At a minimum, the law still serves a hortatory function within
every physician-patient relationship. For those activist patients and
physicians who wish to optimize the quality of decision-making, informed
consent law can still provide the legal framework in which to evaluate what
information to provide and discuss.310 If informed consent law, however,
were more than just half-heartedly idealistic and utopian, it would also
prescribe an understanding that “reasonable” scope of disclosure would
mean “reasonable to a good Bayesian.” Accordingly, genuinely utopian law
would further require that competent medical decision-making, particularly
at the end of life, would be a collective, shared agency311 and responsibility
of patient and doctor312 and that it should be guided by algorithmic rather
than heuristic thinking and deciding, unaffected by either rational patient
apathy or rational physician apathy. In contrast, pursuant to the prevalence
and exploitation of rational apathy in non-utopian decision-making, actual
informed consent law, both on the books and in application, is not about
“obtaining consent or respecting [patient] autonomy [but rather about]
securing acquiescence—quite another thing.”313

310

I.e., depending on jurisdiction, what a reasonable physician would disclose or what a
reasonable patient would find material. See supra note 190.
311 See supra note 230.
312 I.e., not simply a shared responsibility for complementary decisional components (e.g.,
physician provides the information, patient ratifies the choice), but a “joint and several”
responsibility for an indivisible, team-produced outcome which would be the ultimate shared
choice and understanding between patient and physician, only memorialized in terms of an
actual informed consent.
313 Harris, supra note 306, at 12.
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1. Patient Infra-Marginality
Autonomy, in the context of informed consent, is “the value expressed
as the ability to choose and have the freedom to choose between competing
conceptions of how to live and indeed of why we do so.”314 In order to
competently choose between those rival conceptions and to single out and
consent to a single ‘best” conception on an informed basis, patient autonomy
and the law of informed consent assume that patients are what we call “ultraautonomous” decisional experts. They enjoy “freedom from [all] controlling
influences.”315
In a Coasean utopia of hyper-rationality, patients would also be “hyperautonomous” informational and decisional experts—with regard to every
one of the above competing conceptions. They would require no input from
medical experts or other forms of (informational) assistance by anyone in
making perfectly autonomous decisions. They would have absolute freedom
(and subject-matter competence) to choose because, as perfectly independent
agents, they would know everything there is to know (including all of their
future utility preferences) and would rely on no one other than themselves in
order to make a perfect choice—which, while still giving the inevitable nod
to their mortality, would pair the exact maximum of surviving with the exact
maximum of thriving available under the circumstances.
Notwithstanding its idealistic conception, the law of informed consent
rejects the utopia of hyper-autonomy. But it still erroneously embraces ultraautonomy in that it presumes that patients are not only aware of, and can
factor into their decision-making, the rationality limitations of the Knightian
world316 in order to provide informed consent, but are also always able to
autonomously factor the autonomy limitations of the real world into their
decision-making.317 It is true that humans, in general, can ultraautonomously breath and supply oxygen to their bodies because (i) air is
usually freely available; (ii) their bodies can usually process air perfectly;
and (iii) they are generally aware of both their need for air and their ability
to meet that need because they can test for both of these attributes by simply
holding their breath for a short period of time. Patients, however, unless they
are physicians and have the relevant specialty expertise, can never ultraautonomously choose and consent to complex medical treatment because (i)
knowledge is not freely available; (ii) they cannot perfectly find, filter and
process relevant knowledge by themselves; and (iii) they are generally
unaware of their need for more relevant knowledge and of their inability to
314

Id. at 10–11.
George, supra note 60, at 140.
316 See supra Figure 1.
317 For example, they would be aware of any and all “decision frames” impacting their
choices, thus, unavoidably limiting their ability to “mak[e] truly autonomous decisions in the
sense of effectuating their own preferences.” Epstein, supra note 133, at 1286.
315
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meet that need because they have no means to test for this dual lack of
awareness. Accordingly, an ultra-autonomous patient would, through
logical reasoning, “know[] one thing, that he knows nothing.”318
Again, rational patient apathy here works as a principal mechanism to
shield passivist patients’ awareness of their lack of ultra-autonomy and
decisional control. This rational-apathy shield allows for minimallyautonomous decision-making but without even the awareness that the
minimally-autonomous choice is, at best, limited to a better bad choice. As
a result, the vast majority of patients is infra-marginal to improvements in
informed consent law, particularly at the end of life, when whatever one is
consenting to is not going to be preferred and can never amount to a “best”
or even a “good” choice. Patients simply do not know—and usually do not
want to know—what they are missing. Thus, whatever we do in terms of
improving informed consent law in order to nudge and engage passivists at
the point of contact with serious illness and the health care system, it does
not matter—not even marginally. The majoritarian apathetic default set by
infra-marginal, passivist patients means that overall decisional behavior is
normally beyond the reach of any improvement in the rules. Infra-marginal
apathetic patients are excellent Bayesian updaters in terms of protecting prior
beliefs of rational apathy and its utility. Accordingly, the design and
provision of more and better decisional aids, more and better advance-care
planning tools, etc.—all aimed at improving the experience of patients as
well as the quality of clinical outcomes—only marginally increase patients’
cognitive payloads for rationally-apathetic and ignorant non-Bayesian
updating. In fact, these efforts at improvement will continue to allow
passivist patients to escape any awareness of self-deception in terms of their
imagined decisional ultra-autonomy and rationality.
To be clear, we do not in any way criticize passivist patients for their
rational apathy. All of us are passivist patients and decision-makers at least
some of the time.319 All of us “have neither the willingness nor the ability to
[rationally] manage”320 our lives all of the time. Being decisionallyapathetic is a reasonable option when well-chosen (i.e., in a “selective badBayesian” manner).321 We only here posit that patients who, irrespective of
318

See supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also Wright, supra note 268, at 1093
(discussing how patients “understand the exercise of autonomy to be relational in two distinct
dimensions: deciding with others and deciding, in part, based on others’ interests”).
319 Given that (i) Bayesian updating is always immediately (i.e., non-deferredly) costly and
often inefficient and (ii) non-Bayesian updating is often only costly on a deferred (thus, not
immediate) basis and often works well (enough), we all, over a lifetime of “experiential
learning,” have developed a “meta-preference” for non-Bayesian updating and with it, for
passivist decision-making.
320 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 397.
321 Thus, “ecologically rational.” See, e.g., Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 368.
(“A heuristic is considered ecologically rational when it functionally matches the structure of
environment.”); see also Revenson & Pranikoff, supra note 107.
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preset legal structures and choice architectures, prefer to be more activist—
cognitively, emotionally, and with a willingness to embrace uncertainty—
could have better tools for doing so, particularly at the end of life.
Accordingly, the “legal approach toward improving the efficiency of
collective [patient] action [should be] to make it cheaper for each [activist
patient] to act in an informed way.”322 At present, however, activist patients
fend for themselves. They are functionally orphaned by the scope and
practice of informed consent law.323
2. Physician Infra-Marginality
Rational physician apathy, i.e., the minimally-rational decisional
support of, and influence over, patient decision-making by individual
doctors, is similarly infra-marginal to improvements in informed consent
law. In the individual physician-patient realm, the practical application of
informed consent law is more about avoiding litigation risk than about
supporting patients in making robust, high-quality health decisions. Thus,
in the limited context of informed consent law compliance, an efficient
passivist physician can be rationally apathetic to all outcomes of patient
choice other than the reduction of litigation risk. As explained above,
“[p]hysicians are [also] imperfect agents in that they will recommend
treatment beyond the ‘patient’s optimum level’ in order to gain income.”324
In the current context, this income includes both financial gains and metautility gains. There is strong evidence of this meta-utility: “Physicians have
been shown to be creatures of habit in making medical choices, and are slow
to adopt new practices and technologies that would improve the quality of
care and in turn their patients’ health.”325 Again, to be clear, there are many
activist physicians who seek to help their patients make good choices and so
optimize care at the end of life, to the benefit of the individual patient and
the collective. And even passivist physicians no doubt care about achieving
good health outcomes. Even the best activist physician, however, will be a
bad Bayesian at least some of the time, and activist physicians will always
constitute a minority of “better bad-Bayesians” in a system skewed towards
passivist apathy.
Within the collective realm of informed consent law as lived by
patients and doctors, the baseline legal process of simply providing the
patient with required material information and asking the patient to agree or
“choose” constitutes the most competitive transaction with the lowest

322

Clark, supra note 68, at 783.
Thus, at a minimum, raising “an issue of fairness;” cf. Pinto, supra note 271, at 326. See
also Butkus, supra note 65, at 77 (“If we genuinely care for our patients, we ought to help
them reach meaningful choices, instead of fiating an empty and ill-defined autonomy.”).
324 Frank, supra note 230, at 7.
325 Id. at 8.
323
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transaction cost. Those physicians who adopt this pro forma approach to the
legal duty of informed consent are free-riding on activist physicians’ efforts
to make consent more robust. Fully aggregated, they negatively affect
patients’ overall quality of life but win the race to the bottom in terms of
physician labor-cost savings and meta-utility benefits. All of their supplyside actions are in concordance with the demand-side behavior for rational
apathy by infra-marginal passivist patients. Thus, the demand from passivist
patients and supply from passivist physicians for rational-apathy utility meet
and control the market for suboptimal end-of-life decision-making.
Finally, the limitations on physicians’ time and the impact of payment
structures play a role here. In light of the general assumption made by health
economists and health care market participants that patient “outcomes are
‘non-contractible’, that is it is impractical to pay doctors on outcome” and,
instead, that doctors paid on a fee-for-service basis should be “rewarded for
having a higher volume of patients seeking his or her services,”326 how would
we expect passivist doctors to respond to marginal legal or financial
incentives aimed at improving informed consent?327 Given that (i) the
incentive (i.e., price change) will increase physician labor; (ii) physician
labor is a scarce resource; (iii) physician labor will generally have higherpriced uses (in terms of serving other patients at higher fees for service than
spending the same physician labor on lower-fee informed-consent services);
and (iv) more physician labor spent on “better bad-Bayesianism” will
decrease the utility of rational physician apathy, the marginal cost of
physician labor will be significantly higher for “better bad-Bayesian”
informed consent labor than for bad-Bayesian informed consent labor. As a
result, the passivist default for many physicians will be to remain inframarginal, to consistently offer subpar quality on all aspects of informed
consent, and to be rewarded by “[b]ecoming a bad doctor.”328 Moreover, as
this passivist physician behavior also promotes horizontal rational patientphysician apathy, it will help turn the information-asymmetric market for
complex medical decision-making into a “market for lemons.”329

326

Id. at 10.
For example, in the form of a Medicare reimbursement rule change that allows doctors to
earn an extra fee for the service of having an advance-planning conversation with a Medicare
patient. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text (discussing this rule).
328 Szech, supra note 90, at 244.
329 Akerlof, supra note 54.
327
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
If the disease does not respond to the medicine, the explanation
lies not in flaws in the medicament but in insufficient dosage, in
want of time, in want of “commitment” to the treatment.—Frank
Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel330
Start where you are.—Pema Chödrön331
Rational patient apathy refuses to formulate concrete and realistic
patient-outcome preferences. It refuses to decide on the merits of an optimal
“pathway” between the patient’s decisional situation and her most-preferred
health outcome. Rational patient ignorance refuses to recognize that a
particular choice situation may have arisen, i.e., that choice uncertainty and
a need for evidence even exist. In combination, rational patient apathy and
ignorance refuse to recognize that anything has to be decided which may
have a bearing on a patient’s outcome preferences and their attendant
probabilities—other than, by reiterative default, to “decide not to decide.”
As a result, and assuming that we want to improve both patient experiences
within the informed-consent system and wholistic clinical outcomes for
patients based on better informed-consent practice, we need to develop
concrete, intervening methods and practices that educate patients and
physicians to bypass the non-outcome centeredness that rational patient
apathy promotes.
This reform process should include what we call “non-utopian practical
pathways” aimed at developing viable incentives and solutions for improved
choice behavior at the end of life. Put simply, we have to design meaningful
ways for current and future patients to learn to actively participate in their
complex medical treatment decisions.332 As mentioned above,333 the focus
here is to develop no-nonsense, cost-effective and otherwise sufficiently
“appealing” avenues to support and nurture “better bad-Bayesian” and
“selective bad-Bayesian” choice behavior—both on a per-patient/perphysician basis and systemically. In the individual realm, the objective is to
move beyond the atomistic competition334 faced by two groups of
330

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 229, at 396.
PEMA CHÖDRÖN, START WHERE YOU ARE—A GUIDE TO COMPASSIONATE LIVING (2001).
332 In other words, if rationally-apathetic indifference towards informed consent is attributable
to a lack of meaningful ways for patients to participate more actively in their complex medical
treatment decisions, it is a self-reinforcing frustration given the relative powerlessness
encountered in end-of-life decision-making. This frustration could be somewhat overcome if
patients believed and understood that their decisions, passive or active, will inevitably have
some direct effect on, and correlation with, treatment outcomes and the generation of
individual and collective welfare benefits.
333 See supra notes 292–293 and accompanying text.
334 See supra note 259.
331
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participants in the “market for rational apathy:” (i) patients and doctors who
are already activist-inclined; and (ii) passivist patients and doctors who are
at least minimally inclined to question the one-size-fits-all meta-utility of
their respective rational-apathy defenses. In other words, we are realists who
do not presume that even a majority of passivist patients and physicians
would want to become more rationally activist. We also fully acknowledge
that a large majority of complex medical decisions at the end of life can never
be made in a good-Bayesian, ultra-rational manner. Rather, in the individual
realm, practical pathways should be designed to provide opportunities to all
end-of-life patients—which most of us will eventually become—to be less
bad-Bayesian in their decision-making some of the time. Accordingly, the
teleological design of pathways should not be remedial and normativistic—
i.e., in terms of busting or solving rational patient apathy and returning or
nudging patient decision-making to where it should be in the first place.335
As we hope our discussion has made clear, rational patient apathy and
ignorance are both “rational” in that they serve valid, efficient and important
private and public goals336—but never indiscriminately across the entire
board of all possible choice behavior, never all of the time, and certainly
rarely, if ever,337 at the end of life. As a result, the design of individual
pathways should be supportive and, at most, prescriptive. The design should
provide enabling mechanisms and structures aimed at helping interested
patients and physicians to improve their individual choice behavior.338
In the collective realm of patients and medical providers, similar
enabling mechanisms and structures should support the totality of their
choice behavior. In other words, here we should try to bring patients and
physicians together—ideally, outside of their actual point-of-care
interactions—in order to collaboratively improve their team-produced339
choice behavior at the end of life. The objective here is to move beyond the
rational-apathy-inducing free-rider problem340 of latent-group patientdecisionmakers and physician-decisionmakers. Each of these two large
groups has “latent power or capacity for action, but that potential power can

335 See, e.g., Benjamin Djulbegovic et al., Rational Decision Making in Medicine:
Implications for Overuse and Underuse, 24 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 655, 656 (2018)
(discussing differences between descriptive, normative and prescriptive theories of
normativity).
336 In addition, we would also claim that humans are unable to ever entirely transcend the
rational-apathy boundary shown in Figure 1, and, thus, to transfer their complex medical
decision-making completely from a bad-Bayesian into a good-Bayesian choice architecture.
Hence, our focus on “better bad-Bayesian” choice behavior.
337 Particularly, for the reasons discussed in Part IV.A supra.
338 Cf. Pauly, supra note 58, at 537 (“No single . . . policy is ‘best’ or ‘most efficient’ for a
whole population of diverse tastes.”).
339 See supra note 312.
340 See supra notes 242–251 and accompanying text.
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be realized or ‘mobilized’ only with the aid of ‘selective incentives.’”341 In
addition, the latent group of physician-decisionmakers must largely overlap
with the latent group of patient-decisionmakers given that most physicians
will also become end-of-life patients at some time. This presents an
opportunity to capitalize on the concordance342 that already functionally
exists between patients and physicians as part of their joint decision-making
as well as on the empathy-based concordance that should accrue from the
fact that physicians are also future patients.343 Therefore, in the collective
realm, we should attempt to design pathways to move far beyond the
standard response for improving or remedying the quality of complex
medical decision-making such as calls to improve medical training of
physicians for better point-of-care patient interaction.344
Instead, we should consider two very different changes: first, because
the race to the bottom is produced through the joint agency of physicians and
patients, practical pathways should attempt to selectively slow down and
possibly reverse the race by bridging the relational distance that commonly
exists between patient and physician cohorts. The practical implications of
rational patient apathy and its effects on the delivery of health care for
seriously ill and dying patients require not only education of the
stakeholders, but also ways for patients and physicians to jointly and
systematically disrupt some of their co-generated rational apathy and its
consequent effects. These efforts can realistically focus only on those
physicians and patients (in our opinion, a minority of both populations) who
are open to change and not already rationally apathetic towards rational
apathy. Accordingly, we are fully aware that these “concordance”
approaches based on commonality, affinity and joint responsibility will at
best appeal to only some patients and doctors some of the time.
Second, because most of the race to the bottom is the result of only
structurally-limited point-of-care engagements between patients and
physicians, namely, where a diagnosis of serious illness triggers complex
choices for wholistically optimal health care delivery, collective pathways
should provide supports for complex medical decision-making well before
end-of-life points of care. In other words, we believe that, collectively,
341

OLSON, supra note 242, at 51.
See, e.g., Schmidt et al., supra note 307, at 20 (discussing “a concordance between frame
of mind of the physician and patient”); see also Harris, supra note 306, at 11 (“Informed
consent is a dimension of respect for persons in that it is through consenting to things that
affect us that we make those things consistent with our own values. When we consent to what
others propose we make their ends and objectives part of our own plans . . . .”).
343 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing physicians’ preferences respecting
their own end-of-life care).
344 For a critical assessment of those standard calls, see, for example, Hall, supra note 69, at
1135–36 (“In the inner sanctum of the treatment relationship, the concern is that trust may be
too high, not too low, creating impossible demands on physicians and institutions to meet
such unrealistic expectations.”).
342
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patients cannot wait until a diagnosis of serious illness “eats up” even more
bandwidth than they will normally have and be willing to commit in order to
critically engage with rational patient apathy and “better bad-Bayesian”
updating. Optimizing end-of-life decision-making needs to be practiced well
before the crisis eventually occurs, namely much earlier in life and much
more pervasively.345 As a result, the design of collective pathways should
aim to increase both awareness and practice of better choice behavior,
including in end-of-life decision-making. Being realists, we acknowledge
that practical pathways must be feasible and effective notwithstanding the
large burden of external pressures on physicians (such as fear about liability,
payment-system incentives to provide more than necessary care, and the
broader challenges of the complex, multi-institutional payor/provider system
of health care finance and delivery in the United States) which will always
limit their potential efficacy.
Finally, we acknowledge that less-apathetic, more ultra-rational
decision-making, to the extent that it is feasible in a given choice situation,
always remains unalterably constrained by Knightian uncertainty, bounded
rationality and opportunism.346 The value of transcending the rationalapathy boundary in a single choice “transaction” may be minimal-tononexistent in terms of concrete benefits (i.e., marginal costs of badBayesian decision-making compared to those of “better bad-Bayesian”
decision-making on a per-choice basis).347 We suggest, however, that (i)
similar to the meta-utility of rational patient apathy, “better bad-Bayesian”
decision-making, practiced over the long-term, also offers compounding
meta-utility returns—but in terms of more competent and confident decision345

Cf. SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 6, at 7 (“And here’s the really tragic part of our condition:
only we humans, due to our enlarged and sophisticated neocortex, can experience [the] terror
[of feeling mortally threatened] in the absence of looming danger.”) (emphasis in original);
id. at 10 (“Socrates defined the task of philosophy as ‘learning how to die.’”). For a perhaps
mundane but certainly outside-of-the-box practical “tool” to promote this practice, see, for
example, Bianca Bosker, The App That Reminds You You’re Going to Die, ATLANTIC
(Jan./Feb.
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/when-deathpings/546587/ (describing an App called “WeCroak” which sends five daily reminders, at
random times, that users of the app are mortal, based on a Bhutanese folk saying that “to be a
truly happy person, one must contemplate death five times daily”).
346 See supra Figure 1.
347 Particularly, given the existence of uncertainties that cannot be quantified probabilistically.
See, e.g., ITZHAK GILBOA, THEORY OF DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 130–31 (2009) (“The
main difficulty with . . . the entire Bayesian approach is, in my mind, the following: for many
problems of interest, there is no sufficient information based on which one can define
probabilities. Referring to probabilities as subjective rather than objective is another symptom
of the problem, not a solution thereof. It is a symptom, because, were one capable of
reasoning one’s way to probabilistic assessments, one could have also convinced others of
that reasoning and result in a more objective notion of probability. Subjective probabilities
are not a solution to the problem: subjectivity . . . does not give us a reason to choose one
probability over another.”).
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making rather than decision-avoidance; and (ii) unlike the meta-utility of
rational patient apathy, this “better bad-Bayesian meta-utility” will generate
significantly better psychosocial and medical dividends over the long run
and, in particular, at the end of life. Patients and physicians who have a
preference to systematically practice more ultra-rational and wholistically
authentic decision-making, in principle, will reap significant “utility
rewards” at the end of life:
1. reduced opportunity cost as well as increased psychological
benefit—because of their past choice behavior that resulted
in improved completion of important decisional tasks and
their current awareness thereof;
2. reduced psychological cost—because of their past ability to
avoid regret through more competent decision-making
generally348—as well as further increased psychological
benefit—because of their current “awareness of regretavoidance;”
3. further reduced psychological cost—because, in now
attempting, through a few remaining choices, to “die well,”
they have long learned to accept and embrace limited
choice and limited autonomy; and
4. the eventual psychological benefit of dying with less fear
and being more at peace.349
Accordingly, it seems reasonable to expect that, on average, these patients
will also be more likely to refuse highly-invasive, life-prolonging
technologies at the end of life because they are more content with their earlier
decisions. They may more easily accept impending death as they look back
over their lives as decision-makers who opted to step away from rational
apathy and practiced better rational choice at key points throughout life.
The overall practical impact of rational patient and physician apathy on
informed consent law and the delivery of end-of-life care also prompts a need
for further theoretical and empirical study and testing. As examples, areas
for further research should include the following:
1. basic and applied decision research350 of rational patient
apathy in each of its four dimensions as well as in various
combinations—for example, co-individual intersections of
rational patient apathy and rational physician apathy, cocollective intersections of vertical and horizontal rational
patient-physician apathy,351 intersections of individual and
348

Frank, supra note 230, at 7.
See also supra notes 282–289 and accompanying text.
350 See, e.g., Nelson et al., supra note 230, at S3.
351 For example, the specialization and resultant fragmentation of health care service providers
and patients’ reliance on multiple medical experts as part of a “single” treatment (as over the
course of June’s treatment for Stage IV ovarian cancer) should normally bring with it a
349
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collective realms, and interdependencies among all four
realms;
2. theoretical and empirical research situating rational patient
apathy, similar to other heuristics, within “ecological
rationality”352—for example, if “selective badBayesianism” may be understood as decision-making
which adheres to “an ecological notion of rationality that is
achieved through a functional match between the heuristic
strategy and the task environment,”353 how does this
environment fundamentally change at the end of life and
what are the consequences of this change on the metautility of rational patient apathy on the one hand and the
meta-utility of “better bad-Bayesian” patient choice on the
other hand;
3. theoretical research on the presumed meta-utility of ultrarational decision-making—for example, to what extent
may a reduction of rational patient apathy have unintended
consequences for the overall system;354
4. empirical research on the role of physicians as “better badBayesian decisional intermediaries”—for example, given
that physicians have a competitive advantage as repeat
players with more experience in complex medical decisionmaking under uncertainty, qualitative research
interviewing physicians in relevant specialties (such as
oncology, cardiology, critical care medicine, and palliative
care) could provide better insight on rational patient apathy
and its implications for informed medical decision-making
as well as on how physicians would, if freed from external
pressures, envision a better informed-consent process,
including practical pathways in promoting that process;
diverse network of rational patient apathy because (i) the same patient will interact with
differently-positioned physicians in terms of rational physician apathy and (ii) those
differently-positioned physicians also have to coordinate the patient’s diagnosis and treatment
amongst themselves. Thus, in both these realms, there could be “rational apathy asymmetry,”
“rational apathy noise” and other “rational apathy distortions” observable within these
collective point-of-care interactions.
352 Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 368 (“Heuristics are adaptive tools that ignore
information to make fast and frugal decisions that are accurate and robust under conditions of
uncertainty. A heuristic is considered ecologically rational when it functionally matches the
structure of environment.”) (emphasis in original).
353 Mousavi & Gigerenzer, supra note 79, at 367.
354 Cf. DAVID COLANDER, BEYOND MICROFOUNDATIONS: POST WALRASIAN ECONOMICS 116
(1996) (“In the Walrasian conception the ultra-rational economic actor drives the system to
equilibrium and serves a useful purpose. In the Marshallian system such ultra-rational
economic actors can destroy the system by destroying the institutions that give it stability.”).
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5. “translational research”355 of patient infra-marginality and
its impact on specific reform measures within informed
consent law—for example, empirical correlation studies on
the utilization of specific decisional aids, tracking
utilization distribution between activist and passivist
physicians, and patient treatment choices;
6. theoretical institutional research on collectivized modes of
activist patient and physician organization and team
decision-making—for example, to what extent might
“activist-patient cooperatives” allow the bundling of
patient interests in matters of informed consent and, thus,
counteract the atomistic competition356 in the market for
informed consent;
7. theoretical and empirical research on the impact of rational
apathy on health care agents (what we call “rational agent
apathy”)357—for example, qualitative empirical research as
to how rational apathy affects the procedural and
substantive rationality of surrogate decision-making given
that agents frequently must decide for incapacitated
patients while under the burden of extra levels of nonclinical uncertainty;
8. theoretical and empirical studies on the intersection of
rational patient apathy, physician-patient trust and end-oflife care—for example, does a reduction of rationallyapathetic patient behavior also correlate with either
reduction or increase of physician-patient trust,
particularly, when the credence good of health care is
“buying” the patient “relatively little” at the end of life,
thus, when continued “credence” and “apathetic belief” in
355

Nelson et al., supra note 230, at S4 (“[T]ranslational research is a reciprocal process
whereby basic scientists provide applied/clinical researchers with new tools to test and
potentially use in the clinical arena, and applied/clinical researchers make observations about
patients and diseases that stimulate basic investigations.”).
356 See supra note 259.
357 As explained above, many seriously ill patients lose decisional capacity at the end of life
and so must rely on health care agents (often family members) to make decisions on their
behalf. Agents are tasked with choosing what the patient would choose if able to decide
herself. See supra notes 200–202 and accompanying text (briefly describing the common
need for surrogate decision-making when patients lose decisional capacity). All of the
arguments concerning the effects of rational patient apathy on patients similarly apply to the
health care agents of incapacitated patients. In fact, agents often labor under the additional
burden of extra levels of non-clinical uncertainty, including questions about how family
members might react to their choices, whether they are “doing the right thing” in consenting
to or declining additional care, and whether declining additional care makes them somehow
responsible for the patient’s death.
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the value and “success” of any medical interventions may
be seen as no longer warranted by (passivist) patients; and
9. applied research on physician-apology laws and the
empirical distribution of activist versus passivist
patients358—for example, foundational observational
inquiry into the question of whether physicians who wish
to apologize and patients who derive benefit from
apologies are more likely to be ultra-rational actors or
rationally-apathetic ones.
The deficiencies of informed consent law are well-documented and
understood. The phenomenon of rational patient apathy—and its dynamic,
deleterious effect on the law, application and practice of informed consent—
is neither. This Article has merely corroborated a direct behavioral link
between rational patient apathy and the deficiencies of informed consent
law.359 Without a more profound and better-researched understanding of
rational patient apathy and corresponding legal reform, informed consent
practice will continue to be static, ineffectual, and regulatorily sidetracked
by its own utopian vacuum—at tremendous and avoidable cost for all.360

358

In recent years, a number of states have enacted so-called “apology laws” which attempt
to avoid or reduce liability in malpractice litigation by rendering physician apologies for
medical error inadmissible in court. See Nicole Saitta & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr., Efficacy of a
Physician’s Words of Empathy: An Overview of State Apology Laws, 112 J. AM. OSTEOPATHIC
ASS’N 302 (2012) (explaining that apology laws “have been shown to reduce the financial
consequences of a medical malpractice lawsuit”). The rationale behind these laws is twofold: many physicians wish to apologize for errors that harm patients but are advised by risk
managers and other attorneys to remain silent and to refrain from speaking with patients and
families. At the same time, patients and families often state that their primary reason for filing
a malpractice suit is to “find out what happened” after receiving only limited information from
the relevant health care institution about the events. Research suggests that when physicians
apologize and admit fault, those receiving the apology appreciate and respect the physician’s
honesty and are more likely to settle claims or to reduce the amount of damages requested.
See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Settlement, 45 COURT REV. 90 (2009); Jonathan
R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical Practice, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447 (2000).
359 Cf. Beach & Lipshitz, supra note 38, at 28 (“[C]lassical decision theory does not address
the question of making correct decisions, it merely addresses the question of making decisions
correctly.”); McCaul et al., supra note 172, at S107 (“It is important to recognize that
normative decision models were not intended to describe how decision making actually
occurs but rather to describe how decisions ought to be made.”).
360 Cf. Djulbegovic et al., supra note 335, at 655 (stating that “suboptimal [medical] decision
making is considered a leading cause of death and is responsible for more than 80% of health
expenses”).

